Lansing Ed. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2009
• Docket Number: Docket No. 279895.
• Citation: 282 Mich. App. 165,772 N.W.2d 784
• Parties: LANSING SCHOOLS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA v. LANSING BOARD OF EDUCATION.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

772 N.W.2d 784

282 Mich. App. 165

LANSING SCHOOLS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA v. LANSING BOARD OF EDUCATION.

Docket No. 279895.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted December 2, 2008, at Lansing.

Decided January 27, 2009, at 9:05 a.m.

White, Schneider, Young & Chiodini, P.C. (by Michael M. Shoudy and Dena M. Lampinen), Okemos, for the plaintiffs.

Thrun Law Firm, P.C. (by Donald J. Bonato and Margaret M. Hackett), East Lansing, for the defendants.

Before: SAAD, C.J., and FITZGERALD and BECKERING, JJ.

SAAD, C.J.

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's order that granted summary disposition to defendants. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs, Lansing Schools Education Association, MEA/NEA, Cathy Stachwick, Penny Filonczuk, Ellen Wheeler, and Elizabeth Namie, filed their complaint for a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief on April 9, 2007. Stachwick, Filonczuk, Wheeler, and Namie are teachers in the Lansing public school system and are members of the Lansing Schools Education Association, MEA/ NEA, which is the exclusive bargaining representative for Lansing public school teachers. According to plaintiffs' complaint, students hit two of the teachers with a chair, one student slapped one of the teachers, and one student threw a wristband toward one of the teachers and it struck the teacher in the face. Plaintiffs further assert that school administrators were informed of each incident and the students were suspended, but they were not expelled.

Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that expulsion of the students is required by § 1311a(1) of the Revised School Code (RSC), MCL 380.1311a(1). Plaintiffs asked the trial court for a declaratory judgment on the rights and legal relations of the parties under the statute. Plaintiffs asserted that each incident constituted a physical assault by a student in grade six or above and that expulsion of each student was mandatory. In addition to a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs asked the trial court for a writ of mandamus ordering defendants to follow the statute and expel the students and to issue a permanent injunction to enjoin defendants from future violations of MCL 380.1311a(1). Plaintiffs further asked the court to find the school officials who failed to follow the statute guilty of a misdemeanor and to cancel the contract of the school superintendent or principal who failed to comply with the statute.

In lieu of an answer, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Defendants argued that plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims under the RSC because they have no legally protected interest in the district's decision to suspend or expel students under MCL 380.1311a(1). Defendants further argued that the RSC does not create a private cause of action by teachers or education associations, but merely sets forth the powers and duties of the school board in disciplinary proceedings. According to defendants, a private cause of action cannot be inferred under the statute because exclusive remedies are set forth in MCL 380.1801 to 380.1816. Defendants maintain that, if plaintiffs had standing to bring their claim, MCL 380.1311a(1) provides that the school board has the sole power to determine whether a student physically assaulted a teacher and findings by a school board are generally deemed conclusive by our courts. Defendants claim that plaintiffs are not entitled to a writ of mandamus or declaratory judgment because there is no clear legal right of performance and the decision whether to expel the students involves the exercise of discretion.

In response, plaintiffs asserted that the Legislature enacted MCL 380.1311a(1) to provide safe environments for teachers and, therefore, teachers have a legal interest in teaching in a safe environment. Plaintiffs further asserted that the plaintiff teachers suffered injuries in fact when they were assaulted and their legally protected interest in their own safety was invaded when the assaults occurred. Further, plaintiffs opined, "By refusing to expel students as required by statute, Defendants invaded the Plaintiff Teachers' legally protected interest in having a safe work environment...." According to plaintiffs, they have standing to assert their claims for the above reasons and because, as a remedial statute, MCL 380.1311a(1) should be liberally construed in favor of the teachers. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that a private cause of action should be inferred because there is no other adequate remedy or procedure to enforce the statute. Plaintiffs also maintained that the school board does not have the exclusive power to determine whether an assault occurred and that its duty to expel a student who commits an assault is not discretionary.

The trial court heard oral argument on June 20, 2007, and granted defendants' motion for summary disposition. The trial court reasoned that, while MCL 380.1311a(1) requires the expulsion of a student who commits a physical assault, the Lansing School Board has the discretion to determine whether a physical assault occurred within the meaning of the statute. The court further concluded that trial courts should not oversee the individual disciplinary decisions of a local school board. Accordingly, the court issued a written order that granted summary disposition to defendants.

II. ANALYSIS

A. SUMMARY OF HOLDING

This case centers on the question whether plaintiff teachers and their union have standing to maintain their lawsuit against the defendant school board and district. Standing is a constitutional principle that ensures that the judiciary considers only those cases in which a claimant has, or is about to, suffer a concrete injury. Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 464 Mich. 726, 734, 629 N.W.2d 900 (2001). As our Supreme Court reiterated in Lee, "`[i]t is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants ... who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.'" Id. at 735-736, 629 N.W.2d 900, quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). Constitutional standing requires a three-part analysis of whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact caused by the defendant, and whether that injury can be redressed by the court.

Plaintiffs claim that they have established each element of constitutional standing. However, under well-established Michigan law, we must disagree. At the same time, we are aware that the safe schools legislation at issue here is intended to make schools safer for both students and teachers and it is unfortunate that the statute does not confer a right to require enforcement of provisions of the safe schools act if the school board fails to comply with the law or for teachers to pursue claims under the act when they experience the kind of student behavior cited in plaintiffs' complaint.¹ However, it is within the province of the Legislature to enact such a process and we are bound by the language of the statute.

Plaintiffs argue that the statute at issue, MCL 380.1311a(1), directly, and by implication, confers standing on them to bring this action. However, our courts have held that, in almost all cases, if a plaintiff has not met the constitutional minimum criteria for standing, he or she may not proceed on the theory that standing is statutorily conferred because to do so "would inappropriately involve the judiciary in `deciding public policy, not in response to a real dispute in which a plaintiff had suffered a distinct and personal harm, but in response to a lawsuit from a citizen who had simply not prevailed in the representative processes of government.'" Michigan Ed. Ass'n v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 272 Mich.App. 1, 8, 724 N.W.2d 478 (2006), quoting Nat'l Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 471 Mich. 608, 615, 684 N.W.2d 800 (2004). Accordingly, and because plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement, the trial court properly dismissed their case.

B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs filed their complaint pursuant to MCL 380.1311a, which provides, in relevant part:

(1) If a pupil enrolled in grade 6 or above commits a physical assault at school against a person employed by or engaged as a volunteer or contractor by the school board and the physical assault is reported to the school board, school district superintendent, or building principal by the victim or, if the victim is unable to report the assault, by another person on the victims behalf, then the school board, or the designee of the school board as described in section 1311(1) on behalf of the school board, shall expel the pupil from the school district permanently, subject to possible reinstatement under subsection (5). A district superintendent or building principal who receives a report described in this subsection shall forward the report to the school board.

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(12) As used in this section:

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(b) "Physical assault" means intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to another through force or violence.

i. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING

Defendants argued in the trial court that plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to maintain their claim. As summarized above, "[t]he concept of standing in the context of a legal proceeding means that a party must have suffered an actual, particularized impairment of a legally protected interest, that the opposing party can in some way be shown to be responsible for that impairment, and that a favorable decision by a court could likely redress that impairment." Walgreen Co. v. Macomb Twp., 280 Mich.App. 58, 62, 760 N.W.2d 594 (2008) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, as our Supreme Court explained in Nat'l Wildlife Federation, supra at 628-629, 684...