Langford v. Wilkins
Decision Date | 21 April 2015 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:12–cv–00111 KGB. |
Citation | 101 F.Supp.3d 809 |
Parties | Phyllis LANGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs v. Jimmy WILKINS, in his official capacity as Superintendent, and Hughes School District No. 27, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
J.F. Valley, J.F. Valley, Esq., P.A., Helena, AR, Vandell Bland, Sr., Bland Law Office, Forrest City, AR, David L. Jones, Regina Ann Young, William Stuart Jackson, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, AR, for Defendants.
Before the Court are several motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Jimmy Wilkins, in his official capacity as Superintendent, and Hughes School District No. 27 (collectively “HSD”). The HSD has filed motions for summary judgment against the claims of plaintiffs Phyllis Langford (Dkt. No. 88), Michael Manning (Dkt. No. 97), and Dovie Wolf (Dkt. No. 91). All of these plaintiffs have responded in opposition to the respective motions for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 111, 115, 113), and the HSD has replied to each of these responses (Dkt. Nos. 126, 125, 127).
The Court addresses separately the facts surrounding each plaintiff's claims below. Thereafter, the Court addresses each motion for summary judgment in turn. For the following reasons, the Court grants the HSD's motion for summary judgment against Ms. Langford (Dkt. No. 88); grants the HSD's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Manning (Dkt. No. 97); and grants the HSD's motion for summary judgment against Ms. Wolf (Dkt. No. 91).
Ms. Langford has not filed a statement of disputed facts or otherwise responded to the HSD's statement of undisputed material facts related to her claims. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the factual allegations in the moving party's statement of material facts are treated as undisputed “unless controverted by” the nonmoving party's “separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which it contends a genuine dispute exists to be tired.” U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules Ark., LR 56.1(b)-(c). The Court deems admitted all factual allegations in HSD's statement of undisputed material facts not controverted by Ms. Langford. See Robinson v. American Red Cross,753 F.3d 749, 754–55 (8th Cir.2014).
HSD hired Ms. Langford, a Caucasian woman, to the position of school counselor in July 2010. In this position, Ms. Langford provided direct counseling services to students from kindergarten through 12th grade and completed various administrative duties. Ms. Langford's 2010–2011 employment contract was set to expire on June 30, 2011. On April 11, 2011, Ms. Langford received a letter from HSD Superintendent Mr. Wilkins. This letter stated Ms. Langford's contract would not be renewed because the amount of $1,000.00 for Grade Quick would be deleted from her contract (Dkt. No. 88–2, at 1). Instead, Mr. Wilkins recommended to the school board that HSD extend to Ms. Langford a proposed new contract for employment as school counselor in the 2011–2012 school year (Id.). The letter also informed Ms. Langford that, because of the non-renewal of her 2010–2011 contract, she had the right to file a written request for a hearing with the school board within 30 days after receipt of the notice, citing Ark.Code Ann. § 6–17–1509 (Id.)
Ms. Langford received a copy of the proposed new contract from the HSD for the 2011–2012 school year on May 17, 2011; the proposed new contract purports to be between Ms. Langford and the HSD. Mr. Wilkins instructed Ms. Langford that she needed to return the proposed contract within 30 days (Dkt. No 90, ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 88–4, at 16). Ms. Langford neither signed nor returned the proposed contract for the 2011–2012 school year.
In early June 2011, Ms. Langford met with Mr. Wilkins and Julie Coveney, who was the former Federal Programs Coordinator for the HSD, to discuss plans for the following school year and what Mr. Wilkins expected from Ms. Langford. Ms. Langford and Mr. Wilkins discussed the amount of time she should be spending on guiding students, as compared to conducting administrative duties. During that meeting, Ms. Langford requested from Mr. Wilkins a classroom and secretarial support (Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 20). Mr. Wilkins replied that was not possible because the HSD did not have enough money for additional support (Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 22). Ms. Langford maintains that they also discussed her proposed contract and that she indicated to Mr. Wilkins at the early June 2011 meeting that she had not “turned in [her] contract because [she] didn't know if [she] was going to come back” (Dkt. No. 88–1, at 27).
