Larde v. Commonwealth Zoological Corp.

Decision Date28 October 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 21-10158-RGS
PartiesANTONIO LARDE v. COMMONWEALTH ZOOLOGICAL CORPORATION, ROBERT CHABOT and JENNIFER CANE
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RICHARD G. STEARNS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Antonio Larde brought this lawsuit against his former employer Commonwealth Zoological Corporation (the Zoo); Jennifer Davis Cain, the Zoo's Head of Human Resources; and his direct supervisor Robert Chabot. Larde alleges that the defendants discriminated against him based on disability and race, and retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and under federal and state civil rights laws. The Zoo moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The court will allow the motion in part.

BACKGROUND

In the light most favorable to Larde as the non-moving party, the material facts related to the discrimination claims are as follows. The Zoo hired Larde, an African-American man, as its Director of Facilities on April 17, 2017. See Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt # 43) ¶ 5 (Defs.' SOF). In August of 2017, Chabot was hired as Chief Operating Officer of the Zoo, becoming Larde's immediate supervisor. Id. ¶ 11; Pl.'s Statement of Disputed Material Facts (Dkt # 46) at 2 (Pl.'s SOF). In his duties as Director of Facilities Larde worked alongside Davis Cain. Defs.' SOF ¶ 3.

On June 2, 2018, as part of his duties as a supervisor of the Facilities Department, Larde terminated Allan Briggs, a Zoo Park Services Associate. Id. ¶ 29. Briggs did not go quietly - the termination ended in a fistfight in which Briggs was the aggressor. Pl.'s SOF at 2. Larde suffered serious trauma to his right eye, face, and left shoulder. Wyatt Aff. (Dkt # 47) at Ex. 3. Larde received workers' compensation and took twelve weeks of FMLA leave, followed by an additional seven weeks of leave granted by the Zoo as a disability accommodation under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B (Chapter 151B). Defs.' SOF ¶ 37. Larde resumed work at the Zoo on October 15, 2018. Id., Ex. 21 at 4.

On his return, Larde learned that his private office had been reassigned to the Zoo's Safety & Security Manager and that he had been moved to a shared office space. Pl.'s SOF at 6. Larde contends that the relocation to the office where he had barricaded himself in the aftermath of the fight with Briggs triggered his latent PTSD. Larde Aff. ¶ 29.

On Saturday, November 3, 2018, Chabot called Larde twice on his business cellphone after a tree had fallen on the Zoo's zebra barn, but Larde did not answer. Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 61-62. He returned Chabot's call the next day, Sunday, November 4, 2018. Id., Ex. 23 at 9. Larde received verbal counseling for his failure to respond in a timelier fashion to Chabot. Id. ¶ 67; Pl.'s SOF at 8.

In November of 2018, Larde was assigned to complete a portion of the Zoo's accreditation application for the Association of Zoos & Aquariums (AZA). Defs.' SOF ¶ 71. The Zoo determined that Larde had failed to complete his section accurately, and on March 27, 2019, issued Larde a written warning. Id. ¶ 74; id., Ex. 24.

In May of 2019, Jason Platt, a coworker, “approached Mr. Larde in an aggressive manner and slammed his fists on Mr Larde's desk to intentionally intimidate him”; this confrontation triggered another bout of Larde's PTSD. Pl.'s SOF at 9. Larde reported the incident to Chabot, but Platt was not reprimanded or disciplined. Larde Aff. ¶ 47. Chabot instead made “harassing comments related to [Larde's] anxiety, depression, and PTSD disabilities.” Id. ¶ 46.

In August of 2019, Michael Bartlett, a Zoo employee under Larde's management, improperly terminated Emilio Chinn, another Facilities Department employee. Pl.'s SOF at 10. At the request of the Zoo, Larde investigated Bartlett's handling of Chinn's termination. Id. at 11. The Zoo faulted Larde for his handling of the investigation and concluded that Larde had failed to properly train Bartlett in the Zoo's termination process. Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 81-86.

