Lapland v. Stearns

• Citation: 79 N.D. 62,54 N.W.2d 748
• Decision Date: 28 August 1952
• Docket Number: No. 7304,7304
• Parties: LAPLAND v. STEARNS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

Page 748

54 N.W.2d 748

79 N.D. 62

LAPLAND v. STEARNS et al.

No. 7304.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Aug. 28, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The title to an act of the legislature will be construed liberally and if all the provisions of the act are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title that is sufficient compliance with Sec. 61 of the Constitution.

2. In the enactment of a statute earlier acts on the same subject are generally presumed to have been within the knowledge and consideration of the legislature and the new statute is regarded as having been adopted in the light of former statutes and with reference thereto.

3. It is generally held that the construction by the courts of last resort of former statutes is presumed to have been considered by the legislature in the enactment of a new statute on the same subject and may be considered by the courts in the construction of the latter statute on the same subject.

4. When a former statute and the terms and phrases used therein have been construed by the court of last resort and the legislature enacts a new statute on the same subject using the same terms and phrases it will be presumed, in the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the contrary, that such terms and phrases are used in the same sense as in the former statute.

5. A comparison of Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943 with prior enactments on the same subject discloses that in it are used many of the same words and phrases contained in the prior enactments and heretofore construed by this court. There is no clear expression in Sec. 26-1018, supra, to indicate that the legislature intended to use those words and phrases in a sense different from the sense in which they were used in the former statute construed by this court.

6. Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943, construed and it is held that life insurance policies or contracts by any mutual aid or benevolent associations payable to the estate of the insured are deemed payable to his heirs who take the avails thereof by contract not by descent.

7. Under Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943, the avails of a life insurance policy or of a contract by any mutual aid or benevolent society payable to the estate of the insured do not become a part of his estate upon his death unless there is a specific provision in the policy or the insured has made a contract or a provision in his will to that effect.

8. Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943 is not an exemption statute and does not violate Sec. 208 of the Constitution.

9. Under Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943 the avails of a life insurance policy or of a contract by any mutual aid or benevolent society payable to the legal heirs or estate of the insured upon his death pass to his legal heirs as if they were named beneficiaries through the executor or administrator of his estate without in any way affecting the estate.

10. Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943 does not violate the due process clauses of the federal or state Constitutions.

11. If no heirs can be found to whom the avails of life insurance policy, under Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943, can pass the avails escheat to the state in accordance with Sec. 54-0102, NDRC 1943.

12. When an executor or an administrator of an estate through whom the avails of a life insurance policy or of a contract by any mutual aid or benevolent society under Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943 pass, retains such avails in good faith pending the determination by a court of last resort as to whom they belong he is not liable for interest thereon.

Bosard & McCutcheon, Minot, for appellants.

Halvorson & Halstead, Minot, for respondent.

GRIMSON, Judge.

The plaintiff as the legal heir of Lewis C. Stearns brought this action in the District Court of Ward County against the men who are the executors of his last will and testament for the avails of a life insurance policy payable to the estate of Lewis C. Stearns. The defendant executors admit receiving $24,496.28 on such policy. They deny plaintiff's right thereto and allege that the only law under which the plaintiff could recover in this action is Sec. 26-1018, NDRC, 1943, which statute they claim is unconstitutional. They ask for a dismissal of the action.

The matter was submitted to the District Court on the following stipulated facts: Lewis C. Stearns, a resident of Minot, Ward County, North Dakota, died on Jan. 29, 1951, testate, leaving no wife surviving him. Mona Stearns Lapland, the plaintiff, was his legally adopted daughter and his only child or issue and no issue or children of Lewis C. Stearns preceded him in death. He left a will with codicil which was duly admitted to probate. The defendants are the duly appointed executors thereof. No creditors are involved in this controversy. At the time of the death of Lewis C. Stearns he was possessed of $24,496.28 worth of life insurance on his own life. The beneficiary named in the policy was the Lewis C. Stearns estate. No mention was made in the Stearns will or codicil of life insurance or avails of life insurance. Lewis C. Stearns made no special contract inter vivos in regard to the avails of his said life insurance. The defendant executors have collected the avails of said life insurance and still hold the same in the amount of $24,496.28. They have failed to pay said avails to anyone. Demand for payment of said avails was served on the defendant by the plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. All of the defendants are interested solely as executors except James W. Stearns who is also a legatee or beneficiary under a testamentary trust created by the will of Lewis C. Stearns. The District Court found for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal.

