Langkamp v. Mayes Emergency Servs. Trust Auth., Case No. 16-CV-0676-CVE-FHM
| Decision Date | 29 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-CV-0676-CVE-FHM |
| Parties | RICK LANGKAMP and DARLA LANGKAMP, Plaintiffs, v. MAYES EMERGENCY SERVICES TRUST AUTHORITY, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MAYES COUNTY, and JOHN DOES 1-15, Board Members and Employees, Agents and Representatives of the Mayes Emergency Services Trust Authority, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
Now before the Court are defendant Board of County Commissioners of Mayes County's (Mayes BCC) motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 46) and defendant Mayes Emergency Services Trust Authority's (MESTA) motion to dismiss certain claims (Dkt. # 49).
Plaintiffs Rick Langkamp and Darla Langkamp, a married couple, filed this action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against MESTA and John Does 1-15, alleged board members and employees, agents, and representatives of MESTA. Dkt. # 2. MESTA is a public trust, organized under Oklahoma law, that provides ambulance service for Mayes County, Oklahoma. Dkt. # 43 at 1, 4. Ms. Langkamp has worked for MESTA as a secretary since 2005. Id. at 4. From 2003 until June 14, 2016, Mr. Langkamp was the executive director of MESTA. Id.
In 2014, Mr. Langkamp sued MESTA and several members of MESTA's board of trustees (MESTA Board) in the District Court of Mayes County, State of Oklahoma for defamation, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and negligence (Langkamp I). Dkt. # 13-1. On February 18, 2016, Mr. Langkamp dismissed with prejudice his claims against MESTA in Langkamp I. Dkt. # 13-3, at 1.
On March 8, 2016, MESTA held a public board meeting, during which the board elected Trent Peper as chairman of the board. Dkt. # 43, at 4. Plaintiffs allege that when Mr. Peper was previously chairman he frequently called Ms. Langkamp and other female MESTA employees "demeaning" names such as "sweetie" and "honey." Id. Plaintiffs also assert that Mr. Peper "inappropriately touched Ms. Langkamp's shoulders." Id. Ms. Langkamp spoke during the public comment portion of the board meeting in which Mr. Peper was elected chairman. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Langkamp said, "I will not be putting up with that type of pet name calling that went on the last time this person was in this position." Id. Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Langkamp told the board she had previously informed two MESTA attorneys about Mr. Peper's conduct and that nothing had changed. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs also assert that Ms. Langkamp concluded her comments by telling everyone at the meeting, "You are my witnesses and I will not be putting up with it again." Id. at 6. Plaintiffs allege that at least one Mayes BCC commissioner was present at the meeting. Id. Plaintiffs allege that after the board meeting, several board members, including Mr. Peper, and MESTA's in-house counsel met in a hallway and had a "very loud conversation" that was overheard by another MESTA employee. Id. Plaintiffs assert that one of the board members said, "If [Ms. Langkamp] thinks I'm mean now, wait until I get on the other side of the board." Id.
On June 2, 2016, Mr. Langkamp submitted an intake questionnaire to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).1 Id. at 9. On June 14, 2016, MESTA fired Mr. Langkamp. Id. at 10. On July 7, 2016, Mr. Langkamp signed his EEOC charge of discrimination, which asserted claims against MESTA for retaliation and discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA). Dkt. # 54-12. Mr. Langkamp asserts that, around July 9, 2016, he informed the EEOC that the had been terminated and wished to add that information to his charge of discrimination. Dkt. # 43, at 11. After the EEOC allegedly told him he must file a subsequent charge of discrimination, Mr. Langkamp filed a second intake questionnaire on July 26, 2016. Id.
