Langley v. Langley

Decision Date11 April 1899
PartiesLANGLEY v. LANGLEY ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from chancery court, Tallapoosa county; J. R. Dowdell Chancellor.

Bill by F. E. Langley, administrator, against W. T. Langley and others to enforce a vendor's lien. The facts averred in the bill are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendants demurred to the bill, and moved to dismiss it for want of equity. On the submission of the cause upon the demurrers and the motion to dismiss, the chancellor granted the motion, and ordered the bill dismissed for want of equity. From this decree, complainant appeals, and assigns the rendition thereof as error. Reversed.

T. L Bulger and J. M. Chilton, for appellant.

Garrett & Lackey, for appellees.

TYSON J.

The bill in this cause was filed by the appellant, as administrator of the estate of Slaughter, and seeks to enforce a vendor's lien upon certain lands therein described, which were sold by an order of the probate court of Tallapoosa county for division among the heirs. It is alleged in the bill that the petition for the sale of these lands was filed by the complainant and one of the respondents, W. T. Langley, who was a co-administrator with the complainant; that the lands were ordered to be sold by the administrators for one-half cash, and the remainder on 12 months' credit. At the sale, on the 23d day of November 1893, the respondent Langley became the purchaser at and for the price of $1,283.20, and gave his note to the complainant for the deferred payment, due November 23, 1894; and that he never made the cash payment, nor has he ever paid the note. It is further alleged that a report of the sale was made to the probate court, in which it was stated that the respondent Langley had paid the cash payment, which was untrue, and that no report has ever been made that the deferred payment was paid, that, notwithstanding the terms of sale were partly for credit, before the maturity of the deferred payment the probate judge appointed Oliver, and commissioned him to execute a deed to Langley as purchaser, and Oliver, on the 3d day of July, 1894, executed a deed to him. The remaining allegations of the bill aver a sale of the land by Langley the purchaser, to certain other respondents, and contract of sales by some of his grantees to certain other defendants, and the resignation by Langley, the respondent, as administrator of said estate, and decree entered by the probate court on the 17th day of November, 1896, discharging him from any further administration of said estate, leaving the complainant at the time of the filing of the bill as the sole administrator. Under these averments, it is too clear for disputation that the deed to Langley, as purchaser, did not convey the legal title to the land, but only vested in him an inchoate equity, which, upon full payment of the purchase money, would ripen into a perfect equity; and the purchaser from him or his subvendees cannot claim the protection afforded to purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, although they bought in ignorance of the fact that the purchase money had not been paid, and although the conveyance to Langley was made under an order of the court. Cruikshank v. Luttrell, 67 Ala. 318; Wallace v. Nichols' Adm'r, 56 Ala. 321; Ketchum v. Creagh, 53 Ala. 224; Bolling v. Smith, 108 Ala. 411, 19 So. 370, McCully v. Chapman, 58 Ala. 325; Ligon v. Ligon, 84 Ala. 555, 4 So. 405; Anderson's Adm'r v. Bradley, 66 Ala. 263; Washington v. Bogart (Ala.) 24 So. 245; Bogart v. Bell, 112 Ala. 412, 20 So. 511; Allison v. Allison, 114 Ala. 393, 21 So. 1008.

The main question presented is whether the complainant can maintain this bill, his co-administrator being the purchaser at the sale of the lands, not having paid any portion of the purchase money, and having resigned and been discharged by the probate court before the filing of this bill. The contention of appellees is that, as the respondent Langley was the seller and purchaser, the moment he contracted the debt for the purchase of the lands it was extinguished, and it became assets in his hands as administrator, and he was chargeable with the amount as if he had collected the money or converted the property of the estate into money. And, in support of this contention, they cite the cases of Childress v. Childress, 3 Ala. 752; Ward v. Oates, 42 Ala. 225; King v. Shackleford, 6 Ala. 423; Duffee v. Buchanan, 8 Ala. 27; Ligon v. Ligon, 84 Ala. 555, 4 So. 405; Knight v. Haynie, 74 Ala. 542; Cook v. Cook, 69 Ala. 294.

We do not doubt the soundness of the principles upon which the opinions in those cases are made to rest. No one can doubt that complainant could not maintain this bill so long as, the respondent Langley was his co-administrator. The reason for the rule is clearly stated in King v. Shackleford to be "that where there are several executors each has a right to receive the debts and other assets of the estate, and a payment of the sums received by him to his co-executor will not discharge his liability to the estate. Further, that executors are not liable to each other, but each is liable to the cestuis que trustent and devisees to the full extent of the funds received by him." No such relation as that exists in this case. And the complainant alone is now responsible for the administration of the assets of the estate. Can it be doubted that Langley's promise to pay the price of lands, which he has never paid, going into possession under the purchase and reselling it as owner, is an asset of the estate? Suppose both the Langleys had resigned as administrators at the same time, and the court had appointed an administrator de bonis non, it would hardly be contended that such administrator de bonis non could not enforce the lien for the purchase money. The cases of Ketchum v. Creagh, Cruikshank v. Luttrell, Wallace v. Nichols' Adm'r, cited above, were bills by administrators de bonis non to enforce vendors' liens against the purchasers at sales made of lands under an order of the probate court. And in the case of Cruikshank v. Luttrell the administrator had the purchaser at the sale, who was unable to pay the purchase price bid by him to transfer his certificate of purchase to him (the administrator), and he resold the lands to Luttrell at private sale, taking his notes for the purchase money. Yet this court did not say that the administrator only became chargeable with the purchase money as if he...

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