Langs v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 12 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-1834 |
| Parties | LARRY DON LANGS, TDCJ NO. 1688906, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Larry Don Langs, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (Docket Entry No. 1) challenging a prison disciplinary ruling against him. The Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support (Docket Entry No. 9) that is supported by TDCJ records. After reviewing the pleadings and the records, the court has determined that the Respondent's motion should be granted and this action should be dismissed.
Langs is serving a twelve-year sentence for delivery of a controlled substance. State v. Langs, No. F-9263805 (241st Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex., Dec. 20, 2010). (Docket Entry No. 9-2, p. 2, Respondent's Exhibit A) A procedural history concerning anyappeal and post-conviction proceedings of the felony offense is not necessary because Langs does not attack the validity of his state court conviction. Instead, Langs' petition concerns a prison administrative disciplinary proceeding.
On December 16, 2013, Langs was notified that he was charged with assaulting an officer without a weapon and with no injury on November 30, 20131 (TDCJ Disciplinary Case No. 20140094270, Docket Entry No. 10-2, p. 3). On December 17, 2013, Langs attended a disciplinary hearing, represented by counsel substitute. Id. After reviewing the evidence, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found Langs guilty of the charge and assessed the following punishments: (1) thirty days loss of commissary privileges; (2) thirty days of cell restriction; (3) reduction in classification from S3 to LI; and (4) forfeiture of thirty days of good-time credit. Id.
On December 27, 2013, Langs filed a Step 1 Grievance challenging the outcome of the proceeding. (Docket Entry No. 10-1, pp. 3-4) The grievance was denied and returned to Langs on February 12, 2014. Id. Langs then filed a Step 2 Grievance on February 24, 2014. Id. at 5-6. That grievance was denied on February 27, 2014. Id.
Langs' federal habeas petition was mailed in an envelope that was date stamped June 30, 2014. (Docket Entry No. 1-1, p. 1) Therefore, it is considered to be filed with this court on that date. See Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 616 n.l (5th Cir. 2008). Langs asserts the following grounds for relief regarding Disciplinary Case No. 20140094270:
See Petition (Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 6-7).
Respondent argues that Langs' challenge to Disciplinary Case No. 20140094270 should be dismissed because there was no due process violation. Respondent further contends that Langs' challenges to his loss of privileges and demotion in classification are not actionable because they do not impose "atypical and significant hardships" on Langs. Respondent also asserts that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt and loss of good time and that Langs' claims are conclusory and meritless.
Langs' petition for a writ of habeas corpus is subject to review under the federal habeas statutes as amended by theAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Woods v. Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2002); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). A federal habeas petitioner challenging a state court decision is not entitled to relief unless the state court judgment:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The 1996 AEDPA provisions "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2002), citing Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1518 (2000). Habeas relief should only be granted if the state court's decision is both incorrect and objectively unreasonable. Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Williams, at 1521.
Summary Judgment standards established under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas corpus cases brought under 2 8 U.S.C. § 2254. Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000); McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 1994). Asummary judgment shall be issued if the pleadings and evidence "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Dameware Development, L.L.C. v. American General Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 203, 206-207 (5th Cir. 2012). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court construes factual controversies in the light most favorable to the non-movant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists. Id.; Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois, 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). The burden is on the movant to convince the court that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the claims asserted by the non-movant, but the movant is not required to negate elements of the non-movant's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986).
The non-moving party may not rest solely on its pleadings. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 1992). For issues on which the non-movant will bear the burden of proof at trial that party must produce summary judgment evidence and designate specific facts which indicate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996). The non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith RadioCorp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). To meet its burden the non-moving party must present "significant probative" evidence indicating that there is a triable issue of fact. Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994). If the evidence rebutting the summary judgment motion is only colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment should be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). A habeas petitioner cannot rely on "bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition . . . mere conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas proceeding." Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1983).
The court will review the merits of Langs' claims in light of the record of the proceedings and the disciplinary actions taken against him.
A petitioner's habeas challenge to a disciplinary hearing is not actionable in federal court if the outcome of the administrative proceeding does not adversely affect his release date. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995). A prisoner does not have many of the rights and privileges that a free citizen enjoys. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). In someinstances, the state may create liberty interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. However, a prison inmate may only seek relief from disciplinary actions that impose "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, at 2300.
Three of the four punishments imposed on Langs as a result of his disciplinary hearing (loss of commissary privileges, cell restriction, and reduction in classification) did not impose an "atypical and significant" hardship on him. Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000); Madison, 104 F.3d at 768 ( ). These sanctions, including those affecting good-time earning classification, do not have a direct effect on Langs' release date. See Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1997); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Budnev, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992). See also Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 74 (5th Cir. 1995) (). Only Langs' loss of thirty days of good-time credits is subject toreview in this federal habeas action. Houser v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2004); Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994).
In his first claim for relief Langs contends that he was denied due process because he was unable to call witnesses on his behalf, but he does not allege that the DHO denied his request to call any specific witnesses. Instead, he merely contends that he was unable to call witnesses because he did not know their names, although he states that there were two...
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