On June 14, 2016, Mr. Langkamp brought a second suit against MESTA and several board members in the District Court of Mayes County, State of Oklahoma for claims arising out of MESTA's firing of Mr. Langkamp and the events leading up to his dismissal (Langkamp II). Dkt. # 13-4. On July 22, 2016, MESTA filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it for failure to statea claim. Dkt. # 24-1. On August 15, 2016, Mr. Langkamp filed an amended petition, alleging claims against MESTA for violation of his rights under the Oklahoma Constitution, breach of contract, and negligence. Dkt. # 13-5. On August 26, 2016, MESTA renewed its motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 24-3), which the state court granted on October 24, 2016. Dkt. # 13-6. On November 3, 2016, Mr. Langkamp moved for clarification, or alternatively for a new trial or rehearing, regarding the court's order. Dkt. # 18-4. The state court denied Mr. Langkamp's motion on November 22, 2016. Dkt. # 13-7. Mr. Langkamp received his right to sue letter from his July 7, 2016 charge of discrimination on September 19, 2016. Dkt. # 43, at 11. On October 30, 2016, he signed his second charge, which asserted claims against MESTA for retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADA. Dkt. # 54-13.
Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court on November 7, 2016. Dkt. # 2. In the original complaint, Ms. Langkamp alleged free speech retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, retaliation in violation of Title VII, and common law negligence; Mr. Langkamp alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII. Id. at 9-14. On December 28, 2016, MESTA filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 13), arguing that plaintiffs' claims against it should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On February 28, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend (Dkt. # 25), asking the Court for leave to amend their complaint so that Ms. Langkamp could assert Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims against Mayes BCC. Plaintiffs asserted that Ms. Langkamp had received her right to sue letter from the EEOC on February 15, 2017. See Dkt. # 25-1. On March 1, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion to stay (Dkt. # 26), asking the Court to stay the case until resolution of Mr. Langkamp's then-pending charge of discrimination against Mayes BCC.
On March 3, 2017, the Court entered an opinion and order (Dkt. # 31) ruling on MESTA's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' motion to amend, and plaintiffs' motion to stay. The Court granted MESTA's motion to dismiss as to Ms. Langkamp's negligence claim because she failed to state a claim under Oklahoma law, and as to Mr. Langkamp's Title VII retaliation claim because it was barred by res judicata. Id. at 8-17. The Court denied MESTA's motion to dismiss as to Ms. Langkamp's retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1983. Id. at 6-8. The Court granted plaintiffs' motion to amend, finding that Ms. Langkamp could "amend her complaint to assert discrimination and retaliation claims against [Mayes BCC]." Id. at 17-18. The Court denied plaintiffs' motion to stay because it would cause undue delay of the litigation. Id. at 18.
Ms. Langkamp filed an amended complaint (Dkt. # 32) asserting the same three claims as the original complaint and adding two claims: a Title VII retaliation claim against Mayes BCC and a claim under the Oklahoma Constitution against MESTA and Mayes BCC. Soon after the amended complaint was filed, plaintiffs filed a motion (Dkt. # 36) asking the Court to alter its opinion and order (Dkt. # 31). Plaintiffs asserted that Mr. Langkamp received a new right to sue letter from the EEOC on March 16, 20172 and asked the Court to amend its opinion and order so that Mr. Langkamp could assert Title VII and ADA claims covered by the new right to sue letter. Dkt. # 36, at 2. The Court granted the motion, but cautioned plaintiffs that they "may not alter or amend their amended complaint apart from adding claims covered by the new right to sue letter. Dkt. # 40, at 5.
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (Dkt. # 43), in which Ms. Langkamp alleges claims against MESTA under § 1983, Title VII, and the Oklahoma Constitution and against MayesBCC under Title VII and the Oklahoma Constitution. Mr. Langkamp alleges claims against Mayes BCC under the Oklahoma Constitution and against MESTA under Title VII, the ADA, § 1983, the Oklahoma Constitution, and common law negligence. Mayes BCC now moves to dismiss all claims against it, and MESTA moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under the Oklahoma Constitution and all Mr. Langkamp's claims against it. Dkt. ## 46, 49.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),3 a court must determine whether the claimant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is properly granted when a complaint provides no "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain enough "facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" and the factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citations omitted). "Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 562. Although decided within an antitrust context, Twombly "expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009). For the purpose of making the dismissal determination, a court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to a claimant. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). However, a courtneed not accept as true those...
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