Lansburgh & Bros. Inc. v. Binnix.

• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: RICHARDSON, Chief Judge.
• Citation: Lansburgh & Bros. Inc. v. Binnix., 42 A.2d 922 (D.C. 1945)
• Decision Date: 31 May 1945
• Docket Number: No. 278.,278.
• Parties: LANSBURGH & BROS., Inc., v. BINNIX.

42 A.2d 922

LANSBURGH & BROS., Inc.,

v.BINNIX.

No. 278.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

May 31, 1945.

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.

Action by William G. Binnix against Lansburgh & Brothers, Incorporated, a corporation, to recover for injuries sustained when plaintiff's automobile was struck by defendant's truck. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Arthur L. Willcher, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Norman Sill, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, Chief Judge, and CAYTON and HOOD, Associate Judges.

RICHARDSON, Chief Judge.

Appellant was defendant in an action to recover damages resulting from a collision of its motor truck with plaintiff's automobile at the intersection of 4th and H Streets, Southwest. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff. Defendant in its appeal claims that the trial judge should have granted its motions for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case and at the end of the trial.

Defendant's truck was proceeding south on 4th Street, a main highway, 50 feet wide between curbs. At H Street, cross traffic is controlled by stop signs. Plaintiff, driving west on H Street in a small coupe, was crossing 4th Street when the truck struck the coupe midway of its right side. Plaintiff testified that he was two-thirds across the intersection when this occurred. Officers of the Accident Prevention Squad of the Metropolitan Police, who arrived a few minutes after the incident, testified that by actual measurement the point of impact was 42 feet west of the east curb line of 4th Street, and 12 feet south of the north curb line of H Street. Marks on the street showed that the wheels of the truck had skidded 6 feet in a straight line immediately prior to the impact.

Plaintiff also testified that on approaching the intersection he came to a stop ‘even with’ the official stop sign which is 25 feet east of the curb line of 4th Street. Here, he stated, he looked both north and south, could see a safe distance north on 4th Street, and saw no moving traffic. He then proceeded into the intersection and crossed without again looking for approaching traffic. His attention was drawn to pedestrians crossing H Street ahead of him and he did not observe the truck before the collision occurred. Cross-examined, he fixed 200 feet as the distance 4th Street was visible to the north from the point where he stopped and looked.

The traffic regulation governing the movement of vehicles at such intersections provides:

‘At any point at which an official ‘Stop’ sign has been erected all vehicles shall come to a complete stop and shall yield to other vehicles within the intersection or approaching so closely thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may proceed and other vehicles approaching the intersection shall yield to the vehicle so proceeding into or across said intersection.' Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations for the District of Columbia, Sec. 28(b).

Defendant's motions for a directed verdict were based on plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence. It now claims that in view of the evidence as a whole plaintiff's testimony that he stopped at the traffic sign is unworthy of credit; that if it be true that he did stop at that point, he was negligent in entering the intersection 25 feet beyond and in continuing across the favored street without further observation of approaching vehicles.

While plaintiff's testimony that he stopped at the sign was strongly contradicted, this presented an issue of fact for the jury to decide. In ruling on the motions the court was required to assume that the jury might believe plaintiff's version. ¹

So too, it was a question of fact for the jury to decide whether, from a car stopped at the stop sign, 4th Street was visible for such a distance north of the intersection that a reasonably prudent man, observing no moving traffic, would have proceeded into and across the intersection without again looking to either side for approaching traffic.

Where main streets are intersected by subordinate streets, where traffic crossings are regulated by stop signs, or where traffic approaching from one direction is given the right of way, decisions involving the issue of contributory negligence and the distinctive functions of court and jury are substantially uniform.

In Bland v. Hershey, 60 App.D.C. 226, 50 F.2d 991, 992, when his car arrived at an intersection plaintiff saw defendant's automobile approaching on his right, which under the applicable regulation would give it the right of way at the intersection if it presented an immediate hazard. Plaintiff proceeded to cross and the collision occurred when the front of his car was within 3 feet of the far curb line. It will be noted that at impact the relative positions of the cars in this and the present case were identical. At the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony the trial court, sitting without a jury, entered a finding that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence ‘as a matter of law and fact.’ In reversing, the court said:

‘In our opinion the testimony of the plaintiff does not disclose contributory negligence either in law or fact. According to his statement he approached the street intersection carefully and looked to the right to see if any car was approaching from that direction. He saw defendant's car coming toward the intersection, but at such a distance as to give plaintiff sufficient time to cross in safety if the defendant exercised reasonable care in operating his car.’

The court then quoted from Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 135 A. 587, where it was said that while it was incumbent upon plaintiff to give the right of way to vehicles approaching from the right ‘yet if the way for a safe distance was clear of traffic coming from that direction, he should not judicially be declared negligent * * *.’

The latter case was followed by Jackson v. Leach, 160 Md. 139, 152 A. 813, 815, where it was said:

‘* * * if at the time he looked on approaching, and within a short distance of the intersection, the way for a safe distance was clear of traffic coming from that direction, he should not judicially be declared negligent * * *.’

In Nielsen v. Richman, 8 Cir., 114 F.2d 343, 348, certiorari denied 311 U.S. 705, 61 S.Ct. 172, 85 L.Ed. 458, plaintiff had entered an arterial highway after stopping at a stop sign, from which point she looked and did not see the approaching car. When her car was half-way across the center line of the highway it was struck by one coming from her left. She had made her observation of approaching traffic when she was 25 or 30 feet from the intersection. It...