Langill v. Allstate Ins. Co. of Cal.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-000176-LAB-DEB |
| Parties | EDWARD LANGILL and TRICIA LANGILL, Plaintiffs, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SEAL [DKT. 41]; (2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. 44]; AND (3) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. 43].
Plaintiffs Edward and Tricia Langill (collectively, the “Langills”) are the owners of a condominium located in Coronado, California. When their back deck was damaged by a water leak, their Homeowner's Association (“HOA”) hired a repair company to fix the damage. The HOA also hired another company to remove asbestos they discovered in the walls surrounding the deck. But when the condominium's interior was contaminated with asbestos after the removal company transported the debris through it the Langills' tenants, who were occupying the condominium at the time, filed a lawsuit against them. The Langills first hired a defense attorney to defend them, and then later tendered a claim with their insurance company, Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”). Allstate opened a claim and assumed coverage for the third-party lawsuit, but refused to pay for the Langills' pre-tender defense fees.
The Langills filed this suit against Allstate for claims related to Allstate's refusal to cover their defense costs. The parties now move for summary judgment on the Langills' claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Allstate also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages. For the reasons discussed herein, the Langills' Motion is DENIED and Allstate's Motion is GRANTED.
In 2015, the Langills purchased a condominium located at 46 Antigua Court in Coronado, California (“Property”), for which they purchased a homeowner's insurance policy (“Policy”) from Allstate. (Dkt. 1-2, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 6). The Policy states, in relevant part:
Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an occurrence, to which this policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy.
(Dkt. 43-2, Defendant's Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Def.'s JSUF”) ¶ 2).[2]It also states:
We do not cover any bodily injury which results in any matter from the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of . . . toxic chemicals, . . . toxic solids, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants. We do cover bodily injury which results from such discharge if the discharge is sudden and accidental.
Plaintiffs' Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 1). The Policy additionally provides that Allstate “will provide a defense with counsel of [its] choice” if “an insured person is sued for these damages, ” but the insured must “promptly send [Allstate] any legal papers relating to the accident.” (Def.'s JSUF ¶¶ 3-4).
In December 2016, the Langills learned of a water leak in the back of their Property, ¶¶ 2-3), and that their HOA would need to repair the ensuing damage to their back deck (Def.'s JSUF ¶ 8). This repair work began in January 2017, and the tenants who were occupying the Property, Steve and Yukari Trubow (collectively, the “Trubows”), moved out while the repairs were being performed. (Pls.' JSUF ¶ 4; Def.'s JSUF ¶ 9). In addition, the HOA hired an asbestos removal company, JJ&S Asbestos (“JJ&S”), to demolish and remove some of the surrounding stucco walls which contained asbestos fibers. (Pls.' JSUF ¶ 4). However, during this asbestos removal process, JJ&S staged its removal equipment in the interior of the Property and carried the stucco debris from the back of the Property through its interior and out the front door. (Id. ¶ 6). Later testing revealed that the interior Property had been contaminated with asbestos fibers. (Id. ¶ 5).
On January 20, 2017, after the Trubows' discovery that the interior of the Property had been contaminated with asbestos, Mr. Trubow left Mrs. Langill a voicemail regarding his concerns about the health dangers associated with any level of asbestos exposure, stating, (Id. ¶ 11). The next day, Mr. Trubow sent an email to Mrs. Langill, copying his attorney, Kenneth Gross, restating his concerns that any level of asbestos exposure is unsafe and providing links to online articles supporting these safety concerns. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14).
On January 20, 2017, the Langills called their Allstate insurance agent, Jordie Fuller, who submitted a claim on their behalf for the damage to their deck. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16). The claim was later assigned to a property claims adjustor, named Sandra Mendoza, who spoke with Mrs. Langill on January 24, 2017. (Id. ¶¶ 21- 23). In her written notes from that call, Ms. Mendoza wrote that the “rot [on the deck] has been going on long before [Mrs. Langill] purch[ased] the home in May 2015, ” and that “asbestos is definitely outside on the stucco, ” forcing “the tenant [ ] to move out” even though “he paid 6 months upfront before he moved in.” (Id. ¶ 24). Ms. Mendoza also noted that the “HOA told [the] tenant he needed to move out, ” but that Mrs. Langill “does not know what the unliveable situation is.” (Id. ¶ 24). Ms. Mendoza did not open a bodily injury claim for the Langills at the time. (Id. ¶ 25).
On February 15, 2017, Allstate denied the Langills' property damage claim based on a Policy exception relating to pre-existing, long-term deterioration to the Property. (Id. ¶ 29; Def.'s JSUF ¶ 13-14). Allstate's denial letter stated: “If you believe this claim has been wrongfully denied or rejected, in whole or part, you may contact the California Department of Insurance.” (Def.'s JSUF ¶ 15). The Langills didn't file a complaint against Allstate with the California Department of Insurance. (Id. ¶ 17).
On April 7, 2017, Mrs. Langill called her insurance agent to discuss potential claims filed by the Trubows against the Langills. (Id. ¶ 18; Pls.' JSUF ¶ 55). Mrs. Langill informed Mr. Fuller that “her attorney feels [the Langills] may get named in a suit regarding the asbestos abatement issue.” (Def.'s JSUF ¶ 18). The Langills were indeed sued by the Trubows on May 15, 2017, and later served with the complaint on May 23, 2017. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20). On July 20, 2018, the Langills informed Mr. Fuller that they were sued (“July 2018 Tender”). (Id. ¶¶ 21-28). Mr. Fuller asked them to send him a copy of the complaint, which they did. (Id. ¶ 22). Following the July 2018 Tender, Allstate opened a claim, retained defense counsel to represent the Langills, and ultimately settled the Trubow lawsuit on the Langills' behalf. (Id. ¶ 24; Pl.'s JSUF ¶ 62).
On July 1, 2019, the Langills filed a complaint against Allstate for claims of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Superior Court for the County of San Diego. (Dkt. 1-2). The Langills requested general damages, attorneys' fees and litigation costs, pre-judgment interest, and punitive damages. (Id. at 9). Allstate removed the state court action to the Southern District of California. (Dkt. 1). After engaging in discovery, the parties filed the instant motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 43, 44).
In support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Langills have filed a motion for leave to file documents under seal. (Dkt. 41).
There is a strong underlying presumption that the public will have access to any document filed with the Court. See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). The standard for sealing documents in support of briefing on a dispositive motion is high, and requires a showing that “compelling reasons” support a need for secrecy. Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006). If the request is granted, the Court's sealing order must weigh the competing interests and articulate the factual basis for its ruling without relying on hypothesis or conjecture, and the order must be narrowly tailored. Id. at 1179; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986).
The only reason the motion gives for sealing is that the protective order entered in this case requires it. (Dkt. 42 ¶ 3). But the protective order was issued pursuant to the parties' joint motion and doesn't include enough analysis to show that the high standard is met for sealing documents filed in support of briefing on a dispositive motion. Nevertheless, because the Court hasn't considered the information contained in the relevant documents for purposes of its analysis of the parties' summary judgment motions, nor has the Court relied on them in rendering its ruling, the public access concern is minimal under the circumstances. Thus, the Langills' motion to seal is GRANTED.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(a) where the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the non-moving par...
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