Langley v. F. W. Woolworth Co.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1925
• Docket Number: No. 6004.,6004.
• Citation: 131 A. 194
• Parties: LANGLEY v. F. W. WOOLWORTH CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

131 A. 194

LANGLEY

v. F. W. WOOLWORTH CO.

No. 6004.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 9, 1925.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Kent County; George W. Greene, Judge.

Action by Essie Etta Langley against the F. W. Woolworth Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled, and case remitted for entry of judgment on the verdict.

Stephen J. Casey, Patrick P. Curran, Hoyt W. Lark, and Green, Curran & Hart, all of Providence, for plaintiff.

Arthur S. Phillips, of Fall River, Mass., Edwin C. Markel, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Quinn, Kernan & Quinn, Charles H. Kernan, and Robert E. Quinn, all of Providence, for defendant.

BARROWS, J. Action for negligence. Heard on exceptions to refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant, to grant a new trial after a $7,000 verdict for plaintiff, and because of alleged error in admitting certain evidence over defendant's objection.

Defendant conducts a large five and ten cent store on Westminster, Dorrance, and Fulton streets in Providence. The are eight entrances. The floor is of wood, the store well lighted, and the aisles are 8 to 10 feet wide. Several thousand people pass in and out of the store daily, and the peak of the day's business is reached at about 4 o'clock p. m. At this hour on August 21, 1922, plaintiff, while shopping in the store, fell in front of a counter. Neither she nor any one else testified explicitly as to the cause of the fall. Defendant's assistant superintendent aided plaintiff to the rest room of the store, and later she went home unattended. Mrs. Maloney, a stranger to plaintiff, was shopping at a nearby counter, heard the bump, turned around, and saw plaintiff being assisted to her feet. She went over, picked up plaintiff's hand bag, saw some "peanuts and peanut shells, perhaps a pint," that "had all been stepped on," "all crushed as though they had been walked over," and "almost ground into the floor." Plaintiff's skirt was torn at the knee, and witness brushed therefrom some peanut shells. Mrs. Maloney also testified that, on entering the store, at a time which she definitely fixed by other circumstances as 3 o'clock, she had noticed and walked around peanuts and peanut shells at the spot where plaintiff fell. There is no evidence how the peanuts or shells came to be upon the floor. Mrs. Maloney said that after plaintiff fell she "saw they were the same peanuts," and "had been crushed"; that she plainly saw the mark where plaintiff had "slipped" among the shells.

Defendant denied the presence of peanuts on the floor at or immediately after the fall. The store was swept in the morning and at noon, and the assistant superintendent and two floorwalkers, pursuant to their duties, were at all times patrolling the aisles,' where if they saw anything on the floor they "picked it right up," or called a porter who was always at hand to do so. These witnesses denied the possibility of a pint of peanuts remaining on the floor unobserved and unpicked-up for an hour.

1. The exceptions to the admission of evidence are untenable. The answers were harmless, and, while sometimes the mere asking of improper questions may create a prejudice so great as to vitiate a verdict, in this instance the four questions alone were not prejudicial.

2. The duty of a storekeeper to an invitee or business visitor is to use reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition for the purposes of the invitation. Norton v. Hudner, 213 Mass. 257, 100 N. E. 546, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79; Ginns v. C. T. Sherer Co., 219 Mass. 18, 106 N. E. 600. The issue here argued is whether the evidence shows defendant did so, and, if not, whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care. The jury was properly charged. The presence or absence of peanuts was the vital fact in dispute at the trial. With the jury's finding buttressed by the trial court's approval, this court accepts it as settled that whole peanuts, shelled peanuts, and shells were on the floor where plaintiff fell, somewhat ground in, and that there was among them a mark on the floor where plaintiff's foot had slipped. Defendant now urges that the presence of a pint of peanuts on the floor could not constitute a dangerous condition of the premises, nor could a reasonable person possibly anticipate injury to a customer therefrom; that no proof was offered by plaintiff of the dangerous nature of the spot where the peanuts were; that the question was really if and how long a dangerous condition had existed, rather than how long the peanuts had been there. Whatever may be the merit of this claim, it is a sufficient reply that there was no request for a charge of such a nature and no exception to the charge as given. The charge did impliedly guard defendant's rights in this respect, because it twice contained a suggestion to the jury as to whether these peanuts were a dangerous substance. Counsel and court, however, all assumed that peanuts on the floor in front of a counter and likely to be walked upon by many persons in the course of an hour w

constitute a source from which a dangerous condition might arise; that if left for a sufficient length of time defendant would be charged with constructive notice of their presence, and if not removed within a reasonable time after such constructive notice defendant would be negligent. We cannot say as a matter of law that the presence of peanuts did not constitute such a source of danger.

3. Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. The storekeeper invites the customer to look chiefly on the counters where are displayed the wares. The business of the customer is to see what goods are offered. She may assume that the floor will be free from obstructions of a dangerous nature or unusual slippery spots. This does not mean that the customer may walk blindly along irrespective of...