The sole issue raised on the appeal is the constitutionality of Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943. That section reads as follows:

'The avails of a life insurance policy or of a contract payable by any mutual aid or benevolent society, when made payable to the deceased, to the personal representatives of the deceased, to his heirs, or to his estate, shall not be subject to the debts of the decedent upon the death of such insured or member of such society except by special contract. Such avails shall be inventoried as a part of the estate of the decedent and distributed without deduction and shall pass to the heirs at law or legatees of the decedent in accordance with the laws of succession or of wills, as the case may be. The insured may transfer the avails of such life insurance policy or contract either by will or by contract. Nothing contained in this section shall:

'1. Affect, in any manner, any life insurance policy or beneficiary certificate which is made payable to a designated person, including the spouse of the insured, or to persons or to members of a family designated as a class, such as 'all children' or 'all brothers and sisters', even though the members of such class are not designated by name; or

'2. Permit any insured to dispose of the avails of a contract by a mutual or fraternal society by will to anyone who could not be a beneficiary in such contract under the charter or by-laws of such society.'

This section, 26-1018, supra, was originally Chapter 149 of the 1929 Session Laws. The defendants claim that section was an original enactment and that for that reason they have a right to consider the title thereof in connection with their claim of its unconstitutionality. The first ground for such claim is that the title covers more than one subject in violation of Sec. 61 of the state constitution. That title reads as follows:

'An act to provide for the distribution of the avails of life insurance made payable to the deceased, his personal representatives, his heirs or estate, and exempting such avails from the debts of the decedent.'

The subject matter of Sec. 26-1018, supra, is the distribution of the avails of such life insurance. If all the provisions of an act are germane to the subject expressed in the title then the act is valid as against any claim of violation of Sec. 61 of the constitution.

Referring to that principle this court in State ex rel. Weeks v. Olson, 65 N.D. 407, 259 N.W. 83, 85, has said:

'This principle of law is well settled in North Dakota and in many other states having constitutional provisions similar to ours. Stated differently, this rule means that legislation may include any matter naturally and reasonably connected with the subject of the act as expressed in the title. State ex rel. Gammons v. Shafer, 63 N.D. 128, 246 N.W. 874; Thompson Yards v. Kingsley, 54 N.D. 49, 208 N.W. 949. It is also the law of this state that the title to an act will be construed liberally and not in a strict and technical manner. State ex rel. Poole v. Peake, 18 N.D. 101, 120 N.W. 47.' See also Great Northern Railway Co. v. Duncan, 42 N.D. 346, 176 N.W. 992; State v. Colohan, 69 N.D. 316, 286 N.W. 888; 50 Am.Jur. Statutes, Sec. 196, 197, p. 177-180.

The defendants claim that the method of determining succession and an exemption statute are included in the act extraneous to the matter of the distribution of the avails. The policy makes the heirs or estate of the decedent the beneficiaries. The law of heirship determines the succession. The act makes no determination thereof. The provision that the avails shall not be subject to the debts of the decedent relates merely to the safeguarding of the avails. Construing the act liberally it contains only matters relative to the distribution of the avails of such insurance which is the subject matter thereof.

Furthermore, if there should be any doubt about this, Chapter 149, S.L.1929 was reenacted in the 1943 revision of the code as Sec. 26-1018, NDRC 1943 without the inclusion of the title and the original statute, including the title, was repealed, Sec. 1-0219, NDRC 1943. It has been held that a statute which fails to comply with a constitutional provision requiring every act to embrace one subject to be mentioned in its title becomes valid upon its incorporation in a proper code or revision duly...