Lapuk v. Blount

Decision Date14 October 1963
Docket NumberNo. CV,CV
Citation2 Conn.Cir.Ct. 271,198 A.2d 233
CourtCircuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
PartiesRobert LAPUK et al. v. Charles L. BLOUNT et al. 14-618-4455.

William D. Graham, Hartford, for appellant (defendant Greene-Monroe Corporation).

Marvin H. Lapuk, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Milton D. Newman, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Blount).

KOSICKI, Judge.

The plaintiffs brought action against the defendant Blount for services rendered and materials furnished at Blount's request in preparation of design and structural plans for an addition to a building owned by the Greene-Monroe Corporation. On application of Blount, the corporation was made a party defendant. A substitute complaint was filed in which it was alleged that Blount had incurred the obligation sued on as agent for the corporation, and judgment was rendered against the corporation; it has appealed. The word 'defendant' as used herein shall refer only to the Greene-Monroe Corporation.

The facts as found by the trial court, with the additions and corrections to which the defendants is entitled or which were admitted or undisputed facts, may be summarized as follows: The defendant owned a building on Main Street in Hartford to which it proposed to construct an addition intended for business uses. Early in April, 1960, it engaged Blount to furnish a complete set of plans which would meet with the approval of the Hartford building inspection department and would enable the defendant to proceed with the addition. Blount was a carpenter by trade and was also a part-time student of architecture at the University of Hartford. Although he had on a previous occasion furnished satisfactory plans to Greene, an officer of the defendant, for a dwelling house addition, he was not a qualified architect or engineer. These facts were known to the defendant. The defendant also knew that Blount would need professional help in drawing the plans. It was agreed between Blount and the defendant that the total cost for the plans and for Blount's supervision of the construction would be $1800. The cost of the addition was estimated at $60,000.

Blount drew some rough sketches of the proposed building and submitted them on behalf of the defendant to the Hartford building inspection department for the purpose of obtaining a building permit. These sketches were rejected as not acceptable for that purpose under state law; see General Statutes § 20-298(h); because a building of the proposed size required plans drawn by a registered architect or other professionally qualified person as defined by pertinent statutes. Following this rejection, on April 9, Blount took his sketches to the plaintiffs, who were licensed structural engineers. He represented himself as the designer of the building and as agent for the defendant. The defendant knew that Blount had submitted his sketches, bearing the defendant's name, to the plaintiffs and had requested their services. It allowed Blount to continue to use the plaintiffs' services. It was the plaintiffs' understanding with Blount that they were to deliver to him on behalf of the defendant complete structural drawings and would receive $200 for them from money Blount was to obtain from the defendant. On April 13, the plaintiffs delivered their structural plans to Blount and were paid $50 out of a sum of $300 received from the defendant by Blount.

The plans submitted did not meet the requirements of the building inspection department because they were drawn without the benefit of a plot plan and the proposed building was too large for the lot. Blount discussed the matter with the defendant and was instructed to get a more complete set of plans which would include architectural, electrical, plumbing and heating details. The defendant, at its own expense, obtained a plot plan to aid in drafting the building plans. A second set of plans was then drafted by the plaintiffs, who, at the request and with the knowledge of Blount, engaged the services of Butts, an architectural designer, and Silkowski, a qualified electrical engineer, both of whom completed their portions of the plans. They were to receive $500 and $120, respectively, for their work and looked to the plaintiffs for payment. The plaintiffs were unable to arrange for the heating and plumbing details. The second set of plans was delivered to Blount on June 24, 1960. Blount, at the instruction of the defendant, had a number of blue-prints made of these plans at a total cost of $179.60, which he paid out of the $300 received from the defendant for the initial expenses for the plans. Two sets of the plans were submitted to the building inspection department and, with minor changes, were deemed acceptable by the department for the issuance of a building permit. Blount was informed of the amount of fees to be paid. The defendant made no application for a building permit, nor did it pay the requisite fees.

Two sets of the plans were given by Blount to the defendant. One set was submitted by the defendant to the G & N Construction Company for an estimate of building costs, and the other to the Society for Savings for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan. The construction company was unable to make a firm estimate because of the absence of plumbing and heating plans. The bank gave an oral commitment of $50,000 conditioned on the plans' being completed. Some time later, the defendant, unable to obtain satisfactory financing, informed Blount that it had abandoned the project. Thereupon, Blount stopped working on the building plans and did not arrange for the completion of the plumbing and heating details. At no time had there been any personsl communication between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The defendant, however, knew that the plaintiffs were working on the plans for the building, having examined the first set of drawings soon after completion. These drawings showed that the plaintiffs had prepared them.

The court concluded that, in engaging the services of the plaintiffs, Blount had authority as agent to commit the defendant and acted within the scope of his authority; that the defendant was aware of the commitments which were being made on its behalf; that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover $770 on their complaint; that Blount was entitled to recover $50 on his counterclaim against the defendant; and that the defendant, on its counterclaim against Blount, was entitled to recover a balance of $70.40, being the unexpended portion of the $300 advanced by it to Blount.

In its assignment of errors the defendant has made a wholesale attack on the finding, alleging that thirteen paragraphs were found 'without supporting evidence' and that the court had failed to add to the finding thirteen paragraphs contained in the motion to correct. 'In effect, the defendants by the wholesale manner in which they allege error and by the arguments advanced in their brief seek to have this court retry the issues. That is not our function.' Franks v. Lockwood, 146 Conn. 273, 275, 150 A.2d 215, 217. We have examined the evidence and, except to the extent of the corrections and additions we have made, as reflected in the facts summarized above, the finding as corrected by the trial court must stand.

The defendant claims error in that the trial court in its correction of the finding included subordinate findings of fact which did not appear in the original finding or in the motions to correct filed by the defendant and by the appellees. This the court had the power to do. Our rules provide that upon consideration of a motion to correct the court is required and authorized to 'file corrections of such paragraphs as it finds incorrect or of doubtful meaning, or make additional findings of other facts which it finds proven.' Cir.Ct. Rule 7.25.1.

The principal attack of the defendant is directed toward the conclusions of the court that Blount in his dealings with the plaintiffs was the agent of the defendant acting within the scope of his authority, and that the defendant was liable for the commitments Blount made. There is no dispute as to the fact that services were rendered and materials furnished by the various parties at Blount's request or as to the reasonable value thereof. The defendant's argument is finally narrowed to the claim that Blount, in what he did, was acting as an independent contractor and not as the defendant's agent.

"An agency is defined as a contract either express or implied by which one of the parties confides to the other the management of some business to be transacted in his name, or on his account, by which that other assumes to do the business, and to render an account of it.' Kent, Comm. vol. 2, p. 612.' Kurtz v. Farrington, 104 Conn. 257, 268, 132 A. 540, 543, 48 A.L.R. 259. 'With respect to third persons, an agency may arise by necessity, from acts and appearances which lead others to believe that such a relation has been created, i. e., by estoppel; or from operation of law.' 2 Am.Jur. 24, Agency, § 21.

The distinction generally made between an agent and an independent contractor, in their relations with the principal or owner and their liabilities to third parties, is that the principal exercises some degree of control over the agent in the accomplishment of the object of the agency, whereas an independent contractor represents the will of the owner only as to the result of the work and not as to the means by which it is to be accomplished. Patent Scaffolding Co. v. Roosevelt Apartments, Inc., 171 Wash. 507, 510, 18 P.2d 857; Scales v. First State Bank, 88 Or. 490, 499, 172 P. 499. It has been held that where the facts presented are as consistent with the theory of agency as with that of independent contractor, the burden is only upon the one asserting the independency of the contractor to show the true relation of the...

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