Lanham v. Bond

• Decision Date: 17 September 1931
• Citation: 160 S.E. 89
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: LANHAM v. BOND.

160 S.E. 89

LANHAM

v.BOND.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 17, 1931.

Error to Corporation Court of Alexandria.

Action by Morris Bond against Clyde B. Lanham. Judgment for plaintiff by the corporation court of the City of Alexandria, and defendant brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

Argued before CAMPBELL, HOLT, EPES, HUDGINS, and BROWNING, JJ.

Charles Henry Smith, of Alexandria, for plaintiff in error.

Frederick L. Flynn and William L. Came, both of Alexandria, for defendant in error.

BROWNING, J.

This case grew out of an automobile accident which happened in the city of Alexandria, Va., on the 6th day of July, 1929, about 12:30 p. m., at or near the intersection of Cameron and West streets. Morris Bond, the plaintiff in the court below, was approaching the intersection from the north on West street, and Clyde B. Lanham, the defendant, was traveling westward on Cameron street. A collision occurred at the intersection of the two streets resulting in material injuries to Bond's car but none to Lanham's. No occupant was hurt. The two cars were being driven at the time of the accident by their respective owners, the parties hereto. The evidence was conflicting as to the cause of the collision, and a more detailed statement of the facts is not necessary.

At the instance of Bond a civil warrant was issued from the civil and police justice's court of the city of Alexandria against Lanham for $1,000 damages to Bond's car. This court rendered judgment against Lanham for $500, from which judgment an appeal was allowed the defendant to the corporation court of said city. There the case was heard by the judge and a jury. The verdict of the jury was for the plaintiff, Bond, in the sum of $600. The defendant moved the court to set aside the verdict as being contrary to the law and evidence and because the court had by its instructions misdirected the jury and that it had improperly allowed testimony to be considered by the jury that the defendant carried indemnity insurance on his car.

A writ of error was allowed and a supersedeas awarded by this court, and at the threshold of the controversy we are met by a motion by the appellee, Bond, to dismiss the said writ of error and supersedeas because the same was improvidently awarded, in that said action transcended and rendered of no effect the meaning and significance of section 6337 of the Code of Virginia 1924.

The portion of this section relative to the question at issue is as follows:

"No petition shall be presented for an appeal from, or writ of error or supersedeas to, any final judgment * * *; nor to any judgment of a circuit or corporation court, which is rendered on an appeal from a judgment of a justice, except in cases where it is otherwise expressly provided. * * *"

The position of the defendant in error is that the case having been originally tried in the said police and civil justice's court and a judgment had thereon and an appeal taken therefrom to the said corporation court and a trial and judgment therein had, the matter was finally disposed of and at an end, and that this court, under the terms of the statute quoted, could take no cognizance of it.

The determination of the contention involved in said matter necessitates some review of the history of the statutes which are applicable. The statutory provision above quoted from section 6337 of the Code is, so far as the question in judgment is concerned, the same as it was in the Code of 1S60. It has passed through the intervening years in nearly its original language, the slight changes having no bearing here.

Until the Act of March 20th, 1914 (chapter 142), there was no such tribunal as a civil and police justice court and no such officer as a civil and police justice. There were justices of the peace, trial justices, and police justices, but the act referred to created the precise office with which we are dealing. It follows, of course, that the provision quoted from section 6337, which had been the law for many years, could have no application, anterior to 1914, to a tribunal not then in being. Certainly the language of the statute referred to the judgment of such justice as was then in existence.

The enactment of 1914, with subsequent amendments, now embodied in Code, sections 3097 to 3111, inclusive, brought into our system of jurisprudence a new judicial officer and office. Such a court could only exist in cities of from 10, 000 to 45, 000 inhabitants, of which the city of Alexandria is one. The justice is required to have practiced law in this state for at least five years and during his term he can hold no other office of public trust. His compensation is in the form of a regular monthly salary. Subdivision (d) of the section is, in part, as follows:

"(d) The said civil and police justice, and the judge of the municipal court in any city which has such a judge under its charter, shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and city courts of general jurisdiction in actions at law, except for the recovery of a fine, where the amount in controversy does not exceed one thousand dollars." Code, § 3102 (d).

In all of these particulars we, at once, see how dissimilar this office and officer are from any justice court or justice of the peace court theretofore existing. Such latter courts had at first only insignificant pecuniary jurisdiction, now increased to $300. The courts in question have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and city courts of general jurisdiction, in actions at law where the amount in controversy is as much as $1,000. Indeed, in the case in judgment the warrant was sued out claiming the limit of the jurisdictional amount as damages.

Section 3092 of the Code provides for the election of justices of the peace in cities and it reads in part as follows:

" * * * Except that nothing herein contained shall be construed as vesting in such justices any portion of the jurisdiction given by law to police justices or civil and police justices of the cities of this Commonwealth."

This language unquestionably distinguishes the two types of court. And this interpretation is manifestly the sound and reasonable one. When the amount in controversy is as much as that which gives this court jurisdiction and the court giving judgment has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and city courts of general jurisdiction, no convincing reason can be given for denying the unsuccessful litigant the right of appeal from such judgment.

The proposition posited by the defendant in error is without merit. The civil and police justice is not within the statutory intendment. The motion to dismiss the writ of error and supersedeas is denied.

Addressing ourselves now to the merits of the case, the plaintiff in error submits four grounds of alleged error in the rulings of the trial court. They are all comprehended in the same principle of law and therefore they will be considered together.

The contention is that the court committed prejudicial error in permitting counsel for the plaintiff, in his opening statement, to tell the jury, over the objection of the defendant, that he intended to prove that the defendant stated to the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, that he had insurance and that the insurance company would pay all damages, and, in the course of the trial, allowing evidence to go to the jury to prove that fact.

The plaintiff's counsel, in his opening statement, made the above declaration to the court and the jury. Counsel for the defendant objected to the statement and moved the direction of a mistrial which the court denied.

The plaintiff on direct examination testified that the defendant, at the time of the accident, said, "I am very glad nobody is hurt, it is my fault but I have insurance on my car and the insurance company will pay all damages."

The defendant on cross-examination was asked this question: "Did you not tell Mr. Bond immediately after the accident that it was your fault and that your car was covered with insurance and that the insurance company would pay all damages?"

The witness replied: "I did not admit that it was my fault, but I did say that there was no use having a Police Court case of it, and that if it was my fault I had an insurance policy and the insurance company would take care of it."

At each of the above junctures in the trial the defendant objected to the said questions and answers and moved that they be stricken out and renewed his motion for a mistrial, the court in each instance denying the motions.

The principle here involved was before this court...