Langley v. Guiding Hands Sch., Inc., 2:20-cv-00635-TLN-KJN

• Decision Date: 30 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2:20-cv-00635-TLN-KJN,2:20-cv-00635-TLN-KJN
• Parties: STACIA LANGLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GUIDING HANDS SCHOOL, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

STACIA LANGLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GUIDING HANDS SCHOOL, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00635-TLN-KJN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 30, 2021

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss brought by the following Defendants: Pollock Pines Elementary School District ("PPESD"), Pat Atkins ("Atkins"), and Licia McDonald ("McDonald") (collectively, "Pollock Pines Defendants") (ECF No. 30); Amador County Office of Education SELPA ("Amador SELPA") (ECF No. 33); Placerville Union School District ("PUSD") and Eric Bonniksen ("Bonniksen") (collectively, "Placerville Defendants") (ECF No. 34); Davis Joint Unified School District ("DJSUD"), Jennifer Galas ("Galas"), Patrick McGrew ("McGrew"), and Riley Chessman ("Chessman") (collectively, "Davis Defendants") (ECF No. 35); Elk Grove Unified School District ("EGUSD"), Elk Grove Unified SELPA ("Elk Grove SELPA"), Marilyn Delgado ("Delgado"), and Doug Phillips ("Phillips") (collectively, "Elk Grove Defendants") (ECF No. 36); Kimberly Wohlwend ("Wohlwend") (ECF No. 37); Folsom Cordova Unified School District ("FCUSD"), Folsom Cordova SELPA ("FCSELPA"), Kim Triguero ("Triguero"), Meghan Magee ("Magee"), and Betty Jo Wessinger ("Wessinger") (collectively, "Folsom Defendants") (ECF No. 38); Handle with Care Behavior Management System, Inc. ("HWC") (ECF No. 40); Guiding Hands School, Inc. ("GHS"), Staranne S. Meyers ("Meyers"), Cindy Keller ("Keller"), Jennifer Christensen ("Christensen"), Betty Morgan ("Morgan"), Jill Watson ("Watson"), Linda Stearn ("Stearn"), Michael Smith ("Smith"), Le'mon Thomas ("Thomas"), and David Chambers ("Chambers") (collectively, "GHS Defendants") (ECF Nos. 42, 45); California Department of Education ("CDE") and State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond ("Thurmond") (collectively, "CDE Defendants") (ECF No. 43); and Yolo County Office of Education, Carolynne Beno, and Sharon Holstege (collectively, "Yolo Defendants") (ECF No. 44) (collectively, "Defendants"). Also before the Court is HWC's separately-filed Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 41.)

Plaintiffs Stacia Langley ("Langley"), David Benson ("Benson"), Michael Turelli (personal representative of M.B.), Laura Kinser ("Kinser") (individually and as guardian ad litem for D.Z.), Melanie Stark ("Stark") (individually and as guardian ad litem for M.S.), Cherilyn Caler ("Caler") (individually and as guardian ad litem for J.P.), Timothy Peterson ("Peterson") (individually and as guardian ad litem for A.P.), Suzanne Brent-Petersen ("Brent-Petersen") (individually and as guardian ad litem for A.P.), Robert Darrough ("Darrough") (individually and as guardian ad litem for E.D.), Kristen Coughlin ("Coughlin") (individually and as guardian ad litem for E.D.), Susan Muller ("Muller") (individually and as guardian ad litem for H.K.), Christian Davis ("Davis") (individually and as guardian ad litem for S.D.), Deborah Marques (individually and as guardian ad litem for L.M.), and Louis Marques (individually and as guardian ad litem for L.M.) (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed oppositions or non-oppositions to each motion. (ECF Nos. 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 96.)

Defendants filed replies. (ECF Nos. 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 116, 117.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motions.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves the use of restraints on students with disability-related behavioral issues, which resulted in the death of a child. Plaintiffs include nine children with disabilities, including developmental, social, and emotional disabilities. (ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 18-32.) Also named as Plaintiffs are the students' parents. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.) Plaintiffs' local education agencies ("LEAs") placed the students at GHS. (Id. at ¶ 2.) GHS was a nonpublic school certified by the CDE to provide education and specialized services to public school children with disabilities. (Id. at ¶¶ 75-78.) GHS contracted with LEAs to provide special education services on behalf of those entities. (Id. at ¶ 45.)

At issue is a restraint system developed by Bruce Chapman and marketed by HWC.¹ (Id. at ¶¶ 70-71.) On November 28, 2018, a member of GHS staff placed M.B., a 13-year-old student with autism and other disabilities, in a prone, face-down restraint for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 239-276.) During the restraint, M.B. showed increasing and obvious signs of distress, including kicking the wall with his feet, urinating on himself, biting his lip until it bled, and vomiting. (Id. at ¶¶ 246, 248-251, 258, 260-263, 265-272, 274.) M.B. finally went into cardiac arrest and passed out. (Id. at ¶¶ 263, 266-272.) He was transported to a medical center and died on November 30, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 323-325.) The CDE subsequently revoked GHS's nonpublic school credential. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Two administrators and one staff member have been charged with manslaughter in connection with M.B.'s death. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege M.B. was not the only student subjected to this type of abuse — GHS engaged in a policy and practice of using restraints as a substitute for positive interventions in response to predictable behavior that did not pose a clear and present danger of serious physical harm to the student or others. (Id. at ¶¶ 48-57, 98-101, 336-337, 346-347, 358-359, 363-364, 389-391, 369-397, 401-409, 415-416, 419, 425-426.) Plaintiffs allege GHS used restraints against its students frequently, for periods of time that were longer than necessary, and with excessive force. (Id. at ¶¶ 98-103, 224, 235-237, 306, 422.)

On November 7, 2019, Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendants in El Dorado County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Defendant removed the case to this Court on March 23, 2020. (Id. at 1.) On May 3, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, alleging various state and federal claims against Defendants. (See ECF No. 12.) Defendants subsequently brought 12 separate motions to dismiss and HWC also brought a motion to strike. (ECF Nos. 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45.) The Court will address all Defendants' pending motions herein.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Nevertheless, a court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Apleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged[.]" Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to "nudge[ ] [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]" is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, "'[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.'" Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Altho...