Langforddavis v. United States, Civil Action No. 13-2921 (PGS)
| Decision Date | 30 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-2921 (PGS) |
| Parties | LARRY LANGFORDDAVIS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Petitioner, Larry Langforddavis, a federal prisoner, filed this motion to vacate, correct, or set aside his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 11.) Respondent United States of America opposes the petition. (ECF No. 13.) The Court issues the Opinion below based on the parties' written submissions and oral testimony.
On May 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his sentence. (ECF No. 1.) On May 20, 2013, the Court advised Petitioner of his rights under U.S. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 1999). (ECF No. 3.) On July 2, 2013, Petitioner advised the Court that he wished to proceed with his petition as-filed. (ECF No. 4.) Petitioner was then granted leave to, and did file, an amended petition pursuant to § 2255. (ECF No. 11.) Respondent subsequently filed an amended answer, (ECF No. 13), to which Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 14.) On December 14, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of whether Petitioner's counsel had allowed a plea offer to lapse before Petitioner went to trial. (ECF No. 26.) The following Opinion results from a consideration of the facts developed on the papers and at the evidentiary hearing.
In the evening of January 4, 2008, Petitioner celebrated Antoine Dobson's birthday at Jersey Girls Entertainment Club. Dobson—a Deputy U.S. Marshal at the time—sustained injuries during an altercation outside the club. Petitioner visited Dobson that night in the hospital, at which time Petitioner put his arm around a police officer, showed a gun secured in his ankle holster, and declared he was "on the job." Once the police officer realized Petitioner was not a corrections officer, Petitioner then disappeared before the officers could question him. In the early morning of January 19, 2008, Petitioner and Dobson had been drinking at a bar. Petitioner's girlfriend, Sakinah Franklin, called Petitioner to pick her up at Jersey Girls, where she worked and where officers were intervening in an altercation.
Langforddavis left Dobson in the care of a friend and started driving to the club. When Dobson realized that he had left his firearm in Petitioner's car, he called Petitioner, asked him to return the gun and told him not to leave the gun in the car. Petitioner proceeded to Jersey Girls and upon arriving strapped Dobson's gun to his leg and exited the car. When officers attempted to detain Petitioner, he resisted arrest. The officers arrested Petitioner and confiscated the gun, later identified as Dobson's Glock 27, a backup weapon Dobson had purchased in November 2007, but was not cleared to carry. Petitioner and Dobson were indicted, and the cases were severed. InDecember 2009, a jury found Petitioner guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).2 In July 2010, the District Court sentenced Petitioner to a maximum sentence of 115 months of imprisonment followed by a three year period of supervised release.
The Third Circuit affirmed both the conviction and the sentence, and the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari. Langforddavis v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2445 (May 21, 2012). Petitioner filed the amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on November 19, 2013. (See ECF No. 11.)
Petitioner raises the following issues for Section 2255 review in his amended petition, some of which were raised on direct appeal:
28 U.S.C. § 2255
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court articulated the test for demonstrating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. First, the petitioner must show that, considering all of the circumstances, counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688; see also Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 798 (3d Cir. 2013). This means that Petitioner must identify acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Second, Petitioner mustaffirmatively show prejudice, which is found where Id. at 694. Additionally, the Third Circuit has "reasoned that 'there can be no Sixth Amendment deprivation of effective counsel based on an attorney's failure to raise a meritless argument.'" U.S. v. Bui, 769 F.3d 831, 835 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Sanders, 165 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel failed to move for dismissal based on a violation of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. (ECF No. 11-2 at 2-8.) The Speedy Trial Act stipulates that a defendant must be brought to trial within 70 days of an initial arraignment or signing of an indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Here, the government concedes in its Answer that it did, in fact, violate Petitioner's Speedy Trial Act rights. (ECF No. 5 at 11) ("Here, the government concedes that Petitioner was not brought to trial within seventy days of his initial arraignment on October 29, 2008."). Respondent argues, however, that Petitioner failed to show how this violation prejudiced him, thus necessitating denial nonetheless. (Id.)
The two-pronged test announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland governs ineffective assistance of counsel claims at the trial level. The Court turns first to the prejudice prong of Strickland, because "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed." 466 U.S. at 670. In terms of prejudice in the arena of pre-trial motions, Petitioner must show that, "but for counsel's unprofessional errors," hisindictment would have been dismissed. Id. at 669; see also U.S. v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2005). Accepting Petitioner's allegations as true, as the Court must,3 Petitioner has not pled sufficient facts to convince the Court he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to move for dismissal.
In order to prevail on prejudice grounds, Petitioner must show that his indictment would have been dismissed with prejudice, thereby implicating the following factors: 1) seriousness of the offense; 2) the facts and circumstances of the case which led to dismissal; and 3) the impact of reprosecution on the administration of justice. See United States v. Martinez, 75 F.Supp.2d 360, 364 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988)).
First, if counsel had moved to dismiss the indictment, the district court would have looked to the seriousness of the charges. Here, violations of § 922(g) are routinely treated as "serious" under the Speedy Trial Act. See U.S. v. Strickland, No. 04-58, 2004 WL 1468992, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2004) (); U.S. v. Mcintosh, 229 F.Supp.2d 431, 435-36 (D.V.I. Oct. 30, 2002) (same); United States v. Wright, 6. F.3d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same).
Second, Petitioner has not alleged any facts that would indicate his defense was prejudiced due to delay. In fact, it appears that his counsel moved to stay the trial date so that a key witness, Mr. Dobson, would be able to testify in Petitioner's favor. (See Dkt. No. 08-779, ECF Nos. 93 & 97.) At the evidentiary hearing held on December 14, 2015, Petitioner's trial counsel testified as such. (See Tr. at 52-53.) As a result, Mr. Dobson did in fact appear and testify on Petiti...
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