Laramie v. Stone
| Decision Date | 30 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008–790.,2008–790. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph LARAMIE and another v. Shawn STONE and another. |
Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, P.C., of Concord (Charles G. Douglas, III and C. Kevin Leonard on the brief, and Mr. Douglas orally), for the plaintiffs.
Orville B. Fitch II, acting attorney general (Richard W. Head, associate attorney general, and Laura E.B. Lombardi, assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Mr. Head orally), for the defendants.
The defendants, Shawn Stone and Todd Connor, appeal a jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs, Joseph Laramie and Timothy Hallam, $650,000 and $1.3 million, respectively, in compensatory damages. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
The record supports the following relevant facts. The parties worked together for the department of corrections (DOC) at the New Hampshire State Prison in Concord. Laramie and Hallam were dismissed from their employment as a result of an incident on April 12, 2005, involving an inmate who had to be physically "extract[ed]" from his cell. The inmate claimed he was injured by a DOC employee who used excessive force during the extraction, and his accusations implicated the defendants.
On the day of the incident, the defendants filed written incident reports, but neither report mentioned the inmate's assault claim. Hallam also filed a report, which mentioned the alleged assault but did not state that the inmate had specifically accused the defendants. One week after the incident, each defendant filed a second report, stating that he saw Laramie assaulting the inmate during the extraction. Defendant Connor's report also stated that he told Hallam on April 12 that he saw Laramie punching the inmate. These reports led to an investigation, and Laramie and Hallam lost their jobs in July 2005.
They appealed their employment terminations to the personnel appeals board (PAB). After an evidentiary hearing, the PAB concluded that the terminations were unjust, and it reinstated Laramie and Hallam with back pay, benefits and seniority. Laramie returned to the DOC, but Hallam remained out of work on medical leave. An independent psychiatric evaluation concluded that he was permanently unable to return to work at the DOC, and he retired on medical disability.
Laramie and Hallam filed separate multi-count writs against their supervisors, the DOC, and the defendants, alleging, among other claims, intentional interference with contractual relations and invasion of privacy (false light). The suits were consolidated, and the Trial Court (Lynn, C.J.) granted summary judgment in favor of all parties except the defendants. Following trial, a jury returned verdicts for Laramie and Hallam, awarding them compensatory damages. On appeal, the defendants argue that the Trial Court (Sullivan, J.) erred by: (1) permitting Robert W. Sturke, Ph.D, Hallam's treating psychologist, to testify as an expert witness; (2) admitting the expert testimony of Arthur Kenison, Ph.D; (3) admitting evidence of the plaintiffs' reinstatement by the PAB; (4) failing to set aside the verdict based upon statements made by counsel during closing argument; and (5) failing to apply the statutory cap in RSA 541–B:14, I (Supp.2009), which limits recovery in certain claims filed against the State or its employees to $475,000 per claimant.
The defendants raise several arguments pertaining to the trial court's management of discovery and its decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. Specifically, they argue that Hallam failed to disclose Sturke as an expert properly by providing "a summary of facts and opinions to which [he] [wa]s expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion," as required by discovery rules. Super. Ct. R. 35(f)(4). Even if Sturke was disclosed properly, they argue, he was not qualified to testify about Hallam's current or future ability to return to work. See N.H. R. Ev. 702. Finally, they contend that the testimony of Arthur Kenison, Ph.D, involving formulae for how to calculate Hallam's loss of earning capacity, was inadmissible.
At a hearing on the defendants' motion in limine to exclude Sturke's testimony, the trial court noted that on the plaintiffs' expert disclosure deadline, Hallam's attorney sent a letter to the defendants' attorneys which provided:
Under separate cover, I sent you office notes from Robert W. Sturke, Ph.D., Mr. Hallam's treating counselor. Upon my receipt, I will forward you Dr. Sturke's more recent office notes. The Plaintiff may call Dr. Sturke, Ph.D., as a witness in the trial in this case. I am enclosing a copy of his curriculum vitae. It is anticipated that Dr. Sturke will testify at trial on his treatment, clinical diagnosis, ongoing treatment routine, Mr. Hallam's inability to return to employment at the Department of Corrections, as well as his ability or inability for Mr. Hallam to return to employment given his current condition, medications and assessment.
The trial court found that this letter, coupled with Sturke's records and the defendants' opportunity to depose was "sufficient" and that the disclosure was "adequate."
