Langford v. State

• Decision Date: 18 July 1933
• Citation: 111 Fla. 506,149 So. 570
• Parties: LANGFORD v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

149 So. 570

111 Fla. 506

LANGFORD v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

July 18, 1933

Error to Circuit Court, Walton County; A. G. Campbell, Judge.

Homer Langford was convicted of the unlawful sale of alcoholic liquor, and he brings error.

Reversed.

COUNSEL W. W. Flournoy, of De Funiak Springs, for plaintiff in error.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

In this case the defendant was convicted in the circuit court of Walton county under an indictment charging him with the unlawful sale of alcoholic liquor when he (the defendant) had theretofore pleaded guilty to the crime of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor in said county and had had imposed upon him the judgment of the court of his guilt of such crime and the sentence of the law consequent thereon.

It is contended here that the judgment should be reversed because the conviction was based upon an entrapment. Next, that it should be reversed because the court without consulting counsel peremptorily limited the time in which counsel could consume in arguing the case before the jury to not exceeding fifteen minutes to the side; that is fifteen minutes to the state and fifteen minutes to the defense. And, third, that the verdict, which was: 'We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged. So say we all. On the first count,' was insufficient.

It is contended here that because a prohibition agent, in company with a native undercover man well known to the defendant went to the home of the defendant and there offered to buy whisky from the defendant, the undercover man assuring the defendant that the prohibition agent was his (the undercover man's) brother-in-law and that he was 'all right' and that nothing would be said about the sale, and thereby gained the confidence of the defendant causing thereby the defendant to sell the two a pint of whisky, that this was an entrapment which would bar the prosecution for the offense committed.

The most recent enunciation of the law of entrapment is that contained in the opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court of the United States, Sorrells v. U S., 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 212, 77 L.Ed. 413. In that opinion the writer said: 'It is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises. Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610, 39 L.Ed. 550, 552, 15 S.Ct. 470; Goode v. United States, 159 U.S. 663, 669, 40 L.Ed. 297, 300, 16 S.Ct. 136; Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 42, 40 L.Ed. 606, 610, 16 S.Ct. 434, 480 [10 Am. Crim. Rep. 251]; Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420, 423, 40 L.Ed. 1023, 1024, 16 S.Ct. 798; Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 315, 41 L.Ed. 727, 729, 17 S.Ct. 366; Bates v. United States (C. C.) 10 F. 92, 94, note page 97; United States v. Reisenweber (C. C. A. [2d]) 288 F. 520, 526; Aultman v. United States (C. C. A. [5th]) 289 F. 251. The appropriate object of this permitted activity, frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law. A different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.'

Now, in this case, there is evidence from which the conclusion may be drawn that the purpose of the defendant to engage in the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor did not originate with the prohibition agent or with the undercover man, but that the defendant was engaged in that unlawful enterprise and the prohibition agent and the undercover man employed artifice and stratagem to catch the offender and to procure evidence upon which he might be convicted. The artifice and stratagem which they employed is not to be commended, because falsehood and deception are both immoral and wrong, regardless of the end to be attained by their use.

Quite a different case would be presented if the record disclosed that the defendant here was a law-abiding citizen and had not been and was not then engaged in the enterprise of selling intoxicating liquor, but had been persuaded by the officers of the law, and those employed to aid them, to commit an act in violation of the law which was wrong...