Lanier v. State
| Citation | 635 So.2d 813 |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-KP-00875,91-KP-00875 |
| Parties | Johnny Rufus LANIER v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
Johnny Rufus Lanier, pro se.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., John R. Henry, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
EN BANC.
Lanier appeals the August 1991 denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. Although Lanier entered into an agreement with the State whereby he agreed to waive any right to parole, he now challenges the propriety of his sentence--life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Because the contract by which Lanier waived any present and future rights to parole is void and unenforceable on public policy grounds, this Court remands for resentencing within the strictures of Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-19-101 (Supp.1993).
Johnny Rufus Lanier was indicted for capital murder in the December 28, 1985 murder, kidnapping, and aggravated assault of Alma Walters, a Meridian police officer. Venue was changed from Lauderdale County to Covington County, where Lanier was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court affirmed the guilty verdict but, based on a confrontation clause violation by the State, reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. See Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473 (Miss.1988).
On remand, the State agreed to forego a sentencing hearing, thus forfeiting the right to seek the death penalty, in exchange for Lanier's waiver of any future right to apply for parole on the capital murder charge. At a hearing before the circuit court on October 27, 1989, the judge accepted Lanier's waiver. Lanier was represented by five attorneys 1, all of whom were in favor of Lanier's agreement with the State and felt it was in Lanier's best interest. All five attorneys assured the court that Lanier understood the terms and implications of the agreement.
The circuit judge questioned Lanier extensively about his agreement with the State and the rights he waived by signing it. Lanier acknowledged that he had discussed the agreement with his attorneys and that he understood he was giving up all present and future rights to parole on the capital murder charge. Lanier further understood that his sentences for the three offenses (murder, kidnapping, aggravated assault) were to run consecutively, beginning with his life sentence for the murder.
In response to questions from the court, Lanier responded that he had not been threatened or coerced to accept the agreement with the State. Lanier and his attorneys then signed the agreement, which provided Lanier was "sentenced to serve a life sentence with the Mississippi Department of Corrections without eligibility for parole." Accordingly, the circuit judge sentenced Lanier to life without parole.
On April 11, 1991, Lanier offered a motion to "Reduce, Modify and/or Correct Sentence," which was ultimately filed by the Circuit Clerk of Lauderdale County on April 30, 1991. Lanier alleged the following three grounds for post-conviction relief:
1. His sentence violated the constitutions of the United States and the State of Mississippi;
2. His sentence exceeded that allowed by law; and
3. He received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase.
On May 3, 1991, the circuit judge entered an order directing the State to answer Lanier's petition and requiring answers from two of the attorneys who had represented Lanier at trial. The circuit judge stated explicitly in his order that he was expanding the record pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-39-17.
Lanier's motion was denied by the circuit judge on August 20, 1991. The judge noted Lanier challenged only the validity of the sentence agreed to for capital murder, yet did not seek to withdraw or breach his "Waiver of Parole Rights" agreement. Consequently, the trial court found only one question needed to be addressed: Is the "no parole" provision in the sentence imposed upon Lanier for his capital murder conviction valid? The trial judge further concluded that this was a question of law; therefore, no evidentiary hearing was necessary. The Lanier now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging two errors by the trial court. Only the first issue warrants discussion:
court then found that, as a matter of law, the "no parole" provision of Lanier's sentence was "a valid part of the sentence imposed on the Petitioner."
Whether the trial court erred in its holdings that the waiver of Lanier's future right to apply for parole was valid and the "no parole" provision was a valid part of the sentence.
While the agreement between the State and Lanier, as embodied in the document labeled "WAIVER OF PAROLE RIGHTS," has all the indicia of a valid contract, it is nonetheless void as against public policy. As thoroughly discussed by Presiding Justice Lee in his dissent, all essential elements of a contract are present; the right to parole was anticipatorily waived by Lanier voluntarily, knowingly, and on the advice of five attorneys; and the State fulfilled its promise to not seek the death penalty. Moreover, the dissent asserts, deletion of the "without parole" provision of Lanier's sentence does not affect the agreement between Lanier and the State. Nonetheless, this Court holds that the "contract" is invalid.
Enforcement of the contract between Johnny Rufus Lanier and the State would result in a sentence which is not authorized by law. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-19-101(1) (Supp.1993), the sentencing options available to one convicted of capital murder are life imprisonment or death. Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is not an option unless the convict is adjudged an habitual offender. Miss.Code Ann. Secs. 99-19-81, 99-19-83 (Supp.1993). Lanier was not indicted as, and apparently was not, an habitual offender; therefore a life sentence qualified by the preclusion of parole is not available to Lanier.
Enforcement of the contract would also yield a result beyond the power of this Court to produce. The legislature has established our parole system and the extent of possible sentences for crimes. See Miss.Code Ann. Title 47, Chapter 7 (Probation and Parole) and Titles 97 and 99 (Crimes, Criminal Procedure). The judiciary is responsible for trying those accused of crimes and for imposing sentences authorized by the legislature. But it is the executive branch, via the parole board, that implements the legislature's parole policies and determines the actual time served by those convicted of crimes. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 47-7-5(3) (1972). It follows that enforcement of the contract by this Court would effect judicial encroachment on an executive function. In other words, enforcement would bind the parole board, which took no part in the negotiations with Lanier.
Although the right to contract is fundamental, contracts contrary to public policy are unenforceable. Hertz Commercial Leasing v. Morrison, 567 So.2d 832, 834 (Miss.1990); First Nat. Bank of Vicksburg v. Caruthers, 443 So.2d 861, 864 n. 3 (Miss.1983). Our statutes are enactments of the public policy of this state. Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So.2d 1201, 1209 (Miss.1986) (Robertson, J., concurring). Indeed, regarding invalidation of contracts on public policy grounds, this Court has said that the public policy of this state is "found in its constitution and statutes, 'and when they have not directly spoken, then in the decisions of the courts and the constant practice of the government officials.' " Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So.2d 378, 380 (Miss.1982), quoting State ex rel Knox v. Hines Lbr. Co., 150 Miss. 1, 48, 115 So. 598, 605 (1928).
The contract between Lanier and the State relates not merely to the parties' private business, but to matters of public concern. Both Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-19-101 and this Court's interpretation of this statute have consistently allowed only two sentencing options for one convicted of capital murder: death or life imprisonment, not qualified by preclusion of parole. The contract at issue is an attempt to circumvent Sec. 99-19-101, and as such, this contract is void ab initio on the
ground that it violates the public policy of this state. 2 As a result, both parties are placed back in the positions which they occupied prior to entering into the agreement. Sullivan v. Pouncey, 469 So.2d 1233, 1234 (Miss.1985). Lanier once again has the right to be sentenced by a jury and the State once again has the right to seek the death penalty.
In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1862, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that because the sentencing proceeding under Missouri law is similar to a trial, the double jeopardy protection afforded to one acquitted of a crime after a trial is also afforded to one "acquitted" of the death penalty at his initial sentencing proceeding. Mississippi's sentencing proceeding, like that of Missouri, consists of a hearing separate from the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, where the jury has a choice between life and death and is presented with standards to guide that choice. Moreover, the State has the burden of establishing certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing hearing in order to have the death penalty imposed. Since our capital sentencing procedure requires the jury to determine whether the State has proved its case for the death penalty, just as the Missouri sentencing procedure does, the double jeopardy clause will protect a defendant from any subsequent attempt to subject him to the death penalty after a jury has impliedly acquitted him of the death penalty by determining that only a life sentence is warranted.
However, Lanier has not yet been acquitted of the death penalty. At his initial sentencing proceeding, the jury found...
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