Lantz v. Office of the Jackson Twp. Tr.

• Decision Date: 29 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1:10 CV 340.,1:10 CV 340.
• Parties: Donald LANTZ, Ronnie Wright, Plaintiffs, v. The OFFICE OF the JACKSON TOWNSHIP TRUSTEE, the Jackson Township Advisory Board, Jackson Township, and the Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Corporation of Dekalb County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

938 F.Supp.2d 810

Donald LANTZ, Ronnie Wright, Plaintiffs,

v.The OFFICE OF the JACKSON TOWNSHIP TRUSTEE, the Jackson Township Advisory Board, Jackson Township, and the Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Corporation of Dekalb County, Defendants.

No. 1:10 CV 340.

United States District Court,

N.D. Indiana,

Fort Wayne Division.

March 29, 2013.

W. Erik Weber, Mefford Weber and Blythe PC, Auburn, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Kelly J. Pautler, Murphy Ice & Koeneman LLP, Robert T. Keen, Jr., Carson Boxberger LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, David L. Ferguson, Ferguson & Ferguson, Bloomington, IN, Timothy M. Swan, Garan Lucow Miller PC, Merrillville, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES T. MOODY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the township defendants' (the Office of the Jackson Township Trustee, the Jackson Township Advisory Board, and Jackson Township) motion for summary judgment (DE # 34) and the Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Corporation of DeKalb County's motion for summary judgment (DE # 36). For the reasons set forth below, those motions are granted in part, and the remaining claims are remanded to state court.

I. Facts and Background

The following facts are not genuinely disputed.¹ The Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Corporation (“the VFC”) provides firefighting protection services for Jackson Township, which is located in Dekalb County, Indiana. All of the VFC's corporate powers are vested in the Fire Corporation Board. This Board oversees all of the VFC's operations. In 2009, the Jackson County Trustee entered into an agreement with the Fire Corporation Board. Under the agreement, Jackson Township paid the VFC $38,500 a year for fire protection services.

The Fire Corporation Board is made up of eleven individuals. The Jackson Township Trustee and the Fire Chief are both mandatory members of the Fire Corporation Board. The other nine members are elected. The Fire Corporation has its own set of bylaws. Each year, the Fire Corporation Board appoints a Fire Chief and an Assistant Fire Chief.

Plaintiff Donald Lantz began his tenure at the VFC after joining as a volunteer firefighter in 2000. From that time, until the date he was terminated in 2009, Lantz held several positions, including Assistant Chief. Plaintiff Ronnie Wright began working for the VFC in 1982. Wright also held various positions within the corporation, including Fire Chief from 1991 to 2005. As volunteer firefighters, Lantz and Wright received a yearly stipend for clothingand reimbursement for training and attendance on fire runs.

In 2008, the VFC held a fundraiser at which alcohol was served. At some point prior to the date of the fundraiser, Lantz, while at a meeting of firefighters and Fire Corporation Board members, announced that he would not be attending the fundraiser because his religious beliefs would not allow him to participate in an event that served alcohol to the public. (DE # 37–2 at 5.) The VFC planned to hold the same fundraiser in 2009. When it was announced that the same fundraiser would be held, but this time, sex toys would be auctioned off, Lantz stated to his fellow firefighters that he “would not participate again in [the] fundraiser.” ( Id.; DE # 39–1 at 76.) Although Lantz was not penalized in any way for failing to participate in the fundraisers, other members of the VFC started to shun him after he announced he would not be attending the 2009 fundraiser.

Lantz was involved in another incident that caused tension at the VFC. ² One of Lantz's fellow volunteer firefighters, Todd Helgesen, also worked at a nightclub in Fort Wayne. At some point, Helgesen told Lantz two stories about his employment at the nightclub that caused Lantz to become alarmed about Helgesen's well-being. First, Helgesen told Lantz that someone had pointed a gun at his face while he was working security at the nightclub one night. Additionally, Helgesen told Lantz that twelve of his coworkers at the nightclub had been arrested for drug possession. After hearing these stories, Lantz called the nightclub that Helgesen was working at out of a concern for Helgesen's well-being. Lantz ended up voicing his concerns to Helgesen's supervisor, and later, the owner of the nightclub. After learning about this incident, Matt Logsdon, the Fire Chief at the time, approached Lantz about the phone calls to the nightclubs. Lantz told Logsdon that he was concerned for Helgesen's well-being, apologized for making the calls, and promised not to make any additional phone calls to the nightclub.

On March 23, 2009, the Fire Corporation Board met and decided to terminate both Lantz and Wright.³ On September 1, 2010, plaintiffs filed suit in Indiana state court against the Jackson Township Trustee, the Jackson Township Advisory Board, Jackson Township, and the Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Corporation of Dekalb County. In their complaint (DE # 1), plaintiffs allege federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the first amendment, and state-law claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, defamation, libel, and violations of the Indiana Open Door Law. (DE # 1.) Additionally, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the removal of the plaintiffs from their positions with the VFC was invalid and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The township defendants and the VFC have both moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs' claims.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate-in fact, is mandated-where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that these requirements have been met; it may discharge this responsibility by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir.2010) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). To overcome a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence, however, is insufficient to fulfill this requirement. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The nonmoving party must show that there is evidence upon which a jury reasonably could find for him. Id.

The court's role in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to evaluate the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505;Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.1994). On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir.1998); Doe, 42 F.3d at 443. Importantly, the court is “not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record [in favor of the non-movant]-only those inferences that are reasonable.” Bank Leumi Le–Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991) (emphasis added).

III. Analysis

The court will begin and end its analysis with plaintiffs' First Amendment and § 1983 declaratory judgment claims.

A. Lantz's First Amendment Claim

Plaintiffs provide two separate statements that they believe prompted Lantz's termination: Lantz's statement that he would not participate in the fundraiser, and the conversations Lantz had with Helgesen's superiors at the nightclub. (DE # 42 at 21.) Both groups of defendants have moved for summary judgment on Lantz's First Amendment claim. The VFC argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Lantz's First Amendment claim because the phone conversations Lantz had with Helgesen's supervisors did not involve a matter of public concern. (DE # 37 at 9.) The township defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Lantz's statement that he would not participate in the fundraiser did not involve a matter of public concern. (DE # 35 at 10.) ⁴

The First Amendment prohibits “a public employer from retaliating against an employee for engaging in protected speech.” Clarke, 574 F.3d at 376. The court must apply a three-step analysis to a First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: “(1) the employee's speech must be constitutionally protected; (2) the employer's action must be motivated by the constitutionally protected speech; and (3) if the action was retaliatory, [the court must] consider whether the employer has demonstrated that it would have taken the same action irrespective of the employee's speech.” Id. To be constitutionally protected, the speech must involve a matter of public concern ⁵Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 983–84 (7th Cir.2013). “ ‘Whether a statement rises to the level of public concern is a question...