Laplante v. GGNSC Madison
| Decision Date | 18 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | #29075 |
| Citation | 941 N.W.2d 223 |
| Parties | Christina LAPLANTE, Claimant and Appellant, v. GGNSC MADISON, SOUTH DAKOTA, LLC d/b/a Golden Living Center – Madison and Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, Employer, Insurer and Appellees. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
A. RUSSELL JANKLOW, JAMI J. BISHOP of Johnson, Janklow, Abdallah, & Reiter, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for claimant and appellant.
JUSTIN T. CLARKE, REECE M. ALMOND of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for employer, insurer, and appellees.
[¶1.] Christina LaPlante was injured while working as a certified nursing assistant at GGNSC Madison, South Dakota LLC d/b/a Golden Living Center – Madison (GGNSC). LaPlante filed a petition with the South Dakota Department of Labor (Department) seeking workers’ compensation benefits on October 29, 2015. On April 3, 2018, GGNSC and Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (Employer/Insurer) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of prosecution pursuant to ARSD 47:03:01:09.1 The Department granted the motion to dismiss and LaPlante appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the dismissal. LaPlante now appeals to this Court.2 We reverse.
[¶2.] On August 9, 2012, LaPlante was injured when her right wrist was lodged between a metal grab bar on the wall and the automatic lift she was using to assist a resident at the GGNSC facility. She reported the injury and received periodic medical treatment to her right hand, thumb, and wrist. In 2013, LaPlante underwent surgery on her wrist. LaPlante continued to seek medical treatment following the surgery, and claimed she was unable to work due to her injury.
[¶3.] Employer/Insurer eventually denied ongoing workers’ compensation benefits to LaPlante. LaPlante then filed a petition with the Department seeking disability benefits and medical expenses. Employer/Insurer answered on November 19, 2015. The parties exchanged written discovery in March 2016. LaPlante’s deposition was taken in July 2016.
[¶4.] On August 26, 2016, LaPlante presented a settlement demand to Employer/Insurer. The demand requested temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, mileage reimbursement, unpaid medical expenses, and vocational rehabilitation benefits. LaPlante also completed a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) that she forwarded to Employer/Insurer in September 2016 as a part of the settlement discussions. Employer/Insurer submitted a counter-proposal for settlement to LaPlante in October 2016. LaPlante did not respond to the counter-proposal.
[¶5.] Instead, LaPlante applied for vocational rehabilitation assistance from the South Dakota Department of Human Services in December 2016 to assist in finding employment within her physical limitations identified in the FCE. LaPlante was accepted into a twelve-month vocational rehabilitation program in March 2017. LaPlante also made several requests from January through April 3, 2017, to obtain medical records held by Human Services concerning her work injury and physical limitations. She received a report of her Individualized Plan for Employment from Human Services on April 5, 2017.
[¶6.] LaPlante did not inform Employer/Insurer that she was participating in the vocational rehabilitation program. However, she did inform Employer/Insurer on March 8, 2017, that she was having problems obtaining records from Human Services, and that she was scheduled to undergo an evaluation with Human Services. LaPlante continued to participate in the vocational rehabilitation program until she obtained employment and successfully completed the program in November 2017.3
[¶7.] On September 22, 2017, counsel for Employer/Insurer sent a letter to counsel for LaPlante. The letter stated, Neither LaPlante nor her lawyer responded to the letter or communicated further with Employer/Insurer. On April 3, 2018, Employer/Insurer filed a motion to dismiss with the Department for lack of prosecution under ARSD 47:03:01:09. Employer/Insurer asserted in its affidavit and brief that there had been no activity for at least one year, and LaPlante had failed to show good cause for the delay. LaPlante submitted an affidavit and brief asserting her efforts to obtain records and her involvement in the vocational rehabilitation program constituted activity under ARSD 47:03:01:09, and in the alternative, asserted that these efforts established a good cause for delay. LaPlante requested the Department deny the motion to dismiss and enter a scheduling order.
[¶8.] On June 20, 2018, the Department entered a memorandum decision dismissing the petition under ARSD 47:03:01:09. The Department found that LaPlante had finished the vocational rehabilitation program less than one year before the motion to dismiss was filed. However, the Department concluded there had been no activity within the last year because "there has not been record activity and no effort was made to communicate with the Employer and Insurer." In discussing whether there was good cause for the delay, the Department agreed that "waiting on the results of the voc rehab program would be good cause for delay[,]" but found LaPlante’s participation was not good cause because it was not communicated to Employer/Insurer.
