Lanham v. State, 26235.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1935
• Docket Number: No. 26235.,26235.
• Citation: 208 Ind. 79,194 N.E. 625
• Parties: LANHAM et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

208 Ind. 79

194 N.E. 625

LANHAM et al.

v.STATE.

No. 26235.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 14, 1935.

Howard Lanham, Noel Lanham, and Ruth Lanham were convicted of failure to support their father, and they appeal.

Reversed, with directions.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; Frank P. Baker, judge.

Joseph T. Markey and J. B. Kammins, both of Indianapolis, for appellants.

Jas. M. Ogden, Atty. Gen., Jas. T. Dowling, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Merl M. Wall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

TREANOR, Judge.

This is a criminal action, commenced by affidavit, in the name of the state of Indiana against Howard Lanham, Noel Lanham, Ruth Lanham, and Ward Lanham, on a charge that the appellants above named, being of full age and being financially able, have neglected, without reasonable cause, to maintain and support their father, Frederick Lanham, the said Frederick Lanham being sick and not able to work and not having sufficient means or ability to maintain or support himself.

The trial court found Howard Lanham, Noel Lanham, and Ruth Lanham guilty, as charged in the affidavit and pronounced sentence as follows: That each of the appellants be fined in the sum of $1, and that they each be imprisoned in the Marion county jail for a period of sixty days; that sentence was suspended on condition that the appellant Noel Lanham pay into the court the sum of $5 per week; and that each of the appellants Ruth Lanham and Howard Lanham pay into court the sum of $1.50 per week for the support of their father, Frederick Lanham.

The appellants rely upon the alleged error of the trial court in overruling their respective motions for new trials. The grounds specified in support of each motion for a new trial were ‘(1) that the finding or decision of the court is contrary to law’ and ‘(2) that the finding or decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence.’

Before considering appellants' contention that the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law, it is necessary to determine the scope and meaning of the statute. For that purpose, the following provisions are sufficient: ‘Hereafter, if any person being of full age and being financially able has neglected, or shall hereafter, without reasonable cause, neglect, to maintain and support his or her parent or parents, if such parent or parents be sick or not able to work and have not sufficient means or ability to maintain or support themselves, such person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding six (6) months. * * * The provisions of this act shall not apply to children who have not lived with or who have not been supported by their parents when such children were minors.’ Section 10-1410, Burns' Ind. St. Ann. 1933; section 2875, Burns' Ann. Ind. St. 1926, Acts 1921, c. 31, § 1, p. 90, Acts 1923, c. 15, § 1, p. 53.

At common law, children have no legal duty to supportparents and the statute in question departs from the common law by imposing such a duty and by making it a criminal offense for a child to neglect ‘to maintain and support his or her parent or parents.’ To be guilty of the misdemeanor which is defined by the statute, a child's neglect to maintain and support his parent or parents must be without reasonable cause. We understand ‘reasonable cause’ to refer to some fact or facts which exist at the time of the neglect to maintain or support, and which deprive such act of neglect of any criminal quality. For example, a child might be in ignorance of his parents' need, or the parents might refuse unreasonably to accept the kind of support offered by the children. The neglect of the child to maintain or support must be characterized by willfullness, but is not excused by reason of the personal conduct of the parent or parents during, or subsequent to, the minority of the children.

It follows that if a parent is physically and financially unable to care for himself, a child of full age, who is financially able to care for such parent, has a legal duty to support the parent; and if the child willfully refuses to discharge this duty, he is guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable in accordance with the terms of the statute.

But the statute expressly excludes from its operation all adult children ‘who have not lived with or who have not been supported by their parents when such children were minors.’ The evident legislative intent was to exempt entirely from its operation children of full age whose parents either had failed to maintain a home for their minor children, or had not furnished, in lieu thereof, support for such children. Since the language of the act does not qualify the clause ‘when such children were minors,’ we cannot construe this clause as defining any period of time less than the full minority of the children. Consequently, the act applies only to children whose parents either maintained a home for them throughout their minority or, in lieu thereof, supported them in other surroundings.

The evidence was sufficient to justify the trial court's finding that the...