Lanier v. City of Newton, Ala., 86-7331

• Decision Date: 11 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-7331,86-7331
• Parties: Randall E. LANIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEWTON, ALABAMA, etc., Chief of Police in his Official Capacity of the City of Newton, etc., Defendants-Appellees. Non-Argument Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 253

842 F.2d 253

Randall E. LANIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEWTON, ALABAMA, etc., Chief of Police in his Official Capacity of the City of Newton, etc Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-7331

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

April 11, 1988.

Joseph W. Adams, Ozark, Ala., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, HILL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

Randall E. Lanier brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985 against the City of Newton, Alabama (the City) and the Police Chief of Newton in his official capacity. Lanier sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorney's fees based upon appellees' enforcement of an ordinance barring topless dancing in establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that, as the State of Alabama had not preempted the city's power to regulate the sale of alcohol in this fashion, and as the ordinance was not inconsistent with state law, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's power under the twenty-first amendment.

This court, on appeal, determined that Alabama law provided no clear, controlling precedent on the issues decided by the district court. We certified to the Alabama Supreme Court three questions: (1) whether the state had delegated its power under the twenty-first amendment to municipalities to a sufficient extent to enable the City of Newton to enact the ordinance; (2) whether the state had preempted the field of regulating the activities that may take place in establishments licensed to serve liquor; and (3) whether the ordinance was inconsistent with state law. Lanier v. City of Newton, 807 F.2d 922 (11th Cir.1987). The Alabama Supreme Court has now responded to our certified questions. See 518 So.2d 40 (1987). Based upon that court's response, appended hereto, and upon our review of the remaining questions presented by appellant, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the district court.

Our previous opinion, reported at 807 F.2d 922, discusses the factual and legal history of this suit. See also Fillingim v. Boone, 835 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir.1988) (explaining municipal authority to enact ordinances barring nude or topless dancing by virtue of state delegation of power under the twenty-first amendment). The Alabama Supreme Court has determined that the state has delegated its powers under the twenty-first amendment to municipalities enabling them to enact ordinances banning topless dancing in business establishments serving alcohol. It has further concluded that the state has not preempted municipalities from regulating the activities that may occur in business establishments licensed to serve alcohol. Although the court also has found that the City of Newton's ordinance does not conflict with state law, it determined that section 2(c) of the ordinance is unreasonable. This section provides:

No person maintaining, owning, or operating an establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages shall suffer or permit any person to expose to public view his or her cleavage or simulation thereof within the establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages.

As the ordinance provides no guidance as to how "cleavage" would be defined, the court concluded that this section places an Given the response of the Alabama Supreme Court to our certified questions, we are left with the question of whether the regulation is a valid exercise of the municipality's delegated twenty-first amendment authority. "[T]he broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals." California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114, 93 S.Ct. 390, 395, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). Indeed, state regulation adopted pursuant to the twenty-first amendment enjoys a presumption of validity. Id. at 118-19, 93 S.Ct. at 397; Fillingim v. Boone, 835 F.2d at 1397-98. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state's "power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages entirely," which may be delegated as the state sees fit, ² "includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs." New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 717, 101 S.Ct. 2599, 2601, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981).

unreasonable burden on the licensees of the regulated establishments. However, as pointed out by the court, the severability clause included in the ordinance allows this section to be declared unenforceable without affecting the validity of the remainder of the ordinance. ¹

Because the ordinance in this case was adopted pursuant to authority derived from the twenty-first amendment, rather than from the municipality's police power, "extensive and detailed legislative findings based upon substantial evidence that the prohibited activity contributed to criminal activity in the county are not required." Fillingim, 835 F.2d at 1397. The Newton Town Council found, as included in the preamble of the ordinance, that "nudity and sexual conduct and depiction thereof, coupled with alcohol in public places, encourages undesirable behavior and is not in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare, and that such undesirable behavior occurs in and around establishments dealing in alcoholic beverages where nude and sexual conduct and depiction thereof is permitted...." The Newton Council's findings, providing a rationale for the ordinance, are similar to those approved by the Supreme Court in Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. at 2602, where the Court noted that elected representatives "have chosen to avoid the disturbances associated with mixing alcohol and nude dancing by means of a reasonable restriction upon establishments which sell liquor for on-premises consumption." ³ Accordingly, except for the portions of the ordinance forbidding Appellant has raised two other challenges to the ordinance. First, he contends that, as the owner of the sole adult entertainment establishment in Newton, he was singled out for discriminatory treatment by the town council. In order to state a claim for selective prosecution, appellant must demonstrate that he was prosecuted while others similarly situated were not, and furthermore that the government prosecuted him invidiously or in bad faith. Fillingim, 835 F.2d at 1399. Whether or not appellant could show that he was singled out by the town council, he cannot, on the facts alleged, demonstrate that he was prosecuted in violation of his constitutional rights. "The invidiousness requirement is satisfied only if it can be established that the government's selective prosecution is motivated by constitutionally impermissible motives such as racial or religious discrimination or interference with the legitimate exercise of constitutional rights." Id. Here, as in Fillingim, we have found the ordinance not to infringe upon appellant's constitutional rights, and appellant has alleged no other unlawful motive for the council's action. Accordingly, his selective prosecution claim does not merit relief.

the display of cleavage, an unreasonable requirement under Alabama law, we affirm the district court's finding that the ordinance is constitutional under the twenty-first amendment.

Appellant's second contention is that section 1(b) of the ordinance is overbroad. That section defines an establishment dealing in alcoholic beverages as:

any business establishment operating within the corporate limits of the Town of Newton which sells, dispenses or otherwise allows the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the premises.

(emphasis supplied). Appellant argues that this definition goes beyond the scope of permissible twenty-first amendment regulation, as it would include bottle clubs, restaurants, concerts, fashion shows, and other such businesses or commercial activities not licensed by the government to sell alcohol, but where alcohol may be consumed. He contends that the ordinance is invalid under our decision in Leverett v. City of Pinellas Park, 775 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.1985), which struck down as overbroad an ordinance, adopted pursuant to the city's police power, that prohibited nude or semi-nude entertainment in any commercial establishment. The court noted in Leverett that because the ordinance there applied to "any commercial establishment," it clearly "did not regulate protected expression as "[T]he invalidation of an ordinance for facial overbreadth is a remedy that should be applied 'sparingly and only as a last resort.' " Fillingim, 835 F.2d at 1398 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). In this case the district court rejected Lanier's overbreadth claim, finding that the ordinance "clearly was passed as an incident to the regulation of alcohol, and did not go beyond the bounds of the Twenty-first amendment." We do not go so far, but conclude that, as applied in this case, the ordinance falls within the ambit of the twenty-first amendment and is not unconstitutionally overbroad.

                an incident to the regulation of alcohol."    775 F.2d at 1540, n. 2
                

Accordingly, we AFFIRM IN PART the decision of the district court. Based upon the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court that section 2(c) of the ordinance, prohibiting the exposure of cleavage, is unreasonable under Alabama law, we REVERSE the determination of the district court upholding this section. We also find that the reference to cleavage in sections 2(a) and 2(f) of the ordinance is unreasonable, and REVERSE the district court's approval of those sections only as to the word "cleavage."

APPENDIX

THE STATE OF ALABAMA--JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

SPECIAL TERM, 1987

Randall E. Lanier

v.

City of Newton, Alabama, etc.

86-515-CER

CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF...