Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Authority, 89 C 1067.
Decision Date | 08 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 89 C 1067.,89 C 1067. |
Citation | 722 F. Supp. 443 |
Parties | Dorothy LARAMORE and other individual plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, and the South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition, Plaintiffs, v. The ILLINOIS SPORTS FACILITIES AUTHORITY, The City of Chicago, and The Chicago White Sox, Ltd., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
James P. Chapman, Alan Mills and Kathleen Hogan Morrison, James P. Chapman & Associates, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Matthew A. Rooney, Michele L. Odorizzi, Ruth Miller and Diana Runcie, Mayer Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., for Illinois Sports Facilities Authority.
Donald E. Egan and Andrew M. Hale, Katten Muchin & Zavis, Chicago, Ill., for Chicago White Sox, Ltd.
Sharon Baldwin, Corp. Counsel's Office-Law Dept., Ed Kus and Judson H. Miner, Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for City of Chicago.
This lawsuit is brought by residents of areas adjoining the site which was selected for a new stadium for the Chicago White Sox baseball team. Plaintiffs allege that the site was selected, and that their neighborhood is accordingly being destroyed, for racially discriminatory reasons. Pending is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons described below, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
For the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Certain factual allegations contained in defendants' memoranda have been used to complete the background discussion, although these allegations are immaterial to resolution of the legal issues.
On January 20, 1987, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act ("the Act"), Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 85 § 6001 et seq. The Act was amended on June 30, 1987 and on July 7, 1988. The Act was passed to create the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority (the "Authority") and to direct the Authority to build a single stadium for the exclusive use of the Chicago White Sox, Ltd. ("White Sox") in a specific location. (Complaint ¶ 24.). Section 8(6) of the Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 85 § 6008(6), directs the Authority to determine the location of a new sports facility. Section 12 of the Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 85 § 6012, specifies the parcels of land which the Authority may condemn. The area covered by these parcels is referred to as South Armour Square. (Complaint ¶¶ 24, 47.) The July, 1988 amendments provided the authority necessary to fund construction of the stadium, and the site acquisition process began immediately thereafter. (Defendant's Memorandum in Support ("Mem.") at 2.)
In order to acquire the site, the Authority found it necessary to displace over 425 black residents of South Armour Square from their residences. (Complaint ¶ 4.) In the summer of 1988, the Authority began negotiating with the homeowners and tenants who lived on the site. (Mem. at 2-3.) Plaintiffs allege that the Authority used high-pressure tactics in these negotiations. (Complaint ¶¶ 44(e), 54.) By September 15, 1988, the Authority had reached a settlement with these residents, pursuant to which the Authority agreed to build new homes for homeowners or pay them fair market value plus a $25,000 bonus, and to pay relocation costs for tenants and give a cash settlement to long-term tenants. (Mem. at 3.) The Authority benefitted from the settlement by avoiding the necessity of condemnation proceedings and by obtaining a covenant not to sue from the South Armour Square Coalition ("Coalition"), which participated in the negotiations with the Authority and which at that time represented both homeowners who were to be relocated and tenants in the neighboring housing that would remain. (Mem. at 3.)
On or about October 14, 1988, the Authority filed an application with the City for an amendment to the City's zoning ordinance. (Complaint ¶ 61.) The application sought a waiver of "virtually every limitation which applied to every other development in the City," including limitations concerning light, heat, noise, smoke, toxic discharge, noxious odors, fire, and explosive materials. (Id.) In early November, 1988, without providing meaningful notice to neighboring residents, the Chicago Plan Commission held a "purported" public hearing. (Complaint ¶ 62.) At plaintiffs' insistence, a further hearing was held on November 30. During a final hearing on December 8, despite the belief of many members that the Authority had failed to satisfy concerns about negative effects on plaintiffs, the Plan Commission voted to recommend approval of the application by the City Council, with the suggestion that the City Council require the Authority to address these concerns before the issuance of a building permit. (Complaint ¶ 63.)
The next day, without any meaningful notice to plaintiffs, the Chicago City Council's Committee on Zoning voted to approve the requested zoning amendment. The City Council enacted an amendment substantially identical to the one sought by the Authority on December 21, 1988. (Complaint ¶¶ 64-65.)
The plaintiffs in this case are:
Defendants are the Authority, the White Sox, and the City of Chicago.
Plaintiffs allege that the selection of the stadium site was based on discriminatory motives — that South Armour Square was selected because its residents were almost exclusively black. (Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 44, 45.) Plaintiffs allege that the private homes were essential to the stability of their neighborhood, and that the destruction of these homes and the selection of South Armour Square as the stadium site has caused or will cause them numerous injuries which will make it impossible for them to continue to live in their neighborhood. These injuries include:
Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit on February 9, 1989. Count I alleges that defendants' conduct violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II alleges a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Count III alleges a violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq. Count IV alleges that the Ordinance is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance and Article 1, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution. As relief, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the amendatory zoning is null and void, an injunction forbidding defendants to proceed with the new stadium, an injunction requiring defendants to replace the South Armour Square homes which the Authority has acquired and destroyed, and compensatory and punitive damages. The Court has participated in several settlement conferences with the parties, but the negotiations have been fruitless. The Court therefore proceeds to consider defendants' motions...
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