Langford v. King
| Decision Date | 31 December 1868 |
| Citation | 1 Mont. 33 |
| Parties | LANGFORD, respondent, v. KING, Treasurer of Lewis and Clarke County, appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the District Court of the Third District, Lewis and Clarke County.
LANGFORD applied to the district court of the third district on August 5, 1868, for a writ of mandate to require King, as county treasurer of Lewis and Clarke county, to accept a territorial warrant in payment of taxes due from Langford. The warrant was duly drawn and issued in favor of Green C. Smith, and presented for payment on July 17, 1867. Smith sold the warrant for a valuable consideration to Langford, who tendered it, in part payment of his taxes, to King on July 11, 1868. King refused to receive the warrant, because it was not issued in the name of Langford, according to the act approved November 19, 1867, “defining the duties of county treasurers, and the payment of county warrants.” Langford then applied for the writ of mandate, which was issued in the alternative on August 15, 1868, by the court, MUNSON, J., who made the following order in chambers:
“This case having been submitted to me for a ruling, under stipulation that the same be taken to the supreme court for final decision, without giving the subject that full consideration its importance demands, and for the purpose of raising the question for the consideration of the supreme court, I do hereby make a ruling in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and, therefore, adjudge that the defendant receive said warrant for said taxes due from the plaintiff, as in said complaint specified.”
The parties stipulated in writing that no peremptory writ of mandate should be issued until the final decision of the supreme court had been rendered.
The statutes relating to the subject of the action, and further facts, appear in the opinion.
J. H. SHOBER, District Attorney, Third District, for appellant.
The purpose and manner of issuing territorial warrants, as well as the mode, manner and order of payment of the same, are strictly within the control of the territorial legislature.
The legislature has a right to provide means for defraying the expenses of the territorial government. It must necessarily provide laws for levying and collecting taxes. Hence follows the authority to prescribe in what the taxes shall be paid, money, warrants or both.
The act approved November 19, 1867, does not impair the obligation of contracts. The contract made between the Territory, and the holder of the warrant tendered, was that he should have $10 paid by the territorial treasurer out of any money in the treasury, not otherwise appropriated. This contract is not impaired by that act. He is required to pay his taxes in money when they become due, but his right to receive the money on his warrant is not affected. One use to which the warrant might have been applied has been destroyed by the act.
The appellant properly refused to receive the warrant tendered by respondent, as it was issued to Green C. Smith, and assigned by him to respondent.
LAWRENCE & HEDGES, for respondent.
Const. U. S., art. 1, § 10. No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. If a State cannot do it, much less can a Territory. This law applies to all contracts between the State and individuals. 1 Kent's Com. 462.
All effectual remedies affecting the interests and rights of owners, existing when the contract was made, become an essential ingredient in it, and are parcel of the creditor's rights, and ought not to be disturbed. All suspension by statute of remedies, or any part thereof existing when the contract was made, is more or less impairing its obligation. tion. 1 Kent's Com. 461-2.
What is the contract contained in this warrant under the law existing at the time it was issued? It is negotiable. The indorsee has all the remedies of original payee. Section 14, page 57, and section 1, page 59, of the act of 1867, do not apply to warrants issued prior to November 1, 1867, or they are unconstitutional.
The warrant is in the form authorized by law, and is receivable for full amount of taxes payable into territorial treasury. Acts 1865, pp. 408 and 422, § 35; also, p. 528, § 16.
County treasurers are collectors of taxes and licenses due the Territory. Act 1865, p. 421, §§ 34, 35; act 1867, pp. 45, 240.
The holders of such warrants are deprived of all remedy. Act 1867, pp. 53, 57, 59.
This cause comes to this court on appeal from a judgment awarding the respondent a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding the appellant to take in payment of the Territory's proportion of a license, territorial warrant No. 458, for $10, issued July 2, 1867, to Green C. Smith.
On the 2d day of July, 1867, the following statutes of this Territory were in full force, viz.: Sections 2 and 5 of “An act to provide for the expenses of Montana Territory.” They read as follows:
Ҥ 2. That the treasurer shall pay, out of any funds in his hands applicable to such use, the amount stated as due in the auditor's warrants, only in the order in which they are drawn according to priority of date; provided that all warrants are receivable into the treasury in payment of any taxes, licenses or other dues due the Territory.
§ 5. That the warrants drawn by the auditor of this Territory on the treasurer shall be received by the sheriff or collector of the revenue in payment of taxes, fines and penalties, or other dues to the Territory, at par, and shall be received from such officer by the treasurer in settlement of revenue due from such sheriff or collector of the Territory.”
Also section 35 of “An act providing for the collection of the revenue.” That part of it which refers to territorial warrants is as follows:
“Auditors' warrants are receivable for the full amount of taxes payable into the territorial treasury.”
After the issuing of this warrant to Smith, and before the tendering of it to appellant by respondent in payment of the Territory's proportion of a license, the following statute was enacted, viz.:
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