Lanier v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 94-0013.
Citation | 871 F. Supp. 20 |
Decision Date | 14 December 1994 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 94-0013. |
Parties | Glenard E. LANIER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and, The United States of America, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Robert Edward Deso, Jr., Mitchell Bruce Weitzman, Deso, Thomas & Rost, Washington, DC, for Glenard E. Lanier, James C. Campbell, Kenneth O. Beckwith, Anthony S. Giglio, Donald L. Keller, Franklin C. Beal, William G. Roode, Terri L. Jordan, James A. Miller, Joe D. Smith, John G. Grubbs, and Gary D. Workman.
Carol Elaine Burroughs, Office of Corp. Counsel, D.C., Washington, DC, for District of Columbia.
Robert Lawrence Shapiro, Douglas A. Wickham, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for U.S.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and Defendant United States' cross-motion to dismiss. This case presents an issue of statutory construction. Plaintiffs are all retired members of the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division ("Secret Service"). Although they were federal employees, their retirement is governed by the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act ("District Retirement Act"), D.C.Code §§ 4-601 through 4-634. The issue presented to the Court is whether pursuant to the District Retirement Act's "equalization provision," § 4-605(c), the plaintiffs' retirement pay should be increased to reflect the "locality pay adjustments" given to active duty officers of the Secret Service.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In this case, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the issue before the court is solely one of law.
Plaintiffs, who are retired members of the Secret Service, are covered by the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act ("District Retirement Act"), §§ 4-601 through 4-634. At the time of their retirement, all plaintiffs were serving in the Washington, D.C. — Maryland — Virginia Statistical Metropolitan Area ("Washington, D.C"). See Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts No. 3. Sixty-four percent of the plaintiff class, which is 311 plaintiffs, currently reside in the Washington, D.C. area. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts No. 5.
Under the Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act of 1990 ("FLEPRA"), incorporated as Title IV of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 ("FEPCA") (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5304), federal law enforcement officials, including active members of the Secret Service, were given special adjustments in salary in certain cities to reflect the higher cost of living in those cities. The locality pay increase in Washington, D.C. was set at 4% by 404(b)(1) of FEPCA, 5 U.S.C. § 5305. The active members of the Secret Service began receiving these benefits on the first pay period after January 1, 1993. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts No. 11.
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to the "equalization provision" in the District Retirement Act, D.C.Code § 4-605(c), they are entitled to have their retirement pensions increased by 4% to reflect the "locality pay adjustment" given to active members.1
The "equalization provision" provides:
Each individual retired from active service and entitled to receive a pension allowance or retirement compensation under §§ 4-607 to 4-630 shall be entitled to receive, without making application therefore, with respect to each increase in salary, granted by any law which takes effect after the effective date of the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act Amendments of 1972, to which he would be entitled if he were in active service, an increase in his pension relief allowance or retirement compensation computed as follows: His pension relief allowance or retirement compensation shall be increased by an amount equal to the product of such allowance or compensation and the per centum increase made by such law in the scheduled rate of compensation to which he would be entitled if he were in active service on the effective date of such increase in salary.
§ 4-605(c) (Emphasis added).
Principles of statutory construction dictate that the Court is to interpret a statute according to its plain terms. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 71 L.Ed.2d 748. In analyzing the meaning to be attached to particular phrases, it is necessary to view the statute as a whole, informed by its overall purpose and objective. See In Re Mitchell, 977 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1992) (); Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276 (D.C.Cir.1992) ()
The plain terms of the statute indicate that the retirees are to receive commensurate percentage increases in their retirement compensation for "each increase in salary, granted by any law ... to which he would be entitled if he were in active service...." (emphasis added.) The Court finds that the 4% locality increase is an "increase in salary granted by law" to which active members in the Washington, D.C. area are entitled. A plain reading of the phrase "increase in salary" would include any increase in the amount that a worker receives in pay.
The government contends that the equalization provision limits the type of salary increases to which retirees are entitled to benefit from only to those increases "in the scheduled rate of compensation" and that a locality increase is not such an increase in the "scheduled rate of compensation."
This contention fails on several counts. First, the term, "scheduled rate of compensation," is no where defined by statute. Second, it is clear that this language is meant to be merely instructive as to how to apply the provision and is not meant to limit the coverage of the provision in any regard.
H.R. No. 92-1180, Salary Increases for District of Columbia Police and Fireman, June 27, 1972, Title I, § 114 (emphasis added). The equalization provision is one type of retirement system that Congress has adopted. The increases that the retirees receive through this equalization provision "are the only source of increases in annuities granted to retired D.C. policemen and firemen to offset increased costs of living, as they do not benefit from periodic cost-of-living adjustments as do retirees under Civil Service and other retirement systems." Id. See also, S.R. No. 92-994, Title I, § 115.
The House and Senate Committee Reports provide no hint that the "scheduled rate of compensation" phrase was meant to be limiting or that the equalization provision should in some way not cover across the board salary increases whether it be labelled locality pay or given some other designation. The Reports suggest percentage increases in salaries are to be given pro rata to the retirees as an alternative to so-called cost-of-living adjustments.
Defendant argues that retirees should not...
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