Lankford v. Somerset County Com'rs
| Decision Date | 13 November 1890 |
| Citation | 20 A. 1017,73 Md. 105 |
| Parties | LANKFORD ET AL. v. COUNTY COM'RS SOMERSET COUNTY. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court, Somerset county.
For Dissenting Opinion see 22 A. 412
Argued before ALVEY, C.J., and MILLER, ROBINSON, IRVING, BRYAN MCSHERRY, FOWLER, and BRISCOE, JJ.
N Walter Dixon, for appellants.
Hodson & Hodson, Page & Miles, and Wm. A Fisher, for appellees.
This appeal is from a pro forma order, passed by the court below, upon an application for a mandamus to the county commissioners for Somerset county, requiring them to appoint judges of election in each of the election districts of that county, according to the provision of article 33, § 40, of the Code of Public General Laws of this state. By the pro forma order the petition was dismissed, and the petitioners have appealed. The appellants, citizens of the state and legally qualified voters of the county, allege that the county commissioners have neglected and refused to appoint judges of election, as required by the provision of the Code; the said commissioners treating and relying upon the act of the general assembly of 1890, c. 538, as a valid and constitutional act, whereby the power of appointment of judges of election in that county is taken from the county commissioners, and vested in a board of election supervisors, appointed by the governor of the state; and the appellants, alleging that the act of 1890 is invalid, pray that the commissioners may be compelled to appoint the judges of election under the provisions of the Code, irrespective of the act of 1890, c. 538. They allege that this latter act is unconstitutional and void, upon three distinct grounds: (1) That it was not duly approved and signed by the governor, within the time required by the constitution; (2) that it is a local or special act, and, as such, is repugnant to and in violation of section 33 of article 3 of the constitution; and, (3) that it violates section 29 of article 3 of the constitution, because the subject of the act is not sufficiently described in the title thereof.
In the petition it is alleged that the act of 1890, c. 538, was presented to the governor for his signature on the 31st day of March, 1890, and was approved and signed by him on the 8th day of April following. But, by the amended answer of the appellees, it is alleged, in denial of the allegation of the appellants, that the session of the general assembly of 1890 adjourned sine die on the 31st of March, and that the said act of 1890, c. 538, was, in fact, presented to the governor, duly sealed, for his approval, on the 4th day of April, 1890, and was signed by him on the 8th day of that month, though the bill was indorsed by the secretary of the senate, as having been presented to the governor on the 31st of March, the day of adjournment of the general assembly. These facts, thus set up by the amended answer, are shown by the record kept by the secretary of state, as required by section 23 of article 2 of the constitution; and a certified copy of which record has been introduced into the case by agreement of counsel, subject to all legal objections that could be taken thereto, as legal and competent evidence of the facts shown by the record. The entries in this record of the official acts and proceedings of the executive office are very full and explicit as to the facts and time of the presentation of the bill here in question, together with many other bills, in the executive chamber, and specially recording the fact that this and the other bills so presented had been indorsed by the secretary of the senate, as having been presented to the governor on the 31st of March, instead of the 4th of April, the true date. The special character of the entries seems to have been intended to correct the false entries on the bills; and it is not contended that these entries in the record by the secretary of state are not strictly in accordance with the facts as they occurred, but it is contended that such recorded entries by the secretary of state are not admissible to impeach or control the indorsements on the bill itself made by the secretary of the senate. Or, in other words, that the official indorsements of bills made by the secretary of the senate and the clerk of the house of delegates are to be taken as conclusive, and that the official record of the acts and proceedings of the executive department cannot be appealed to for the purpose of showing the truth of what has transpired in that department, if in conflict with the clerical indorsements on the bills presented to the governor. But to this contention tion we cannot for a moment accede. The record kept by the secretary of state is required by the constitution to be carefully kept and preserved, and it is competent evidence; and it is entitled to the same degree of credit as that accorded to any other record of mere official acts; and, giving to this record the credit to which it is entitled, it would seem to be too clear for any serious question that the act assailed by these proceedings was in point of fact presented to the governor for his approval on the 4th day of April, 1890, after the adjournment of the legislature, and that the act was approved on the 8th of April, 1890. Having disposed of this preliminary question of evidence, we come now to consider the main questions for decision; and the first and principal of these is, was the act in question signed by the governor within the time allowed by the constitution?
1. As we have just stated, the two houses of the general assembly adjourned sine die on the 31st of March, 1890, and the act under consideration was not presented to the governor for his approval until the 4th day of April thereafter. He approved and signed it on the 8th of April, and the bill was thereupon deposited in the office of the clerk of the court of appeals, where all bills passed and signed by the governor are required to be recorded. The constitution contains two sections that have direct relation to the subject of inquiry. The first of these is section 30 of article 3, the legislative article; and the second is section 17 of article 2, the executive article, and which last-mentioned section confers upon the governor the qualified veto power. Section 30 of article 3 declares that "every bill, when passed by the general assembly, and sealed with the great seal shall be presented to the governor, who, if he approves it, shall sign the same in the presence of the presiding officers and chief clerks of the senate and house of delegates." And section 17 of article 2 declares that While the constitution declares that during the session of the legislature, if the governor does not return a bill that has been presented to him for approval within six days after such presentation, Sundays excepted, it shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, there is no express limitation of time within which he shall sign the bill, where it has been presented to him during the session, but an adjournment occurs before the expiration of the six days. In such case, it would seem to be clear, by implication, that the governor would have the full extent of the six days within which to determine whether he would sign the bill or not. The qualified veto power is conferred upon the governor for a substantial and important purpose,--to restrain and defeat hasty and inconsiderate legislation. He may defeat the bill by assigning reasons against it during the session of the legislature, unless overcome by a three-fifths vote of the members elected to each house; and so he may defeat the bill by refusing to sign it, if the two houses adjourn before the expiration of the six days from the time the bill is presented to him. The six days would clearly appear, by implication, to be allowed to the governor within which to consider and determine whether any particular bill shall become a law. The right to this time for consideration is clearly not defeated by the adjournment of the two houses of the legislature before the expiration of the six days. There is nothing in the constitution restrictive of the action of the governor in such case, except the limitation of six days by implication, and it is very clear that a bill so presented to him may be signed by him at any time within the six days, notwithstanding the adjournment of the two houses before the expiration of that time. In the event of his signing the bill within the time, it becomes a perfected law, and he does not return it to the legislature, or to their officers or clerks, but he commits it to the custody of the clerk of the court of appeals to be recorded. If, then, a bill presented to the governor during the session of the general assembly, and signed by him within the six days but after the adjournment of both houses, may become a law, why may not a bill presented by the proper officers of both houses, as soon as practicable after the adjournment, be signed by the governor with the same effect? There is nothing in the constitution that forbids it, unless we hold that the presentation of ...
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