Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority, CIV.A. 98-12336-NG.

Decision Date27 November 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 98-12336-NG.,CIV.A. 98-12336-NG.
Citation234 F.Supp.2d 33
PartiesKelley LANGLOIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ABINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Christopher Whittingham, Southeastern Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation, New Bedford, MA, Amy Copperman, Judith Liben, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Boston, MA, for plaintiffs.

Timothy H. White, White & White, Weymouth, MA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GERTNER, District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
                  I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................... 38
                     A. Facts ..................................................................... 38
                        1. The Section 8 Program .................................................. 38
                           a. 1980-1995: Federal Preferences ...................................... 39
                           b. 1995-1998: Administrative Suspension of the Mandatory
                                 Preferences .......................................................... 39
                           c. OHWRA: Permanent Repeal of Mandatory Preferences
                               Coupled with Targeting of Extremely Low Income Families ............ 39
                              (1) 75% Rule ........................................................ 41
                              (2) Nondiscrimination ............................................... 41
                              (3) Affirmative Furtherance of Fair Housing ......................... 42
                        2. The Defendant PHAs' Policies ........................................... 42
                           a. The Application Process ............................................. 42
                           b. Formulation of the Waiting Lists: Residency Preferences ............. 43
                        3. The Plaintiffs' Interaction with the PHAs .............................. 43
                     B. Procedural History ........................................................ 44
                 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................................... 46
                     A. Summary Judgment Standard ................................................. 46
                     B. Causes of Action .......................................................... 46
                        1. The Blessing Test: § 1983, Statutes, and "Rights" ................. 47
                        2. Enforceability of Administrative Regulations and Executive Orders
                             under § 1983 ........................................................ 49
                     C. Abington and Rockland: Compliance with the 75% Rule ....................... 54
                        1. The 75% Rule: Does It Meet the Blessing Standard? ...................... 54
                        2. The 75% Rule: Does the Rockland Plan Comply? ........................... 54
                     D. Disparate Impact (Title VIII/Fair Housing Act) ............................ 55
                        1. The Prima Facie Case for Disparate Impact .............................. 56
                           a. The Preliminary Injunction Tests .................................... 57
                              (1) The "Four-fifths" Rule .......................................... 57
                              (2) The Comer Test .................................................. 58
                           b. The Summary Judgment Stage .......................................... 58
                              (1) The Track Records of Pre-1998 Residency Preferences ............. 59
                              (2) The Effect of Pre-existing Residency Preferences on
                                    Current Participation ............................................. 59
                              (3) The Effect of the Preliminary Injunction ........................ 60
                              (4) The Measure of Delay ............................................ 61
                           c. Conclusions ......................................................... 62
                        2. The Prima Facie Case for Disparate Impact: Application
                             Procedures ............................................................... 64
                        3. The "Simple Justification Test" ........................................ 66
                           a. Statutory Purpose and Intent ........................................ 67
                           b. The Broader Statutory Context: Local Needs Harmonized with
                              Civil Rights Enforcement ................................................ 68
                           c. Proving More than Just "Residential Preferences Are Allowed" ........ 69
                        4. Less Discriminatory Alternatives ....................................... 70
                     E. Duty to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing ................................ 70
                        1. Does the "Affirmatively Further" Standard Comply with Blessing
                           and Other Procedural Prerequisites? ........................................ 71
                           a. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(15) (QHWRA) ................................71
                           b. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (Title VIII) ..............................71
                
                            (1) The Statute ................................................ 71
                            (2) The Regulations ............................................ 75
                         c. Executive Orders 11063 & 12892 ................................. 76
                      2. Did the PHAs' Plans Meet the Affirmative Furtherance
                           Requirement ......................................................... 77
                   F. Miscellaneous Provisions ............................................. 78
                      1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c): Advertising ............................. 78
                      2. PHAs' Compliance with Section 8 Plans ............................. 79
                III. CONCLUSION ............................................................ 79
                

This case challenges the administration of Section 8 rental assistance programs by eight Massachusetts suburban public housing authorities ("PHAs").1 The plaintiffs are four racial minority, lower-income women residing in Randolph and Brockton, the class of similarly situated individuals that they represent,2 and the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless ("MCH").3 The communities in which the PHAs are situated are predominantly white, with low percentages of racial minority residents and a low overall rate of poverty.

The plaintiffs' principal challenge is to the use of a preference for local residents in determining a Section 8 applicant's position on the waiting list, as well as the logistics of the application processes. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they maintain that the PHAs' policies effectively discriminated against minorities by favoring local, predominantly white applicants and violated the PHAs' duties to target housing to extremely low-income families, and to "affirmatively further" fair housing.

Defendants counter on a number of fronts, both procedural and substantive. They claim that recent decisional law casts doubt on the use of § 1983 to enforce the very statutes, regulations, and executive orders plaintiffs cite. Moreover, even if § 1983 is available to enforce these provisions, defendants deny that they have violated any of their legal obligations under them. Rather, they allege that the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act ("QHWRA") allows them to administer Section 8 housing as they have done, namely with preferences for local residents.

The following issues, then, are joined:

(1) Can § 1983 be used to enforce the particular statutes, regulations, and orders at issue here? I conclude that § 1983 enforcement is proper here, based on the language of the statutes and their implementing regulations, on the one hand, and § 1983's unique history and expansive language, on the other. Of all the cases in which § 1983 has been used to enforce state statutes and regulations, few come closer to the statute's purpose and history since its enactment post Civil War than cases like the instant one—cases that seek to enforce antidiscrimination laws in general, and fair housing provisions in particular.

(2) Have the plaintiffs met the standard for summary judgment on the question of whether the law has been violated, particularly given the 1998 Act's provisions on local housing preferences? I conclude that—with certain limitations described below—the plaintiffs have proven such violations, notwithstanding the language of the QHWRA. The Act's reference to "local needs and priorities" does not give the PHAs carte blanche to effect preferences for local residents. Rather, it was intended to encourage local authorities to determine the kind of housing mix that suits local needs, within the framework of the applicable laws.

For the following reasons, Langlois et al.'s motion for summary judgment [docket entry # 76] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and Abington Housing Authority et al.'s motion for summary judgment [docket entry # 86] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts
1. The Section 8 Program

In 1974, Congress established the Section 8 program as a vehicle for providing an adequate supply of housing for low-income families. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-383, tit. II, § 8(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f).4 The component of the Section 8 program at issue here has been known variously as the Section 8 Existing Housing Program, the Certificate/Voucher5 Program, or the Section 8 "Tenant-Based" Program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (2002); Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir.1994). The Program provides subsidies to private landlords. In Massachusetts, about 44,000 Section 8 tenant-based subsidies are administered by about 130 local housing authorities ("PHAs") and the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development.

Under the tenant-based provisions of the Section 8 Program, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") enters into annual contracts with PHAs to fund Section 8 vouchers. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). In connection with this contract, each PHA must submit a plan to HUD describing the administrative details of the Section 8 program and its compliance with federal and state equal housing requirements. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437c-1(b) (annual plan...

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