Laprade v. Baker

Decision Date08 April 2022
Docket Number21-AP-198
PartiesRicky L. LaPrade* v. James Baker
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont

In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

APPEALED FROM: Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division CASE NO. 29-1-21 Wncv Trial Judge: Robert R. Bent

ENTRY ORDER

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter: Plaintiff appeals pro se from the court's decision concerning sentencing credit. [*] We affirm.

Plaintiff was convicted of numerous crimes in 2003 and 2004, including driving under the influence #4 (DUI #4) and four misdemeanors; the sentences ran consecutively to one another. Plaintiff was charged with three new felonies in June 2004 and his sentences in these cases were consecutive to the sentences for plaintiff's prior crimes. In December 2019 the DUI #4 conviction was vacated. Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75, arguing that the Department of Corrections (DOC) had not provided him the sentencing credit he was due. The court ultimately determined on summary judgment, with the agreement of plaintiff's counsel, that plaintiff had received the credit due.

The court's decision rested on the following undisputed facts. Plaintiff was arraigned for DUI #4 in January 2003 and held for twelve days before posting bail; he was arraigned for domestic assault in April 2003 and held for eight days before posting bail; in June 2003, he was arraigned on two counts of violating his conditions of release (VCR) and one count of unlawful mischief and held for failure to make bail. In October 2003, he was sentenced to nine-months-to-five-years for DUI #4. There were 129 days between the date he was arraigned and held on the VCR/unlawful misdemeanor charges and the date he was sentenced for DUI #4.

In March 2004, plaintiff was sentenced on the four misdemeanors above to two-to-thirty months, consecutive to the DUI #4 and each other. There were also 129 days between the October 2003 imposition of the DUI #4 sentence and the imposition of sentence for the misdemeanors.

In June 2004, plaintiff was held on aggravated domestic assault and unlawful trespass charges. Several days later, he was held on escape charges. Plaintiff is still serving sentences in the three felony cases referenced above; the sentences run consecutive to his earlier crimes. In December 2019 plaintiff's DUI #4 conviction was vacated.

Plaintiff argued below that the DOC failed to give him appropriate credit for the misdemeanors for the time between sentencing on the DUI #4 in October 2003 and sentencing for the misdemeanors in March 2004 (129 days). Coincidentally, the court explained, the same number of days were at issue for the time between when plaintiff was held on the misdemeanor charges and the imposition of sentence for the DUI #4.

The court found that plaintiff was owed additional nonduplicative credit for the second 129-day period and it ordered the DOC to recalculate plaintiff's sentences with inclusion of the period between October 2003 to March 2004 applied as pre-trial credit as against the misdemeanors, as was appropriate in consecutive sentences (with no double credit). If that affected plaintiff's sentence commencement date for his current sentences, the court explained, then the DOC should make the necessary adjustment.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, arguing the court overlooked one of his arguments, specifically, that he was still owed credit from the time he was held in June 2004 on his new felony charges because the sentences for those crimes were consecutive to his vacated DUI #4 sentence and no other sentence.

At a status conference, a DOC employee agreed with the court's summary judgment decision and applied the additional 129-day credit to plaintiff's sentence, resulting in a total of 482 days of credit. The DOC employee explained that plaintiff had received the credit referenced by plaintiff's attorney in the reconsideration motion and stated that 482 days of credit had been applied to plaintiff's sentence. Plaintiff's attorney agreed that that was the amount of credit she had been advocating for on plaintiff's behalf. The DOC employee stated that she...

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