Langley v. Coughlin
Citation | 715 F. Supp. 522 |
Decision Date | 08 June 1989 |
Docket Number | 83 CIV. 7172 (LBS).,No. 84 CIV. 5431 (LBS),84 CIV. 5431 (LBS) |
Parties | Carolyn LANGLEY, Alberta Succaw, Shirley Furtick, and Celeste Cleckley, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Thomas COUGHLIN, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Defendants. Corean EVANS, Plaintiff, v. Thomas COUGHLIN, N.Y.S. Department of Correctional Services, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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Koob, Magoolaghan & Salzman, New York City (Joan Magoolaghan, Elizabeth L. Koob, of counsel), for plaintiffs-Class.
Prisoners Legal Services New York City (Ruth Cassell, of counsel), for plaintiffs-intervenor.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., State of N.Y., New York City , for all defendants except Klug.
Singleton, Keegan & Spolzino, Mount Kisco, N.Y. (Robert A. Spolzino, of counsel), for defendant Robert Klug.
By Order dated January 23, 1989, this Court expanded the scope of its earlier reference to Magistrate Dolinger to "include all pretrial matters including, but not limited to, questions of class definition and certification, except that questions relating to defendants' immunity are not included in this reference." On March 31, 1989, this Court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity, 709 F.Supp. 482 (1989). On April 21, 1989, Magistrate Dolinger filed a Report and Recommendation ("Report") (Appendix A, hereto) dealing with all other matters raised by the pending motions except as noted.1 The case is now before the Court on the parties' objections to the Report.
Initially, defendants Coughlin, Lord and Duncan object that the Magistrate's Report exceeded the scope of the reference to him and that it was their understanding that his Report would be limited to class decertification and class definition issues on the grounds that all other matters dealt with by the Magistrate relate to the issue of immunity excluded from the reference. The Magistrate clearly understood and acted within the scope of the reference.
Of course, there is an intermeshing between the immunity issues and other questions in the case. But there is no significant inconsistency between the Magistrate's Report and this Court's March 31, 1989 Opinion denying the motion for summary judgment. The claims of inconsistency relate to matters that this Court left open for possible revisiting and that defendants assert the Magistrate foreclosed. These contentions lose sight of the fact that both this Court's Opinion and the Magistrate's Report are denials of summary judgment. If the factual development of the case as it evolves furnishes a good faith basis for asserting that the premises upon which those denials were predicated are not valid, e.g., if the Court (which will be the fact finder in these proceedings) concludes that plaintiffs' damage claims do not involve any constitutional rights, defendants may ask that the immunity issue be reexamined. Indeed, in such an event, the § 1983 claims would fail and only state law issues would remain. A re-examination by the Court of its role in such a controversy would be entirely appropriate.
Suffice it to say, on the record as presented at the time these motions were made, the March 31, 1989 Opinion of this Court and the April 21, 1989 Magistrate's Report are consistent, harmonious, and provide adequate ground rules for the future conduct of this vexatious litigation.
Correctional defendants assert that the Magistrate has erroneously placed the burden of proof on them on the issue of class certification. They claim that the burden should properly rest with the plaintiffs since plaintiffs are now, for the first time, asserting a new class and subclasses and a new theory for certification. We find it unnecessary to resolve this question (which the Magistrate characterized as "doubtful," Report at 60) because we are satisfied that plaintiffs would prevail on the class certification issue even if it were entirely their burden to sustain such certification de novo.
Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate's exclusion from the class of those inmates who were placed in Building 118 for purposes of protective custody rather than for disciplinary infractions. Plaintiffs urge that "Building 118" and "SHU" were used interchangeably and synonymously for many purposes in this litigation and for purposes of the monitoring pursuant to the settlement of the injunctive aspects of this case. But plaintiffs fail to address their concession that, were such inmates included, there would be need for a fourth subclass which they have never sought and for which they have no such class representative (Report, at 90). Indeed, plaintiffs still do not seek a fourth subclass: "Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court's adoption of the Magistrate's findings and recommendations accepting plaintiffs' definition of three subclasses." Plaintiffs' Response to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate at 37 (Apr. 21, 1989). We adopt the Magistrate's definition of the scope of the class, including the three subclasses, and the August 31, 1981 commencement date.2
Defendant Klug urges that the Magistrate's Report is erroneous particularly because plaintiffs have not asserted a "conditions" claim against him. But plaintiffs have asserted a "treatment" claim against Dr. Klug and we see no error in the Magistrate's reasoning and conclusion denying summary judgment to Dr. Klug.
Dr. Klug argues that plaintiffs have introduced evidence as to only eighteen of the 250 class members and that summary judgment should therefore be granted as to the remaining 232 class members. This claim misconceives the difference between a motion for summary judgment in a class action and the trial itself. We adopt the Magistrate's Report in this regard.
The parties are to take up with the Magistrate the details concerning class notice. See Report at 96, n. 48.
Correctional defendants point out (Correctional Defendants' Objections, at 19, n. 7) that N.Y.Pub.Off.Law § 17(3)(c) (McKinney 1988) was amended in 1986 to delete the clause that specifically excluded indemnification for "punitive or exemplary damages." Historical Notes to N.Y.Pub. Off.Law § 17 (McKinney 1988). The law now excludes indemnification of intentional wrongdoing, fines and penalties but does not exclude indemnification of "deliberate indifference" claims. No change in the Magistrate's Report is occasioned by this correction.
We have considered and find to be without merit the other objections raised by the parties. The Report and Recommendation is adopted.
SO ORDERED.
APPENDIX A
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This class-action prisoner lawsuit was commenced in 1984 to seek relief from certain allegedly unconstitutional conditions and practices on the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") at the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility.1 Plaintiffs allege principally that until September 19872 New York State Correction Department officials routinely placed severely mentally ill inmates on SHU and that in so doing they failed to conduct any screening of these inmates, failed to provide even marginally adequate treatment for their mental condition while they were on SHU, and failed to protect the other inmates on SHU from the conditions that resulted from the presence of these disturbed inmates — including filth, noisome odors, deafening noise, fire and smoke, and the sight and sound of prisoners engaging in such psychotic behavior as attempted suicide, self-mutilation and hallucination. According to plaintiffs, these failings reflected a violation of the jailers' obligations (a) to provide medical care for the serious medical needs of the disturbed inmates and (b) to ensure that living conditions on SHU not fall below constitutionally permissible standards for all inmates on that unit.
Following the certification of a class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) in December 1985, and the settlement of plaintiff's injunctive claims in July 1987, the parties commenced discovery concerning plaintiff's demand for compensatory and punitive damages. During the later phase of this discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits and on the basis of qualified immunity or for dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Alternatively they seek decertification of the class for purposes of any trial on damages. In addition, the New York State Office of Mental Health seeks dismissal of a cross-claim asserted against it by one of the individual defendants, Dr. Ronald Klug.
For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the motions for summary judgment or dismissal be denied except with respect to Dr. Klug's cross-claim.3 As for the class, I recommend that it be recertified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class, with appropriate notice to be provided to the putative members.
In its original form plaintiffs' complaint was not styled as a class suit, but it sought both injunctive relief and damages based upon the asserted continuing violation of the Eighth Amendment rights of SHU inmates. The complaint named as defendants Thomas Coughlin, III, the Commissioner of Correctional Services; Frank Headley, the Superintendent of Bedford Hills; Elaine Lord, the Deputy Superintendent; Dr. James Prevost, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene; Dr. Ronald J. Klug, the Unit Chief of the Mental Hygiene Unit at Bedford Hills; a Lieutenant George Duncan, who was assigned to supervise security at the Bedford Hills...
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