When the defendants' counsel deposed Sturke, the following colloquy took place:
Hallam's counsel did not interject or otherwise immediately clarify that Sturke would be presenting expert testimony at trial. In addition, although a complete transcript of Sturke's deposition is not in the record, an excerpt quoted in Hallam's objection to the defendants' motion in limine shows that the defendants' counsel asked Sturke about the cause of Hallam's psychological problems. Specifically, he was asked:
(Emphasis omitted.) Later, when asked more specifically whether the defendants were the cause of Hallam's depression, Sturke replied, "I don't know."
"A party is ... entitled to disclosure of an opposing party's experts, the substance of the facts and opinions about which they are expected to testify, and the basis of those opinions." Figlioli v. R.J. Moreau Cos., 151 N.H. 618, 626, 866 A.2d 962 (2005). This disclosure rule applies "even when a known factual witness acts as an expert." Wong v. Ekberg, 148 N.H. 369, 372, 807 A.2d 1266 (2002). "A party's failure to supply this information should result in the exclusion of expert opinion testimony unless good cause is shown to excuse the failure to disclose." Id. (quotation omitted); see Super. Ct. R. Preface. "The policy of disclosure of expert witnesses rests upon the premise that justice is best served by a system that reduces surprise at trial by giving both parties the maximum amount of information." Gulf Ins. Co. v. AMSCO, 153 N.H. 28, 33, 889 A.2d 1040 (2005) (quotation omitted). The trial court has broad discretion in the management of discovery, and its decisions will be reviewed under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. In re Juvenile 2002–209, 149 N.H. 559, 561, 825 A.2d 476 (2003). "To show that the trial court's decision was not sustainable, the appealing party must show that the ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case." Milliken v. Dartmouth–Hitchcock Clinic, 154 N.H. 662, 665, 914 A.2d 1226 (2006) (quotation omitted).
It is the defendants' burden, as the appealing party, to submit so much of the record as is sufficient to decide the issues they raise on appeal, and to demonstrate that they raised such issues in the trial court. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250, 855 A.2d 564 (2004). The defendants have not provided us with a sufficient record on appeal to determine whether the trial court's decision to admit Sturke's testimony was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of their case. While we find it disturbing that Hallam's counsel failed to correct Sturke's erroneous deposition statement that he was "a fact witness," we cannot determine, based upon the record provided, whether the disclosure of Sturke was consistent with the requirements of superior court rules or whether the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in permitting Sturke to testify as an expert.
Although the defendants' appendix includes the plaintiffs' disclosure letter, it does not include Sturke's office notes. Further, the defendants failed to provide a complete record of Sturke's deposition. We do not know what facts and opinions, if any, the notes disclosed or what other information Hallam's counsel was able to obtain from Sturke upon deposing him. Without the materials upon which the trial court determined that the disclosure was adequate, we are unable to review its decision. Thus, because the trial court retains broad discretion in the management of discovery, we cannot say upon the record before us that its exercise of discretion was unsustainable.
The defendants next argue that Sturke was not qualified to give an opinion on Hallam's current or future ability to return to work "because his background showed a lack of any significant expertise ... in the relevant area of impairment to earning capacity." We disagree.
"Under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In the Matter of Martin F. Kurowski And Brenda A. Kurowski.
...allows us to correct errors not raised in the trial court under certain limited circumstances. See Sup.Ct. R. 16–A; Laramie v. Stone, 160 N.H. 419, 432, 999 A.2d 262 (2010). Before we may do so: (1) there must be error; (2) the error must be plain; (3) the error must affect substantial righ......
-
Green Mountain Realty Corp.. v. the Fifth Estate Tower
...To address this argument, we must interpret the CPA, which is a question of law that we review de novo. See Laramie v. Stone, 160 N.H. 419, 436, 999 A.2d 262, 276 (2010). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words ......
-
Farrelly v. City of Concord, 2014–0480
...RSA 99–D:1 represents "a statement of policy adopting the common law doctrines of sovereign and official immunity." Laramie v. Stone, 160 N.H. 419, 437, 999 A.2d 262 (2010). While there is no corresponding comprehensive statute covering municipal employees, the legislature has afforded immu......
-
Stachulski v. Apple New Eng., LLC, 2016-0692
...continue into the future" — is "within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience" of the average layman, Laramie v. Stone, 160 N.H. 419, 427, 999 A.2d 262 (2010), or whether an expert opinion is needed to "preclude the jury from engaging in idle speculation," Estate of Joshua T.......