Lappin v. Laidlaw Transit Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C 00-2823 SI.,C 00-2823 SI. |
| Citation | 179 F.Supp.2d 1111 |
| Parties | Julia LAPPIN, Plaintiff, v. LAIDLAW TRANSIT INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
James J. Braze, Gail Stimmell Braze, David Ng, Braze Law Offices, Petaluma, CA, for plaintiff.
Jeffrey L. Adams, Jill A. Fukunaga, Littler Mendelson, Walnut Creek, CA, Richard A. Frankel, Michelle R. Ferber, Frankel & Goldware, Danvil, CA, Frederick L. Nelson, Hildebrand, McLeod & Nelson, Oakland, CA, Kevin C. Brodar, Associate General Counsel, Cleveland, OH, for defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On December 14, 2001, the Court heard argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Having carefully considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants' motion for the reasons set forth below.
Plaintiff Julia Lappin ("Lappin") was employed as a bus driver by defendant Laidlaw Transit, Inc. ("Laidlaw"), between November 1997 and October 1999. Laidlaw provides bus transportation services for children in the City and County of San Francisco. Declaration of Robert Gonzalez, 2:5-6. During her employment at Laidlaw, Lappin was a member of the United Transportation Union Local 1741 ("UTU"), and was subject to the collective bargaining agreement between Laidlaw and UTU. Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 15. Defendants Donald Brown ("Brown") and Donald Choy ("Choy") were co-workers of Lappin, also employed as bus drivers, and were members of UTU during all relevant times. Lappin socialized on a regular basis with Brown and Choy, as well as other co-workers. Deposition of Julia Lappin, 332:8-333:3.
This suit is based in large part on an altercation between Lappin and Brown that occurred on October 1, 1999. On that date, Lappin encountered Brown in the dispatch office after driving her morning bus route. Lappin got a cup of coffee, at which point Brown asked her why she was drinking the coffee he had made. Id. at 115:7-116:22; 124:1-12. The two then became involved in a physical altercation. The parties dispute the details and seriousness of the altercation. According to Lappin, Brown approached her from behind and hit her on the back of the head. She turned around and tried to kick him, but he grabbed her and pushed her, causing her to fall on two co-workers. Id. at 121:4-5. Brown then approached Lappin and she hit him on the side of the head. Brown grabbed her and "threw her" approximately five or six feet. Id. at 128:7-129:5. Lappin was propelled into an object she believes to have been a wall or table, and then fell to the ground. Id. at 131:5-17. Two co-workers came to Lappin's assistance and another took Brown out of the room. Id. at 131:16-19.
Later in the day, as Lappin prepared to drive her afternoon route, she saw defendant Choy and told him about the altercation with Brown. According to Lappin, Choy reacted by laughing and tapping her on the head, apparently mimicking Brown's earlier act. Id. at 144:16-18. Lappin then parked her bus, told dispatch that she could not drive, and went home. Id. at 148:2-3.
On October 4, 1999, the following Monday, Lappin went to work and drove her morning route. When her route was completed, she returned to the dispatch office and spoke with Susan Moorehead, who was a fellow driver at Laidlaw and also the president of UTU, about the altercation with Brown. According to Lappin, Moorehead discouraged her from reporting the incident to management because she thought that Brown was "just going to make it a racial issue and that we should just kind of work it out among ourselves." Id. at 154:12-16. After two other co-workers encouraged her to report the matter to management, Lappin filled out an incident report and provided it to the District Manager for Laidlaw Transit, Inc., Robert Gonzalez. Id. at 133:13-19.
Gonzalez began an investigation of the incident soon afterwards. He interviewed several employees who had witnessed the incident and convened a meeting on October 15, 1999 between the parties. Gonzalez Decl., 2:13-16. Present at the meeting were Brown, Lappin, Gonzalez, Moorehead, and the Area General Manager, Barbara Perry. Both Brown and Lappin provided their differing versions of the incident. The company apparently concluded that the incident stemmed from horseplay between Brown and Lappin. Id. at 351:15-18. Laidlaw sent a letter to Lappin on November 1, 1999 summarizing the findings of the investigation. In essence, Laidlaw concluded that the incident "occurred because both of you behaved inappropriately, which caused the incident to get out of hand." Lappin Depo., Ex. 22 ("Letter of Understanding") (emphasis in original). The company determined that Lappin and Brown had engaged in "friendly verbal bantering and even occasional horseplay" in the past. Brown's act of striking Lappin on the back of the head, according to Laidlaw, was "the usual horseplay in which you and he had previously engaged." Instead of retaliating, Lappin should have reported the incident to supervisors. Id. According to Laidlaw, Brown received a similar letter. Defs.' Mot, 6:28-7:1.
After filing the incident report on October 4, 1999, Lappin did not return to work at Laidlaw. Lappin Depo., 463:19-21. On October 27, 1999 Lappin submitted a resignation letter. On November 1, 1999, Gonzalez sent a letter to Lappin in response in which he recognized Lappin's concern for her safety and assured her that he believed that she could safely return to work at Laidlaw. He encouraged her to reconsider, advising her that the resignation could be reversed, allowing her to return to work at the same level of seniority. In response to her concerns that Brown had not been appropriately disciplined, Gonzalez reported that "the matter had been properly addressed with Donald, and he clearly understands the consequences of a repeated infraction." Lappin Depo., Ex. 23 ("Gonzalez 11/1/99 Letter"). Lappin did not respond to the letter. She commenced a new job at Marin Country Day School on November 1, 1999. Id. at 511:12-15.
Lappin filed the instant suit on August 8, 2000 alleging several causes of action against Laidlaw, Brown, and Choy. The claims are as follows: (1) Title VII race discrimination (against Laidlaw and Brown); (2) Title VII sex discrimination (against Laidlaw and Brown); (3) sexual harassment based on hostile work environment (against Laidlaw and Brown); (4) battery (against Laidlaw, Brown, and Choy); (5) breach of contract (against Laidlaw); (6) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (against Laidlaw); (7) violation of California Constitution Article I, Section 8 (against Laidlaw, Brown, and Choy); and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Laidlaw, Brown, and Choy).1 All three defendants now move for summary judgment on each claim.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554.
The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to "designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence ... will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2519, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Id.
Lappin's first and second causes of action are for race and sex discrimination against Brown and Laidlaw under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).2 In her complaint, Lappin claims that Laidlaw constructively terminated her from her position by failing to provide a safe place to work. Lappin explains that "[d]efendant Laidlaw apparently was more concerned with appeasing Defendant Brown who is a black male as opposed to Plaintiff who is a Chinese female." Complaint, ¶ 59. In addition, Lappin claims that Laidlaw permitted an employment environment that was hostile to her race and gender because Laidlaw permitted racial slurs and sexual jokes and comments on the job. This conduct, according to Lappin, amounted to discrimination on the basis of her race and gender. Id. at ¶¶ 53-60.
The burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), governs Lappin's claims of race...
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