Lannigan v. Lannigan

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: BRALEY
• Citation: Lannigan v. Lannigan, 222 Mass. 198, 110 N.E. 285 (Mass. 1915)
• Decision Date: 22 November 1915
• Parties: LANNIGAN v. LANNIGAN.

222 Mass. 198

110 N.E. 285

LANNIGAN

v.LANNIGAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Nov. 22, 1915.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Essex County; J. F. Quinn, Judge.

Action by Maud F. Lannigan against James E. Lannigan for alienating her husband's affections. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

Defendant asked the court to rule: (1) That the evidence in the case is insufficient to overcome the presumption that in all that defendant did or said, he acted under the influence of natural affection and for what he believed to be the real good of his son. (2) That on all the evidence plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The court refused so to rule. The jury returned a verdict of $22,500 for plaintiff which the court reduced to $10,000, and defendant alleged exceptions.

Wm. R. Scharton, of Boston, and Jas. H. Maguire, of Jamaica Plains, for plaintiff.

Sweeney & Cox, of Lawrence, for defendant.

BRALEY, J.

The only questions on the record are whether the defendant's requests for rulings that the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption that in all the defendant said and did he acted under the influence of natural affection and for what he conceived to be the real good of his son, and that ‘upon all the evidence in the case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover,’ should have been given. The plaintiff sues her father-in-law for alienation of her husband's affections and for enticing him to leave her home whereby she lost his ‘company, society, aid and assistance.’ To entitle her to go to the jury she was required to show that the defendant's conduct was actuated by malice, and that through his efforts her husband's affections were alienated, and he was induced to separate from her. A father from parental affection may advise his son to discontinue the marital relation, and no action lies if such advice honestly given results in a separation. But if because of hostility and ill will to his son's wife he procures the separation, her conjugal rights are invaded, justification fails, malice is proved, and damages may be recovered. Geromini v. Brunelle, 214 Mass. 492, 102 N. E. 67,46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, and cases cited; Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890,4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605,6 Ann. Cas. 658. The question ordinarily is one of fact. If not expressly conceded, the following facts were uncontroverted. The plaintiff's husband, a man of mature years, associated in business with the defendant, married without the knowledge or assent of his father. It was not until two weeks after marriage that the husband and wife called at the defendant's home where she was not welcomed, but coldly received; the defendant being aggrieved because of his son's failure to inform him that he intended to be married. During the nine succeeding years, or until the son's death, the defendant's demeanor did not change, and he invariably treated the plaintiff with stolid indifference. He never entered her home, or voluntarily engaged her in conversation, and refused to recognize her on the street even when accompanied by her husband. The defendant was a witness at the trial, and the jury could say from his attitude shown by argumentative replies to questions of counsel, and of the court, as well as from the character of...