[¶9.] On appeal, the circuit court entered a memorandum decision affirming the Department’s decision. The court likewise concluded there had been no "record activity" before the Department for a period of at least one year before the motion was filed. The court also affirmed the Department’s determination that LaPlante failed to show good cause for the absence of any activity.
[¶10.] LaPlante appeals, arguing that the Department and circuit court erred in determining there was no activity for a period of one year. She also argues that the Department and circuit court erred in concluding that her participation in the vocational rehabilitation program did not constitute good cause.
[¶11.] This Court has not previously considered the dismissal of a workers’ compensation petition by the Department under ARSD 47:03:01:09 or the appropriate standard of review for such a dismissal. In considering the dismissal of a civil case for failure to prosecute under SDCL 15-11-11 or SDCL 15-6-41(b), we review the "circuit court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, while we apply the de novo standard when reviewing its conclusions of law." Eischen v. Wayne Twp. , 2008 S.D. 2, ¶ 10, 744 N.W.2d 788, 794. We review the circuit court’s ultimate decision to dismiss "a claim for failure to prosecute using the abuse of discretion standard." Id.
[¶12.] Because the language of ARSD 47:03:01:09 also provides the Department with discretion to determine whether to dismiss a petition when there has been no activity for more than a year and no showing of good cause, we will likewise apply the abuse of discretion standard. In workers’ compensation cases, we review both findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo when the Department’s findings are based solely on documentary evidence presented to the Department, as was the case here. Martz v. Hills Materials , 2014 S.D. 83, ¶ 14, 857 N.W.2d 413, 417.
1. Whether the Department abused its discretion in dismissing LaPlante’s workers’ compensation petition for failure to prosecute under ARSD 47:03:01:09.
[¶13.] The Department may dismiss a workers’ compensation petition under ARSD 47:03:01:09 when there has been "no activity for at least one year, unless good cause is shown[.]" The Rule does not define the term "activity," which is the threshold basis for considering whether to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution. The Rule also does not define the term "good cause."
[¶14.] In the absence of a decision from this Court considering ARSD 47:03:01:09, both parties cite cases interpreting SDCL 15-11-114 and SDCL 15-6-41(b),5 which address the dismissal of a civil case for failure to prosecute. A court may dismiss a civil case pursuant to SDCL 15-11-11 where the "record reflects that there has been no activity for one year." Under SDCL 15-11-11, "[a] plaintiff’s failure to proceed with a case for a year or more clearly gives a defendant grounds to move for failure to prosecute." White Eagle v. City of Fort Pierre , 2002 S.D. 68, ¶ 10, 647 N.W.2d 716, 720. In contrast, SDCL 15-6-41(b) does not set a length of time that must pass without activity, but rather permits a defendant to move for dismissal when a plaintiff has failed to prosecute a case. In addressing SDCL 15-6-41(b), we have stated that "[n]o requisite period of inactivity is mandated by the statute." Eischen , 2008 S.D. 2, ¶ 12, 744 N.W.2d at 795.
[¶15.] In considering motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute a civil case, this Court has stated that "[p]laintiffs bear the duty to advance their cases, while defendants need only meet plaintiffs’ actions step by step." Moore v. Michelin Tire Co., Inc. , 1999 S.D. 152, ¶ 49, 603 N.W.2d 513, 526. We have explained that the purpose of the rule is to permit "trial courts [to] take an active role in monitoring their dockets." Id. However, "[t]he goal of the courts is justice—docket control and calendar clearance are secondary concerns." Id. In reviewing dismissals for lack of prosecution under SDCL 15-11-11 and SDCL 15-6-41(b), we have cautioned that "a dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute is an extreme remedy and should be used only when there is an unreasonable and unexplained delay." Annett v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. , 1996 S.D. 58, ¶ 12, 548 N.W.2d 798, 802 (quoting Dakota Cheese, Inc. v. Taylor, 525 N.W.2d 713,...
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May v. Spearfish Pellet Co.
...on documentary evidence presented to the Department, as was the case here." LaPlante v. GGNSC Madison, S.D., LLC , 2020 S.D. 13, ¶ 12, 941 N.W.2d 223, 227. We agree with the Department and the circuit court that the February 2014 letter did not contain sufficient information to constitute a......
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May v. Spearfish Pellet Co.
... ... Department, as was the case here." LaPlante v. GGNSC ... Madison, S.D., LLC, 2020 S.D. 13, ¶ 12, 941 N.W.2d ... 223, 227. We agree ... ...