Lansburgh's, Inc. v. Ruffin

• Decision Date: 18 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 9225.,9225.
• Citation: 372 A.2d 561
• Parties: LANSBURGH'S, INC., Appellant, v. Sidney RUFFIN, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

372 A.2d 561

LANSBURGH'S, INC., Appellant, v. Sidney RUFFIN, Appellee.

No. 9225.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued January 13, 1976.

Decided April 18, 1977.

Edward J. Lopata, Washington, D. C., with whom William D. Appler, Silver Spring, Md., Richard W. Boone, Washington, D. C., and Douglas S. Hoff, Chevy Chase, Md., were on the briefs, for appellant.

William R. Kearney, Rockville, Md., for appellee.

Before KELLY, GALLAGHER and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff in a false imprisonment suit. After a jury trial, the plaintiff (appellee) was awarded a judgment of $38,000 of which $25,000 was for punitive damages. The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred in (a) not granting motions for directed verdict and in declining to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and (b) in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. We will set forth the pertinent facts in the light most favorable to appellee, as we must.

Appellee Ruffin was employed as an Assistant Manager of a shoe department, operated by Wohl Shoe Company¹ in then Lansburgh's Department Store in this city. A female customer came to the shoe department to exchange a pair of boots. Appellee testified that she had been in the store a week previously to return boots and at that time appellee Ruffin "wrote up a `no sales' slip." This was to explain the absence of a sales slip for the boots if the customer were to be checked later by store security.² When the customer returned a week later with the same boots he informed her he could not exchange the boots but, instead, referred her to the manager for the latter's decision. Shortly thereafter, according to appellee, the customer went to the first floor as the manager had left the counter where they were. The manager at the first floor called appellee to inquire concerning the problem. Appellee advised him that the manager in his department had gone upstairs "to Security" with a pair of boots. The manager on his floor then returned to appellee and informed him the Security Officer wished to see him and he proceeded to that office.

Appellee testified that he recognized it was appropriate for the Security Officer to request an employee to come to his office for communication. As an employee, he had been to the Security Office previously in connection with shoplifting by others. Upon arrival there on this occasion, he said he did not consider that he was then being detained. While there, he was questioned by security employees concerning his sales practices. Investigation encompassing the previous period of the sale in question had been conducted. The receipts and sales slips were reviewed and there was no record of the sale of the boots nor was there a cash overage for the pertinent period. In other words, no record of the sale was discovered.

Appellee said he was questioned for some and hours³ and was given an opportunity to supply the amount of the cash deficit for the sale but he declined to do so. He testified that the security employees' coats were not being worn and that their pistols and handcuffs were attached to their belts. There was contrary testimony that pistols were not being worn and that it was a violation of store policy to do so but, viewing the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to appellee, we accept that pistols were being worn. Appellee also testified, however, that he was not at any time threatened with physical harm by the Security Officer.

Near the end of appellee's stay in the Security Office he was told he was going to be "booked" and he was then told to empty the contents of his pockets. After these were examined, he was escorted to the personnel office where he was notified that he was discharged from employment. He then departed the store and no criminal charge was made against him.

The nature of the questioning in the Security Office was illustrated by appellee's own testimony:

He [security officer] said, "Either you pay for the boots or I'm going to ask you to step down or terminate you." I said, "I will not resign, myself." I said, "If it's that way, you're going to have to terminate me, yourself."

So, it was about twenty to thirty minutes, I was in there talking to him. So, he had a big sign on the wall. It was the "Rights."

Q. What rights?

A. All I remember, I didn't really read it, because I was in there to co-operate with him, because, you know, I had not did any crime. He said, "Read the sign."

Q. Did the security guard tell you to read the sign?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. All right. Then, what happened?

A. Then we started talking. He said, "Mr. Ruffin, do you remember about two weeks ago, we was talking, and I was saying to you how fine work you were doing and for you to be Assistant Manager, all you have to do is just do your job and do everything in order?" I said, "Yes, I do remember, because on the occasion, me and Mr. Holder was talking."

* * * * * *

BY MR. KEARNEY:

Q. Continue.

A. So, he told me, he said, "Do you remember the time that I told you, just to go and be Assistant Manager and do your job, because everybody on the second floor and also in store were looking up to you?" I told him yes, I could remember the time he told me that.

So, he said, "Do you remember the time I told you that you probably would become a Manager?" I said, yes, I could. He said, "Now, you aren't going to Manager Training School." I said, "Yes, I am."

So, he said, "I want to know now, if you believe this young lady when she said you sold her the boots, you sold her the boots. And, anyhow, I just want you to pay for the boots." He said, "Boy, don't mess up your record here." He said, "have you ever been arrested for anything?" I said, "No, I haven't."

He said, "Well, I want you to pay for these boots. If you don't pay for these boots, we're going to arrest you."

The principal issue is whether the trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict⁴ and, subsequently, in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

As we stated initially, we have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee. In doing so, however, we have not ignored certain undisputed evidence of appellant.⁵ While more frequently than not, reviewing courts have occasion to look primarily to the evidence of the opposing party in considering motions for directed verdict this is not to say that review must be restricted to that evidence.

"On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence — not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case — but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion." Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane). In Carlson v. American Safety Equipment Corp., 528 F.2d 384, 385 (1st Cir. 1976), the court said:

We examine the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff [party opposed to motion] but without neglecting the uncontradicted evidence introduced by defendant. [Emphasis added.][⁶]

When the Security Officer requested appellee's presence in his office for questioning there was no detention at that point. One does not lose one's legal rights by virtue of having the status of an employee. On the other hand, up to a point an employer has the right to question employees about their sales practices generally and in a particular case. Proulx v. Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., 343 Mass. 390, 178 N.E.2d 575 (1961); Roberts v. Coleman, 228 Or. 286, 365 P.2d 79 (1961). Taken too far, however, a detention of the employee may result depending upon the circumstances, including the length, nature and manner of interrogation. Compare Proulx v. Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., supra.

Here, we agree with the trial court that a detention occurred at a late point in the questioning when the Security employees said he would be "booked"⁷ and he was told to empty his pockets. The question is whether there was probable cause as a matter of law for the detention. If so, the "imprisonment" (detention) was not legally "false," so to speak.

While there is no judgment here against appellant for false arrest⁸ we must view the judgment against appellant for false imprisonment as being synonymous for present purposes. In this context, false arrest and false imprisonment are frequently without realistic distinction. Shaw v. May Department Stores Co., D.C.App., 268 A.2d 607, 609 n. 2 (1970).

This brings us to the heart of the issue in this case, that is to say, whether there was probable cause as a matter of law to warrant the detention that took place when the Security Officer said he would be "booked" and when the search of appellee took place. As to the search, one of the store Security Officers, who was on crutches due to a leg injury, patted him down and requested that he empty his pockets and the contents of his wallet on the desk. After an examination, the contents were returned to him. Nothing material was found. Shortly thereafter, he was escorted to the Personnel Office and dismissed from employment.

In false imprisonment cases in this jurisdiction, probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. It is for the jury to determine the facts when they are in dispute. Neisner Brothers, Inc. v. Ramos, D.C. App., 326 A.2d 239 (1974). If, however viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee the uncontroverted and undisputed facts constitute probable cause as a matter of law a defense motion for a directed verdict should be granted. Prieto v. May Department Stores Co., D.C.App., 216 A.2d 577 (1966).

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