Langford v. City of St. Louis
| Citation | 443 F.Supp.3d 962 |
| Decision Date | 05 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:18CV2037 HEA,4:18CV2037 HEA |
| Parties | Jessica LANGFORD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Anthony E. Rothert, Jessie M. Steffan, Omri E. Praiss, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation, St. Louis, MO, Gillian R. Wilcox, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.
Megan Kathleen G. Bruyns, Robert H. Dierker, Julian L. Bush, St. Louis City Counselor's Office, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.
This matter, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is before the Court on fully briefed cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiff Jessica Langford and defendant the City of St. Louis, Missouri (the "City").
In 2012, the City enacted a municipal ordinance entitled "Impeding and interfering with pedestrian and vehicular traffic," codified in part as Section 17.16.275 of the Revised Code of St. Louis (the "Ordinance"). The Ordinance repealed and replaced a prior City ordinance, Section 17.16.270, that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found to be unconstitutional on its face.1 On January 21, 2017, plaintiff participated in a public protest known as the "Women's March" in downtown St. Louis. She was arrested for violating the Ordinance. After the charges were dropped plaintiff filed this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, nominal and compensatory damages, and attorney fees. The complaint alleges the Ordinance violates plaintiff's free speech rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; is overbroad both as applied to her and facially (Count I); and is void for vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II).
For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to plaintiff, and it is void for vagueness. The Court will grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and deny the City's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of St. Louis County, Missouri and is a parent and teacher. She had not participated in any marches or protests prior to January 2017. On January 21, 2017, she participated in the Women's March in St. Louis that took place shortly after the inauguration of President Trump. Thousands of people assembled for the Women's March on the morning of January 21 near Union Station in downtown St. Louis. It commenced with a march east on Market Street from approximately 18th Street near Union Station to a rally at Luther Ely Smith Square near the Arch, with marchers occupying all lanes of Market Street. Various persons gave speeches at the rally. When the rally concluded most of the thousands of Women's March participants returned west on Market Street back toward the proximity of Union Station, again occupying all traffic lanes.
St. Louis police were aware in advance that the Women's March was being planned and accommodated it by closing Market Street and its cross-streets east of 18th Street. Plaintiff did not observe any cars attempting to drive down Market Street during the March. After the rally, she along with many other marchers walked back the way she had come, west on Market Street toward her car which was parked close to Union Station. Throughout the walk back to her car, people were observed in the street. No cars were observed attempting to drive on Market Street.
Shortly before noon Plaintiff was part of a group of people marching west on Market Street near the 16th Street intersection. Police officers instructed the marchers to move to the sidewalk but initially they did not comply. St. Louis bicycle officers then approached the group in the street that included plaintiff and directed them to move to the sidewalk. The parties disagree about whether the officers' command was directed specifically to Plaintiff or to the group in general. Because it does not affect the outcome, the Court will assume that the command was directed specifically to Plaintiff.
Some people near Plaintiff were shouting at the police officers but she was not shouting. Plaintiff moved close to the sidewalk, which was crowded with people, but did not step onto it. Plaintiff remained in the curb lane of Market Street where cars would normally park, as opposed to drive, if there had been any cars parked at the time. Plaintiff did not obey the police officers' command to get out of the curb lane of the street in part because she wanted to have a conversation with one of the officers next to her about how the police were being perceived by members of the community, because she thought maybe they didn't know, so she said something to Lt. Scott Boyher about comments that had been made by speakers at the Women's March rally. Plaintiff submitted a declaration signed under penalty of perjury stating that at the time, she did not intend to obstruct, impede, interfere, hinder, or delay the reasonable movement of vehicular or pedestrian traffic. Pl.'s Ex. 4.
When plaintiff did not step onto the sidewalk and instead made her statement about the rally, Lt. Boyher immediately arrested her for violating the Ordinance and failing to obey the order of a police officer. At the time of plaintiff's arrest, police were attempting to reopen Market Street to traffic. Plaintiff was in the westbound curb lane of Market Street, near 16th Street, a short distance from the sidewalk. At the time of plaintiff's arrest, there was no vehicular traffic on Market Street. Shortly after her arrest, some eastbound traffic began to travel on Market Street.
After plaintiff was arrested, she was handcuffed and taken to a police car that was in the street. The car was moved to an alley where she was taken out of the car, unhandcuffed, re-handcuffed and photographed many times by officers, ranging in number between nine and twelve, that were in the alley. The officers mocked plaintiff and told her to smile although she was crying. Plaintiff was then booked at the City Justice Center and held for approximately nine hours before she was released. The charge against plaintiff was prosecuted and was dismissed only when no officer appeared for her scheduled trial. Plaintiff experienced "a lot of anxiety about what would happen as a result of [her] arrest." Plaintiff Dep. 25:13-14.
Special Events Program Executive Ann Chance, a twelve-year City employee, was designated to testify as the City's corporate representative with respect to City policies or practices concerning the issuance of permits for protests. Ms. Chance testified that the City has "no policies for permits for protests." Chance Dep. 12:13-17. She also testified, however, that the Special Events page on the City's website states that permits are required for "Parades; Street, Run and/or Walk; Cycling Race or Ride; and Festival, Street Fairs, Outdoor Concerts; Other large public events," and that the permit process would apply to someone seeking a permit for a protest although protests are not included in the website's list of events. Id . 15:18-16:15. She testified the appropriate permit application for closing a street for a protest is a parade permit, which would be sent to the City's police, fire, and street departments for approval. Id . 24:19-25:9.
Numerous protests, demonstrations, and marches have taken place in the City without a permit since 2012, including the 2017 and 2018 Women's Marches. Chance Dep. 39:5-7; 44:13-45:16, 51:23-59:11. In fact, only one application has ever been filed with the City for a Special Event permit for a protest, the 2019 Women's March. Unlike the 2017 and 2018 Women's Marches, the 2019 March added a stage, tents, and vendors to the street march and the City issued it a festival permit. Id . 32:5-33:3.
The organizers of the 2017 Women's March communicated with Ms. Chance about the event and asked her about a permit shortly before it took place. Id . 41:21-42:17. The organizers agreed to stay on the sidewalk and obey traffic signals, but Ms. Chance realized the event appeared to be growing in size and as a result contacted the police department's Operational Planning department, which reviews and approves permit applications. Id . 38:3-24. Ms. Chance told Operational Planning, Chance Dep. 42:19-43:10. Operational Planning responded to Ms. Chance by informing her that the Chief of Police was aware of the Women's March and was "standing by and monitoring all events planned for the day" but had no further response. Id . 43:11-18. Ms. Chance then told the Women's March organizers she was "still waiting to hear from [the police] on street closings and a permit," gave them a special event permit application and street application, and other information about traffic control companies, porta-potty companies, and private security. Id . 43:19-44:10.
St. Louis Police Lieutenant Timothy Sachs testified that St. Louis streets are occasionally blocked by protest activity, but when people are marching in the street "it's illegal right away" based on "a state statute or the city ordinance violations that indicate that they're in violation of that." (Doc. 26-5 at 11-17.)2 Lt. Sachs testified the decision whether someone would be arrested for being in the street during a protest is made by the police incident commander at his or her discretion. Id . at 18-23. Sergeant Brian Rossomanno testified that while it was not necessary for police to declare an unlawful assembly when protestors are blocking streets, the practice is that ...
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