Langley v. Dolgencorp, LLC

• Decision Date: 13 September 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:11–cv–03324–RBH.
• Citation: 972 F.Supp.2d 804
• Parties: Stacey LANGLEY, Plaintiff, v. DOLGENCORP, LLC, d/b/a Dollar General Stores, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

972 F.Supp.2d 804

Stacey LANGLEY, Plaintiff,

v.DOLGENCORP, LLC, d/b/a Dollar General Stores, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:11–cv–03324–RBH.

United States District Court,

D. South Carolina,

Florence Division.

Sept. 13, 2013.

John Charles Ormond, Jr., Holler Dennis Corbett Ormond Plante and Garner, Columbia, SC, Lisa Poe Davis, Kelaher Connell and Connor, Surfside Beach, SC, for Plaintiff.

Christopher Near, William L. Duda, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart, Columbia, SC, for Defendant.

ORDER

R. BRYAN HARWELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Stacey Langley (“Plaintiff”) filed the above action against her former employer, Dollar General Stores (“Defendant”), alleging gender discrimination, quid pro quo sexual harassment, sexually hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e–17 (West 2003 & Supp.2010).

On November 21, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a memorandum in support. Plaintiff filed her Response on December 4, 2012, after which the case was temporarily stayed so the parties could engage in mediation. This matter is before the Court after the issuance of the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of United States Magistrate Judge Thomas E. Rogers, III.¹ In the R & R, the magistrate recommends that the Court deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's quid pro quo mixed motive claim and her hostile work environment claim and that the Court grant Defendant's Motion as to all other causes of action. Both Plaintiff and Defendant timely filed objections to the R & R.

For the following reasons, this Court adopts the R & R.

Background²

Defendant hired Plaintiff in August 2007 to work at its store in Andrews, South Carolina, and eventually promoted her to assistant store manager. For a week or two in mid-to-late 2009, Plaintiff worked at Defendant's Kingstree location with Albert Boyd, a 14–year store manager, to help get the store ready to open. Plaintiff claims that while working at the Kingstree store, Boyd made sexual comments to her on three to five occasions, including “do you want to meet me in the storeroom so I can squeeze those titties,” other references to her body parts and genitalia, and would make little moans when passing by. Plaintiff was there for only about two weeks and, because she knew she was going back to the Andrews store, she “let it go.” Upon returning to the Andrews store, both Plaintiff's store manager and district manager mentioned the possibility of Plaintiff becoming an assistant manager at the Kingstree store. Plaintiff refused, noting that Boyd was “fresh” and “nasty” and she did not feel like being hit on every day. Additionally, following her time in the Kingstree store, for the next five months or so, Boyd would frequently come into the Andrews Store and make sexually suggestive comments to Plaintiff.

Some time later Plaintiff's store manager left and Plaintiff temporarily assumed the responsibility of store manager. Defendant's district manager told Plaintiff that if she had questions about day-to-day operations, she could contact Boyd. While Boyd was assisting Plaintiff with her additional management responsibilities at the Andrews store, Boyd made further sexually suggestive comments, including telling Plaintiff that “if you give me some I can help you get the manager position.” Boyd also called one evening and further propositioned Plaintiff. During the telephone call, however, Plaintiff told Boyd that she was not going to have sex with him and hung up the telephone. From that point forward, Boyd did not say anything to Plaintiff that she considered sexual in nature, though Plaintiff claims he exhibited a bad attitude towards her.

On March 13, 2010, Boyd was chosen as the store manager for the Andrews Store. The district manager said he asked Boyd to look into payroll issues. Boyd discovered that on at least two occasions, Plaintiff had clocked in for time she did not work. The district manager verified that Plaintiff had not worked during those times, and Plaintiff herself admitted she entered time on the two occasions she did not work. Plaintiff maintained her error was just a mistake, not an intentional falsification of records. According to Plaintiff, it was not uncommon for the assistant store manager at the Andrews store to manually enter time through Defendant's time-keeping system, which allowed for time to be entered in advance. Plaintiff explained that she entered her time prior to the day in question because she had planned to work a double-shift on that day. Plaintiff claims Boyd then became manager and told Plaintiff not to work the double shift and that someone else would work it. However, neither he nor Plaintiff changed the time reflecting the double-shift that had already been entered. Plaintiff asserts that it was Boyd's responsibility to review the time entered and change it if it was not correct. Defendant ultimately decided to terminate Plaintiff.

The morning of March 25, 2010, Boyd told an employee at the Andrews store something like “[Plaintiff] was laughing now but [Boyd] had something for her later.” Boyd called Plaintiff into the Andrews store office and explained she was being terminated for falsifying time records. Plaintiff contested her termination through Defendant's internal processes and ultimately filed this lawsuit.

Standard of Review

The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to the district court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the district court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R to which specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Court is obligated to conduct a de novo review of every portion of the magistrate judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1982) (“ [D]e novo review [is] unnecessary in ... situations when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendation.”). The Court reviews only for clear error in the absence of a specific objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.2005). Furthermore, in the absence of specific objections to the R & R, this Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315;Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.1983).

Discussion

Both Plaintiff and Defendant filed objections to the magistrate's R & R. The Court will address each parties' objections in turn.³

I. Plaintiff's objections⁴

Plaintiff appears to challenge the magistrate's finding that she did not present direct evidence of discrimination. [ See Pl.'s Obj, Doc. # 65, at 4–6.] However, as she failed to do before the magistrate, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Boyd told her he would fire her or have her fired if she did not succumb to his advances. [ See R & R, Doc. # 60, at 822 n. 7.] As the magistrate explained, direct evidence requires “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the allegedly discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Serv., 181 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir.1999). “Thus, Plaintiff fails to present direct evidence that she was fired because of her response to Boyd's sexual requests.” [R & R, Doc. # 60, at 822 n. 7.]

Plaintiff also challenges the magistrate's finding that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's quid pro quo claim under the pretext analysis for Title VII cases developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). [Pl.'s Obj. Doc. # 65, at 1, 6–11.] Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was terminated for falsifying her time records on two separate occasions. Thus, the burden returns to Plaintiff to establish that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. As she did before the magistrate, Plaintiff argues that her inaccurate time entries were mistakes because she had originally planned to work different shifts but ended up not working those shifts. [ Id.] She argues that it was Boyd's responsibility to catch her mistake, and discusses how Defendant's time entry system operated. [ Id.] However, after conducting a de novo review of the R & R on this issue, the Court agrees with, and adopts, the magistrate's discussion on this issue as follows:

[Plaintiff's argument that Boyd was responsible for fixing Plaintiff's time card] is not consistent with the record.⁵ Furthermore, Plaintiff admits to the actions that lead to her termination and acknowledged that falsifying time records is specifically prohibited by [Defendant's] Employee Handbook and can subject an employee to immediate termination of employment. Plaintiff understood that keeping accurate time records was important to [Defendant]. Thus, Plaintiff fails to show that the reason given for her termination, falsification of records, was not the true reason but simply pretext. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's quid pro quo claim under the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis.

[R & R, Doc. # 60, at 824–25 (internal citation omitted).] Further, Plaintiff's objections appear to truly be an argument that her termination was based, in part, on her failure to comply with...