Laqualia v. Laqualia

• Decision Date: 17 November 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. Pen–10–644.
• Citation: 30 A.3d 838,2011 Me. 114
• Parties: Karen A. LAQUALIAv.John A. LAQUALIA.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

30 A.3d 838

2011 ME 114

Karen A. LAQUALIA

v.John A. LAQUALIA.

Docket No. Pen–10–644.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: Sept. 13, 2011.Decided: Nov. 17, 2011.

N. Laurence Willey, Jr., Esq.(orally), Thomas M. Matzilevich, Esq., Willey Law Offices, Bangor, for appellantKaren A. Laqualia.Dana E. Prescott, Esq., (orally), Prescott, Jamieson, Nelson & Murphy, LLC, Saco, for appelleeJohn A. Laqualia.Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.GORMAN, J.

[¶ 1]Karen A. Laqualia appeals from the District Court's (Bangor, Dobson, J.)¹ divorce judgment ending her marriage to John A. Laqualia.She challenges the trial court's failure to award her attorney fees and its valuation and distribution of certain marital and nonmarital assets.Karen also appeals from the District Court's (Bangor, Jordan, J.) refusal to consider her post-judgment motion to enforce the preliminary injunction entered pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 903(1)(B)(3)(2010) when she filed this action for divorce.Karen has consolidated her appeals before us.We affirm most of the divorce judgment but remand for a single issue concerning the distribution of the marital estate, and affirm the trial court's action with respect to the post-judgment motion.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] On August 16, 1994, Karen and John entered into a premarital agreement, and, eleven days later, they married.At the time of their marriage, Karen had amassed a sizeable estate worth more than $2,000,000 that included a house in Bangor, and a camp in Trenton, as well as paintings, jewelry, and investment accounts.Karen acquired these assets, and continued to receive ongoing payments during the marriage, as a result of a consulting arrangement that she entered into prior to the marriage, but which was subsequently amended through a settlement agreement reached after she and John married.

[¶ 3] John's premarital estate was valued at $20,000.During the marriage, with some assistance from Karen, he developed a computer software business known as PeakKnowledge.Karen and John used the income from PeakKnowledge, the payments Karen received from her consulting arrangement, and her assets, to live lavishly, travel, and acquire substantial real and personal property.

[¶ 4] In 2007, Karen initiated this divorce, citing irreconcilable differences.After nearly three years of highly contentious litigation, the parties presented more than eighteen hours of testimony and admitted boxes of exhibits to the court( Dobson, J.) during a three-day trial in May 2010.Because Karen and John have no children from the marriage, the only issues to be decided by the court involved property.That property included (1) three pieces of real property: a condominium in Bangor, a residence in Florida, and the camp in Trenton; (2) retirement and investment accounts; (3) valuable personal property; and (4) PeakKnowledge.The parties' premarital agreement affected the division and distribution of this property.John challenged the application of the premarital agreement, but the court found it to be “fully enforceable and binding on the parties.”

[¶ 5] At trial, Karen advanced myriad theories and claims purporting to support her demand that John be ordered to make significant payments to her.The trial court considered these claims and, in the findings of fact and conclusions of law it issued simultaneously with its judgment, found that, “[b]ecause of the manner of presentation of multiple and duplicative exhibits making exaggerated and unfounded claims interspersed with legitimate claims, it is impossible to ascertain with precision how much John might owe Karen.”The trial court then held:

John does not owe Karen anything other than those amounts which will be set off against the equitable distribution to John herein and representing (1) claimed Contempt damages in the approximate amount of $40,000 ... and (2) funds paid out of PeakKnowledge for the benefit of Carol Trevains in the amount of $50,000 and (3) Trenton rental income of $21,000 and [$34,297.71 to compensate Karen for two tax-related issues].

Based on these findings, and, after applying the parties' premarital agreement to the evidence presented to divide the real and personal property, the court ordered John to pay Karen $145,000.The court then ordered Karen to pay John $300,000 to achieve an “equitable distribution.”

[¶ 6] On August 23, 2010, Karen filed a request for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.In addition to forty-one other requests, she asked the court to determine whether John had violated the preliminary injunction by discontinuing her health insurance.The trial court responded to Karen's requests to the extent appropriate and otherwise “decline[d] to respond to [Karen]'s request for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.”