Ms. Langford found the administrative side of her job “overwhelming” and “very stressful,” spending approximately 90% of her time preparing academic transcripts, report cards, and other administrative tasks as opposed to guidance sessions with students (Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 9). Ms. Langford testified that she was “burned out” and not sure if she wanted to return to the HSD for another school year (Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 17). Despite being employed by the HSD for only one year, Ms. Langford was already looking for positions at other school districts (Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 18). According to Ms. Langford, during the early June 2011 meeting, Mr. Wilkins stated: “if you want to come back, we welcome you back, if you don't want to come back, we understand and that will be fine” (Dkt. No. 88–1, at 32).
On June 30, 2011, Mr. Wilkins called another meeting with Ms. Langford to discuss the upcoming year. At this meeting, Ms. Langford indicated once again that she did not have enough time to complete all of her responsibilities without additional resources (Dkt. No. 90, ¶ 28). She testified in her deposition about her comments at this meeting:
In an affidavit she submits in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, Ms. Langford claims that, at this June 30, 2011, meeting, Mr. Wilkins instructed Ms. Langford to inform him or Gheric Bruce by the close of business on July 5, 2011, whether Ms. Langford intended to return to the HSD for the 2011–2012 school year (Dkt. No. 112, at 7). Ms. Langford states that she informed Mr. Bruce on the morning of July 5, 2011, that she intended to return for the new school year but that Mr. Wilkins informed her later that afternoon that the school had already hired someone else to serve as school counselor for the 2011–2012 school year. Ms. Langford contends that the HSD hired an African American male to replace her, whom she contends did not have the qualifications to perform the job (Id.at 8).
At some point on July 5, 2011, Ms. Langford received a letter from Mr. Wilkins. This letter stated: (Dkt. No. 88–4, at 35). Ms. Langford neither appealed the school's decision to hire another person for the school counselor position nor requested a hearing on the matter before the school board. Ms. Langford maintains that she did not request a hearing because she believed such a hearing would be futile (Id.at 7–8).
HSD's proposed contract between Ms. Langford and the HSD incorporated the Certified Personnel Policies of the HSD. As HSD points out, these Certified Personnel Policies state:
If a teacher who has been offered a contract fails to sign and return such contract to the superintendent within thirty (30) days after the contract is issued, then the contract shall be and void and the position shall be declared vacant. The superintendent may at his/her discretion extend this time period by a specified number of days through writtenagreement with the employee.
In her deposition, Ms. Langford testified that, in her 25 years as a teacher, she signed a contract every year except one. She indicated that the only time she did not sign a contract was when she began working as a junior high counselor for the South Mississippi County School District. She did not sign a contract for this position because the contract mislabeled her position as “Rivercrest High School counseling position” (Dkt. No. 88–1, at 11).
Ms. Langford currently works as a school counselor for the Osceola School District, where she was hired in June 2012. In her application for employment with the Osceola School District, Ms. Langford stated that she left the HSD because she had “too many grades to do” (Dkt. No. 88–1, at 52).
On November 15, 2011, Ms. Langford filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming that the HSD discharged her because of her race. The EEOC dismissed Ms. Langford's charge and mailed a notice of rights to her on January 31, 2012. Ms. Langford maintains that, although she cannot remember the exact date she received this letter, it was no sooner than February 5, 2012. Ms. Langford filed this action on May 4, 2012, alleging a “violation of [her] civil rights (racial discrimination), violations of federal due process and equal protection, the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, and breach of contract” (Dkt. No. 1, at 2).
Mr. Manning has not filed a statement of disputed facts or otherwise responded to HSD's statement of undisputed material facts related to his claims. The Court deems admitted all factual allegations in the HSD's statement of undisputed material facts not controverted by Mr. Manning. See Robinson,753 F.3d at 754–55.
In 2008, the HSD hired Mr. Manning for the position of “curriculum coordinator.” This position required Mr. Manning to have knowledge of the curriculum at HSD and to work with teachers and improve the performance of the...
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