Langston v. Southern Electric R. Co.

Decision Date08 December 1898
Citation147 Mo. 457,48 S.W. 835
PartiesLANGSTON v. SOUTHERN ELECTRIC R. CO.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Gasconade county; Rudolph Hirzel, Judge.

Action by S. J. Langston against the Southern Electric Railroad Company for damages for personal injuries. From the judgment rendered, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

This suit is for $10,000 damages on account of an injury alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, while a passenger on one of defendant's cars, in consequence of the incompetency and negligence of the persons in charge of the same. The accident occurred on the 18th of September, 1892. The case has been tried four times. The jury failed to agree on two occasions, and upon the third the plaintiff obtained a verdict for $2,500. This was set aside by the learned judge who presided at the trial, as excessive. The last time the case was heard, $5 were awarded plaintiff, and from a judgment in his favor for that amount he has appealed to this court. A reversal is asked upon two grounds, namely, the admission of improper evidence upon defendant's part, and the inadequacy of the damages assessed. The substance of the petition is that plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's street cars; that as it approached the intersection of Sixth and Elm streets, going north, he arose from his seat, and gave a signal to the conductor to stop, which the conductor saw; that plaintiff prepared to get off as soon as the car should stop, but that it was not stopped on the north crossing, at the intersection of said streets; that when the car was at said crossing it was "suddenly jerked, pulled, or moved forward, by the carelessness, recklessness, incompetency, and negligence of the motorman, with such force and violence that plaintiff was knocked off and out of said car, so that he fell on the stone pavement of Sixth street," and was seriously and permanently injured. The answer contains a general denial, and likewise a plea of contributory negligence, upon which issue is joined by the replication. Plaintiff's testimony tends to prove these facts: He was a merchant residing in West Plains, and was temporarily in St. Louis on the 18th of September, 1892. He got on one of defendant's street cars, intending to ride to the end of the line. The conductor passed along and collected his fare. Plaintiff, as the car approached Elm street, thought he recognized an acquaintance on the sidewalk, and determined to get off to speak to him. He arose from his seat, and signaled the conductor to stop, which the latter saw. Plaintiff did not hear the bell, if it was rung in response to the signal from him. He says the conductor was looking directly at him when he indicated his desire and purpose to get off. There were two cars together. Plaintiff was on the second one, or trailer, which was an open, summer car. He moved to the side, so as to be ready to step down from the car as soon as it should stop. He was standing upright, and not holding to anything. The cars were going north, and did not stop on the north crossing at the intersection of Elm and Sixth streets, but, upon the contrary, they started forward more rapidly, with a sudden, quick jerk, which was very severe, and by reason thereof plaintiff was thrown out upon the granite rocks in the street. The cars were moving rapidly at the time the accident occurred, which was about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Plaintiff's arm was broken, and he was otherwise bruised and injured. Two other witnesses corroborated his statement that the cars dashed or moved forward with a sudden jerk. No one saw him fall. He was found lying on the street, and was helped up, and then went to a neighboring drug store, and a physician was called, who advised him to go to the City Dispensary, where he could receive more satisfactory treatment, which he did. He was confined to his bed for a week, and had to carry his arm in a sling from the time of the injury until in the early part of December following. He testified that he suffered severe pain from the injury, and that at the time of the last trial, which was three years after he was hurt, he was unable to use his arm for any manual labor. He paid one physician for treating him $40, and another $40 or $42, and spent $5 or $10 for medicines. This is a sufficient outline of the case made by plaintiff for the purpose of disposing of this appeal. Further details would throw no light upon the questions of law which we are called upon to decide. The testimony introduced by the defendant put an entirely different phase upon the matter. It was to the effect that plaintiff stepped or jumped from the car while in rapid motion, without any request to the conductor to stop the same, and that he was hurt in consequence of his own imprudence and carelessness, and so stated shortly after the accident; and, further, that his injury was aggravated by improper treatment; that, if the bone had been properly set, he would have been well within four weeks, and no permanent harm would have resulted. The conductor did not see the plaintiff fall, and knew nothing of the occurrence; nor did the motorman. Defendant further introduced evidence tending to show that the car was moving upgrade at the time, and was in rapid motion, and that it could not have been started forward with a sudden jerk, and that it was impossible, under the circumstances, for this to have been done. The motorman was called as a witness, and was examined concerning the possibility of moving the car in the manner stated by plaintiff and his witnesses. He said there might be a jerk if the car was not running fast, but not if it was in rapid movement. After he left the stand, and had been fully examined upon this subject, as well as to his recollection about the movements of the car at the time of the accident, defendant's manager was called by defendant. He testified, as an expert, that the car could not have started to go faster, with a sudden...

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31 cases
  • State ex rel. Berberich v. Haid
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 28, 1933
    ... ... evidence is presumed to be prejudicial. State ex rel. v ... Ellison, 270 Mo. 645; Langston v. Railroad Co., ... 147 Mo. 457. (2) It is error to inject the issue of ... contributory ...          In ... Steele v. Kansas City Southern" Ry. Co., 302 Mo. 207, 257 ... S.W. 756, an opinion written by David E. Blair, J., we said: ...  \xC2" ... ...
  • State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Cox
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 1, 1931
    ... ... Aronovitz v. Arky, 219 S.W. 624; ... Haynes v. Trenton, 123 Mo. 326; Langston v ... Railroad, 147 Mo. 457; Dayharsh v. Railroad, ... 103 Mo. 570; Nixon v. Railroad, 141 ... ...
  • Moses v. Kansas City Public Service Co.
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • June 11, 1945
    ... ...           Appeal ... from Circuit Court of Jackson County; Hon. Allen C. Southern, ...           ... Affirmed ...           Charles ... L. Carr and Cowgill ... Hannibal & St. Joe R. Co., 60 ... Mo. 227; Perry v. Ford, 17 Mo.App. 212; Langston ... v. Southern Electric R. Co., 147 Mo. 457, 48 S.W. 835; ... Gunther v. Roy, 74 Mo.App. 597; ... ...
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    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • January 9, 1939
    ... ... defendant company in 1930. Gash v. Mansfield, 28 ... S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App.); Langston v. Southern Electric ... Railway Co., 147 Mo. 457, 48 S.W. 835. (e) By permitting ... witness ... ...
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