Langlois v. Wolford

• Decision Date: 19 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. A00A2205.,A00A2205.
• Citation: 246 Ga. App. 209,539 S.E.2d 565
• Parties: LANGLOIS v. WOLFORD.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

539 S.E.2d 565

246 Ga. App. 209

LANGLOIS v. WOLFORD.

No. A00A2205.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

September 19, 2000.

Reconsideration Denied October 3, 2000.

Certiorari Denied February 16, 2001.

Clark & Clark, Fred S. Clark, Savannah, for appellant.

Hertz & Link, Eric J. Hertz, Mark D. Link, Houston D. Smith III, Atlanta, Rene D. Kemp, Hinesville, for appellee. ELDRIDGE, Judge.

On February 7, 1998, while under the influence of alcohol, Jeffery M. Langlois fled the scene of a collision where he sideswiped the vehicle which Shawn T. Wolford was driving, injuring him. At trial, the court permitted evidence that Langlois had been drinking immediately after the collision, was in an intoxicated state immediately after the collision at another location, and had a long history of drinking, DUI, and other moving traffic violations. Plaintiff had medical specials of $643, and the jury returned a general verdict of $3,500 plus $300,000 in punitive damages. Langlois contends that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict on the punitive damages and in allowing the admission of evidence of his prior drinking, prior traffic offenses, and evidence that he had consumed alcohol after the collision and was intoxicated. The evidence was relevant and material to the aggravating facts and circumstances on the issue of punitive damages and the amount of such damages as well as for liability and impeachment because Langlois contested that he was driving while intoxicated; there being evidence on the issue of punitive damages, the denial of the directed verdict was proper. We affirm.

1. Langlois asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages. We do not agree.

The tortfeasor must have engaged in some form of culpable conduct to support an award of punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. OCGA § 51-12-5.1(b); Howard v. Alamo Corp., 216 Ga.App. 525, 455 S.E.2d 308 (1995); Ralston v. Etowah Bank, 207 Ga.App. 775, 777(3), 429 S.E.2d 102 (1993). However, wilful and intentional conduct is not essential to recover punitive damages, because where the facts and circumstances of the tort show an entire want of care, such conduct gives rise to a presumption of indifference to the consequences, i.e., wantonness, which is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. See Brown v. StarMed Staffing, 227 Ga.App. 749, 755(4), 490 S.E.2d 503 (1997); see also Hoffman v. Wells, 260 Ga. 588(1), 397 S.E.2d 696 (1990); Hodges v. Effingham County Hosp. Auth., 182 Ga.App. 173, 175(2), 355 S.E.2d 104 (1987). The peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case, when supported by clear and convincing evidence of culpability, may cause ordinary negligence to give rise to the presumption that the conduct showed a conscious indifference to the consequences and an entire want of care. See Durben v. American Materials, 232 Ga.App. 750, 751(1), 503 S.E.2d 618 (1998). Leaving the scene of an accident was criminalized under OCGA §§ 40-6-270(a) and (c) and 40-6-271, as hit and run, because the public policy of this state mandates that a party to an accident must stop and render aid to those involved in the collision, no matter who caused the collision, and not leave them in a possibly disabled state without aid. Ga. Power Co. v. Shipp, 195 Ga. 446, 24 S.E.2d 764 (1943); Bellamy v. Edwards, 181 Ga.App. 887, 889(3), 354 S.E.2d 434 (1987); Battle v. Kilcrease, 54 Ga.App. 808, 809-810(4), 189 S.E. 573 (1936). Thus, such act of leaving the scene of a collision without even speaking to the other party, as mandated by statute, was an intentional and culpable act; such conduct demonstrated a conscious indifference to the consequences and an entire want of care as to the victim's well-being, permitting the jury to find that such conduct was of an aggravated and indifferent nature for purposes of imposing punitive damages. Bellamy v. Edwards, supra at 889, 354 S.E.2d 434; Battle v. Kilcrease, supra at 809-810(4), 189 S.E. 573. Thus, such conduct alone was sufficient to show aggravated circumstances so as to permit the jury to consider the imposition of punitive damages for such culpable conduct. Further, driving under the influence of alcohol constituted such wanton conduct that it was both intentionally wilful and evinced such entire want of care as to be wanton, because it placed others at great risk of injury or death. See Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236, 237, 336 S.E.2d 749 (1985); Holt v. Grinnell, 212 Ga.App. 520, 441 S.E.2d 874 (1994).