[¶ 7] In Karen's November 5, 2010, notice of appeal, she listed the trial court's decisions regarding health insurance in her statement of the issues.Then, on November 22 and 24, 2010, Karen moved the District Court and us² to enforce the preliminary injunction, claiming John removed her from his health insurance policy in violation of the injunction.On February 7, 2011, the trial court held it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the preliminary injunction during the pendency of Karen's appeal.Karen timely appealed from this judgment, and she consolidated her appeals before us.

II.DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] Karen claims multifarious errors for our review.Her statement of issues spans five single-spaced pages.She listed the issues under ten headings, which are further described in a total of fifty-two subheadings.Nevertheless, Karen's claimed errors effectively coalesce into four issues.

[¶ 9] First, Karen contends the trial court erred in its valuation of certain assets and in its equitable distribution of the marital estate.Second, Karen asserts the trial court erred in distributing her nonmarital property to John to create an “equitable distribution.”Third, Karen argues the trial court erred in holding it lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion to enforce the preliminary injunction after she filed her notice of appeal.Fourth, Karen claims the trial court erred in denying her request for attorney fees.We address each contention below.

A.Valuation of Property

[¶ 10] Karen contends the trial court erred in its finding that the business, PeakKnowledge, is worth $51,000.“We review the court's factual findings, including determinations about an asset's value or its classification as marital or nonmarital property, for clear error.”Bond v. Bond,2011 ME 54, ¶ 10, 17 A.3d 1219(citingWandishin v. Wandishin,2009 ME 73, ¶ 12, 976 A.2d 949).A trial court's factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any competent evidence in the record to support it.Bond,2011 ME 54, ¶ 15, 17 A.3d 1219.Further, “[w]e review the court's distribution of the property for an abuse of discretion.”Id.¶ 10(citingCarter v. Carter,2006 ME 68, ¶ 14, 900 A.2d 200).

[¶ 11] The testimony of Karen's own expert, Dr. Robert Strong, supports the trial court's finding.Dr. Strong testified the “simple net asset value” of PeakKnowledge was $51,644.Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in adopting that value.

[¶ 12] Additionally, Karen challenges the trial court's valuation of the Lotus vehicle, the ING account and N.Y. Life IRA, and the Trenton camp.With the exception of the Lotus vehicle, the trial court awarded all of these assets to Karen.Fluctuations in their value, then, are of minimal relevance.A divorce court's failure to consider the value of nonmarital property once the parties presented evidence on the subject would be an abuse of discretion.SeeKruy v. Kruy,2002 ME 14, ¶¶ 5–6, 789 A.2d 99.Where the parties fail to present evidence on the nonmarital property's value or, as here, where the trial court finds their evidence inconclusive and contradictory,³a party cannot bemoan the trial court's failure to adopt her view.Seeid.¶ 6.In any case, the court's valuation of that property remains a question of fact, which we will not overturn so long as any competent evidence in the record supports the trial court's finding.SeeBond,2011 ME 54, ¶ 15, 17 A.3d 1219.The record supports the trial court findings as to value of the assets, including the Lotus, and as a result, we affirm.

B.Distribution of Property

[¶ 13]We have long recognized a three-step process for distributing property in a divorce.SeeGrishman v. Grishman,407 A.2d 9, 11(Me.1979).The trial court must first distinguish marital from nonmarital property.Id.Then, the court must set apart nonmarital property.Id.Finally, the court must divide marital property “in such proportion as the court deems just.”Id.

[¶ 14] All property acquired by either or both spouses during marriage is presumed to be marital property.19–A M.R.S. § 953(3).This presumption may be overcome by showing the property was acquired pursuant to one of five statutory exceptions.See19–A M.R.S. § 953(2)(A)-(E).One of the exceptions is “[p]roperty excluded by valid agreement of the parties.”19–A M.R.S. § 953(2)(D).Although section 953 does not define “valid agreement,”we hold that a “valid agreement” pursuant to section 953(2)(D) includes a premarital agreement that is enforceable pursuant to Maine's Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.⁴See19–A M.R.S. §§ 601– 611.

[¶ 15] When a valid premarital agreement excludes property from the marital estate, a divorce court lacks statutory authority to award this separate property to the other spouse because a divorce court“ shall set apart to each spouse the spouse's property.”See19–A M.R.S. § 953(1)(emphasis added).“The trial court has no discretion in the allocation of the nonmarital property; it must be transferred to the spouse to whom it belongs.The equitable considerations applicable to the just division of marital property do not apply to the...