Lappley v. State
| Decision Date | 02 December 1919 |
| Citation | 170 Wis. 356,174 N.W. 913 |
| Parties | LAPPLEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Error to Municipal Court of Milwaukee County; Geo. Clementson, Judge.
Charles Lappley was convicted of perjury, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Plaintiff in error (defendant) was tried and convicted of perjury and brings error to reverse this judgment.
On December 30, 1892, defendant and his wife, Wilhelmina Lappley, borrowed from George Hook, the complainant and plaintiff in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding out of which this action arose, the sum of $800, giving their note for that amount. At the same time a real estate mortgage securing the payment of the note was given to George Hook and signed by Charles Lappley and Wilhelmina Lappley dated December 30, 1892. The complainant, George Hook, testi fies that the note was never paid; that no claim was ever made by the defendant that the note was paid until some time in July, 1914, after foreclosure proceedings had been commenced and when the defendant asked for an extension of time from the complainant's attorney. The defendant admits paying interest on the note up to the year 1914, but claims that he discovered in July of that year that the note had been paid on June 30, 1900, by his wife. The wife became insane shortly after that date and was committedto an insane asylum in October, 1900. He admits that she experienced lucid periods up to the time of her death in 1918, and that he conversed with her in regard to business matters a number of times, but claims that she never told him of having paid the note in 1900, and that he knew nothing of the matter until he found a receipt bearing the date June 30, 1900, signed by George H. Hook. Mr. Hook denied that the receipt, either signature or body, is in his handwriting, or that he had written it, or that it was in the handwriting of his wife or his children or any one employed as his agent.
On January 30, 1915, the plaintiff, Mr. Hook, was awarded judgment in the foreclosure proceeding against the defendant, which judgment was entered on the same day. On January 16, 1916, defendant instituted a proceeding in connection with the foreclosure action by verified petition setting up the alleged receipt and payment of the note and praying that the foreclosure judgment be vacated and set aside. By stipulation this motion was dismissed upon its merits, and on September 26, 1918, the defendant commenced a civil action by swearing to a complaint which is the basis for this prosecution for perjury. This civil action is based upon the same alleged receipt from George Hook. On October 5, 1918, this criminal action of perjury against Charles Lappley was commenced.
The case was tried before the court and a jury, and the defendant was found guilty. He was sentenced to serve a term of three years in the House of Correction of Milwaukee County, which judgment he now seeks to reverse.
Gugel & Kline, of Milwaukee, for plaintiff in error.
John J. Blaine, Atty. Gen., and Winfred C. Zabel, Dist. Atty. and Arthur H. Bartelt, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of Milwaukee, for the State.
SIEBECKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).
[1] It is contended that the perjury charged in the information does not constitute a crime within the provisions of section 4471, Stats., upon the ground that perjury cannot be committed in verifying a pleading. The statutes provide:
“Any person being lawfully required to depose the truth on his oath, * * * legally administered, who shall willfully and corruptly swear * * * to any matter or thing respecting which such oath, * * * is by law authorized or required * * * shall be deemed guilty of the crime of perjury. * * *”
No claim is made that the oath was not administered by an officer as charged. But it is argued that the verification by defendant of his complaint as a pleading in the civil action on which the charge is predicated was a wholly immaterial oath within the contemplation of the perjury statute, because under section 2665 pleadings may or may not be verified, and, whether verified or not, the facts therein stated to which defendant swore do not by operation of law make such oath a material matter or thing in such action. This claim wholly disregards the terms and significance of section 4471. A complaint in a civil action pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear the cause is a material matter in the proceeding, and an oath verifying it is one in regard to a matter before a court and is...
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Rubin v. State
...if it were privileged as a pleading, it was not received as “evidence of a fact admitted or alleged” therein. Lappley v. State, 170 Wis. 356, 359, 174 N. W. 913, 7 A. L. R. 279. [5] 3. The judgment finding Mr. Rubin guilty of contempt must be affirmed if the tribunal which directed Mr. Rubi......
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Loraitis v. Kukulka
... ... of the fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Federal constitution, and section 2 of article II, and section 6 of article II of the State constitution. These same grounds were reasserted in an application for a writ of injunction filed by the defendants seeking to enjoin the taking of ... It is sufficient if they are authorized to be verified and are in fact verified. See: Lappley v. State of Wisconsin, 170 Wis. 356, 174 N.W. 913, 7 A.L.R. 1279; People v. Godines, 17 Cal.App.2d 721, 62 P.2d 787. Under section 35 of the Civil ... ...
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