The defendant left the scene of the collision without even speaking to the plaintiff, which gave rise to the reasonable inference that flight was from a sense of guilt. Parker v. State, 232 Ga.App. 609, 611(1), 502 S.E.2d 310 (1998); Agony v. State, 226 Ga. App. 330, 331, 486 S.E.2d 625 (1997). Further, flight also gave rise to the inference that the defendant sought to conceal the odor of alcohol on his person and intoxication, which even the brief encounter required by law would reveal. The investigating officer, Carrero, testified that hit and run cases occurred to conceal another offense, i.e., no license, no insurance, or driving under the influence. The defendant was observed immediately after the collision at another location driving with an open beer in his hand and in a highly intoxicated condition; the close connection in time makes the evidence relevant to show his condition at the time of the collision. Steiner v. Melvin, 143 Ga.App. 97, 98(1), 237 S.E.2d 635 (1977); see also Menendez v. Jewett, 196 Ga.App. 565, 566-567(2), 396 S.E.2d 294 (1990). Such high level of intoxication only a short time after the collision gave rise to the reasonable inference that he was also intoxicated at the time of the collision and, coupled with a past history of drinking and DUI, gave rise to the reasonable inference that he had been drinking and driving when the collision occurred and that he sought to conceal such conduct by flight. See Moore v. Thompson, supra at 237, 336 S.E.2d 749. Thus, driving under the influence was an aggravated conduct supporting punitive damages. See id.; Holt v. Grinnell, supra. "[E]vidence regarding alcohol consumption is admissible when punitive damages are sought." (Citation omitted.) Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 220 Ga.App. 526, 528(1), 469 S.E.2d 792 (1996).

The jury was authorized to consider that the defendant's perception, attention, reaction time, and motor skills had been affected by alcohol so that the defendant sideswiped plaintiff's vehicle and that defendant left the scene of the collision to avoid detection of his drinking while driving as causing the collision. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find a causal connection between plaintiff's injuries and defendant's drinking and hit and run conduct. See Beal v. Braunecker, 185 Ga.App. 429, 432(3), 364 S.E.2d 308 (1987). Shortly after the collision, the defendant was observed in a drunken state that the jury could find had not occurred between the collision and arrival at the condo where Langlois was staying, because there was insufficient time for him to become intoxicated to the degree observed in such period. Lovejoy v. Tidwell, 212 Ga. 750, 751, 95 S.E.2d 784 (1956); Menendez v. Jewett, supra at 566-567, 396 S.E.2d 294.

It was proper for the trial court to deny the motion for directed verdict where there was evidence to support a jury award of punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. Ga. Kraft Co. v. Faust, 200 Ga. App. 686, 688(2), 409 S.E.2d 247 (1991).

2. The defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his history of alcohol consumption and of his driving record, including DUI. We do not agree.

This case presents an unusual combination of issues. Defendant, at the time that he left the scene of the collision without communicating with the plaintiff, was under threat of discharge from the Army if found drinking again, because he had been found drunk on duty one morning after release from jail for a charge of DUI and had been caught drinking in the barracks on another occasion. Thus, he had not only an interest to avoid both civil and criminal liability, but also to protect his military status by concealing his drinking and driving. Therefore, he left the scene of the collision to avoid detection of his drinking and, at trial, denied drinking and committed spoliation of evidence of his drinking and driving at the time of the collision and then denied drinking and intentionally leaving the scene of the collision so that the rebuttable presumption was of no value. See generally as to spoliation of evidence OCGA § 24-4-22; Jones v. Krystal Co., 231 Ga.App. 102, 107, 498 S.E.2d 565 (1998); Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 225 Ga.App. 523, 525(1), 484 S.E.2d 249 (1997). Thus, evidence of his drinking and driving on February 7, 1998, went not only to issues of liability, punitive damages, and credibility, but also to impeachment. Prior and subsequent DUI offenses and a prior habit of drinking went to punitive damages and interest by showing Langlois' reason to conceal his intoxication while driving on February 7, 1998. Thus, the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to admit doubtful and inferior evidence where the defendant intentionally prevented direct evidence through his act of spoliation by leaving the scene of the collision. The admission or exclusion of evidence which has been objected to on relevancy grounds is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. O'Neal v. State, 254 Ga. 1, 3(3), 325 S.E.2d 759 (1985); McEntyre v. McRae, 240 Ga.App. 148(1), 522 S.E.2d 731 (1999). The trial court properly exercised his discretion in admitting evidence of prior similar conduct under the facts and circumstances of this case. See Troncalli v. Jones, 237 Ga.App....