On August 23, 2019, Larde suffered a job-related foot and ankle injury. He reported the injury to Chabot and applied a second time for workers' compensation. Pl.'s SOF at 11-12; Defs.' SOF, Ex. 21 at 54. Larde filed a written report regarding the injury on September 17, 2019, but only after being asked to do so by the Zoo. Pl.'s SOF at 12. On September 19, 2019, Chabot and Davis Cain issued Larde a “first step” verbal counseling regarding his failure to follow the Zoo's procedure for reporting injuries. Id. at 12-13. Larde was also issued a “second step” written warning after Chabot and Davis Cain concluded that Larde had mishandled the investigation into Bartlett's firing of Chinn. Id. at 13-14.

In their meeting on September 19, 2019, Larde complained to Davis Cain and Chabot that he was receiving harsher treatment than other employees as part of a “longstanding pattern of harassment,” citing the disciplinary actions taken after his foot and ankle injury, workers' compensation claim, and leave request. Id. at 15. Later that September, Larde specifically accused Chabot of treating him more harshly than his nonAfrican-American direct reports. Id. Larde alleges that Chabot angrily responded, “I didn't hire you.” Larde interpreted Chabot's remark as “referencing Mr. Larde's skin color in connection with his statement.” Id. at 15-16. On October 1, 2019, Larde met separately with Davis Cain to complain about Chabot's outburst. Id. at 16-17.

From January 7, 2019, through October 24, 2019, Larde was involved in extended discussions with the State Fire Marshal Inspector about the need to bring the Zoo's boilers up to code. Defs.' SOF ¶¶ 90-95. The boilers had failed inspection on January 7, 2019, October 1, 2019, and October 23, 2019. Id., Ex. 27 at 95-99. Larde states that the boilers were old and difficult to bring into compliance, and that Chabot had refused Larde's request to replace them. Pls.' SOF at 20. On October 24, 2019, the Inspector emailed the Zoo, stating that the boiler situation “at this facility not only violates Mass Codes and regulations it willfully contributes to create a safety hazard .... The Zoo has been out of compliance for nearly a year.” Defs.' SOF ¶ 95.

On October 28, 2019, after receiving the Inspector's email, the Zoo terminated Larde, citing a “pattern of work performance failures.” Id. ¶ 96. On May 15, 2020, Larde filed charges with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Compl. ¶ 89. Following a voluntary dismissal of the MCAD charge on December 4, 2020, and receipt of a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on December 7, 2020, Larde filed this Complaint on January 28, 2021. Before the court is the Zoo's motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when, based upon the pleadings affidavits, and depositions, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). For a dispute to be “genuine,” the “evidence relevant to the issue, viewed in the light most flattering to the party opposing the motion, must be sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either side.” Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). However, ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence' is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2000), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

Larde makes eleven claims against the Zoo: (1) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII); (2) race and color discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (§ 1981); (3) race discrimination under Chapter 151B; (4) disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA; (5) handicap discrimination and failure to accommodate under Chapter 151B; (6) interference with and retaliation for exercising rights under 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (FMLA); (7) retaliation under Title VII; (8) retaliation under § 1981; (9) retaliation under Chapter 151B; (10) retaliation under the ADA; and (11) retaliation under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 152 § 75B (Workers' Compensation Act or WCA). The following claims are also asserted against Davis Cain and Chabot in their individual capacities:[1] race and color discrimination under § 1981; race discrimination under Chapter 151B; handicap discrimination and failure to accommodate under Chapter 151B; interference with and retaliation for exercising rights under the FMLA; retaliation under § 1981; and retaliation under Chapter 151B.

A. Race Discrimination Under Title VII, § 1981, and Chapter 151B

The court will first address Larde's federal and state race discrimination claims in one piece. Because Larde has not offered direct evidence of unlawful discrimination, the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973); Straughn v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 420 (2003). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case giving rise to an inference of discrimination. To meet this burden, the plaintiff must show: “that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the job; [and] (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against him.” Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207,...

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