LaReau v. MacDougall

• Decision Date: 20 May 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 14035.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Donald Joseph LaREAU, Petitioner, v. Ellis C. MacDOUGALL, Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Connecticut, and Frederick E. Adams, Warden, Connecticut State Prison, Respondents.

354 F. Supp. 1133

Donald Joseph LaREAU, Petitioner, v. Ellis C. MacDOUGALL, Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Connecticut, and Frederick E. Adams, Warden, Connecticut State Prison, Respondents.

Civ. A. No. 14035.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

May 20, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Hubert Santos, Enfield, Conn., for petitioner.

Stephen J. O'Neill, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Connecticut, Robert Killian, Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for respondents.

CLARIE, District Judge.

This civil rights complaint was filed September 23, 1970, pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1651. The prepayment of fees and costs were waived and the Court appointed an attorney to represent the petitioner, as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Counsel then filed a substituted complaint in four counts, setting forth the petitioner's claims for relief in greater detail.

In the first count he alleges a violation of freedom of speech under the first amendment and complains of (a) administrative censorship or refusal to mail correspondence to the petitioner's family and friends; (b) censorship or refusal to mail correspondence to his attorneys; and (c) censorship or refusal to send mail to a state court. The second count alleges a constitutional denial of freedom of religion claiming that he has been denied the opportunity to practice his religion, because he was denied permission to attend mass in the prison chapel, receive the sacraments or participate in any ceremony prescribed by his religion. The third count alleges cruel and unusual punishment, because he was placed in a stripped cell without adequate sanitary and living facilities and for inadequate reasons. The fourth count alleges a violation of procedural due process, because on certain occasions punishment had been imposed without affording him the opportunity of appearing before the prison disciplinary board; and on those occasions when a hearing was allowed, minimal due process procedures were not afforded him.

The petitioner's prayer for relief requests that this Court enjoin the defendants from (1) reading, censoring or refusing to mail correspondence to any member of his family, his friends, attorneys or the courts; (2) disciplining him for anything written to a court or anything of a legal nature written to his attorney or to his family or to a prison administrator; (3) placing him in solitary confinement and thereby depriving him of good time without complying with minimal due process requirements; (4) disciplining him because of statements in letters to persons outside the prison, unless those statements present a clear and present danger of disrupting the security of the institution or some justifiable purpose of imprisonment; and (5) denying him the right to practice his religion while in solitary confinement. The petitioner also requests that this Court order the restitution to him of all good time lost, while he was confined in solitary; also all such time as he lost, because of letters which he attempted to send to his family, friends, prison officials, his attorney or the prison administration board; and a further demand that he be granted a judgment for substantial monetary damages.

The petitioner's prison record, insofar as it relates to his present incarceration, discloses that he was convicted on February 2, 1966, on a charge of indecent assault and sentenced to the State Prison for a term of not less than two nor more than six years. On January 10, 1969, he was paroled from this sentence, but was returned as a parole violator on July 25, 1969, having been arrested on July 10, 1969, on a charge of forgery (Tr. 46). He was presented in court on May 13, 1970, and pleaded guilty on only two of the counts (four and ten) of the ten-count information.¹ Count four charged an escape from the Hartford Correctional Center on November 16, 1969, and count ten charged an escape from custody on August 25, 1969, at the Manchester, Connecticut Police Station while temporarily confined, awaiting a preliminary hearing in the state court. On May 29, 1970, the petitioner was sentenced to serve not less than five nor more than ten years in the state prison on the fourth count, and one year on the tenth count, a total effective sentence of not less than five nor more than eleven years; this sentence was to run concurrently with any time then remaining to be served on the prior conviction of February 2, 1966. He completed serving the latter sentence as of December 22, 1970. (Tr. 364).

JURISDICTION

The petitioner claims jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343. The defendants argue, however, that several of his claims were litigated in prior habeas corpus petitions in the State Superior Court, after a full hearing, and were adversely ruled upon. They claim that under such circumstances, this Court should apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and res judicata to those issues previously decided by a final state court judgment.

These state habeas corpus proceedings were custodial in character and were limited in scope to the validity of time credits used to compute the petitioner's term of incarceration. See Saia v. Warden, 25 Conn.Sup. 519, 209 A.2d 520 (1964); United States v. Bibb, 249 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1957). The allegations here, on the other hand, are concerned primarily with administrative violations, which if true, could constitute a deprivation of federal constitutional rights, which are of concern to the court. Not only is the plaintiff seeking equitable relief, but also monetary damages. The United States Supreme Court in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 674, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1437, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963), clearly set out the jurisdictional guide lines in such matters when it said:

". . . (P)etitioners assert that respondents have been and are depriving them of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is immaterial whether respondents' conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Monroe v. Pape, supra 365 U.S. 167 at 171-187, 81 S.Ct. 473, at 481, 5 L.Ed.2d 492. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts."

Also see Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), and Sostre v. McGinnes, (2 Cir.) 334 F.2d 906, cert. denied 379 U.S. 892, 85 S.Ct. 168, 13 L. E.2d 96 (1964).

The Court finds federal jurisdiction to be applicable to all of the human rights issues raised by the petitioner in this action, without this Court's being conclusively bound by the state court's findings in the prior habeas corpus hearings on factually similar issues. The petitioner's prior state habeas corpus petitions which were unfavorably acted upon do not constitute a statutory election precluding federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

First Count

The mail censorship issues and the prepayment of postage requirements have been substantially eliminated by the new mailing regulations adopted May 25, 1970,² subsequently amended effective February 18, 1971. Paragraph # 6 of said regulations permits unrestricted inmate correspondence with attorneys, the courts and multiple other public officials whose duties might relate, directly or indirectly, to the prisoner's incarceration; and Paragraph # 9 thereof prohibits censorship or delay in the handling of correspondence addressed to prisoner's legal counsel or the courts. (Tr. 290). Assurance of this free access to the courts is provided under Paragraph # 8, where it states that first class postage will be provided free by the state, where it is required for mail to be sent to judges or the courts; and all requests for a speedy trial under the Interstate Compact Agreement may now be sent by prepaid certified mail at state expense. (Tr. 267). This rule of free postage however, is applicable only where the inmate has less than five dollars balance in his commissary account. (Tr. 281). Regulation # 3 permits unlimited personal correspondence at the inmate's expense with a maximum of seven approved outside correspondents on the inmate's mailing list. (Tr. 129). Those who have less than a five dollar credit balance in the commissary account are provided with two free sheets of postage paid stationery for personal correspondence. (Tr. 154). The foregoing rules are recognized by this Court as being consistent with reasonable standards of prison postal procedure.

"The generous scope of discretion accorded prison authorities also heightens the importance of permitting free and uninhibited access by prisoners to both administrative and judicial forums for the purpose of seeking redress of grievances against state officers. The importance of these rights of access suggests the need for guidelines both generous and specific enough to afford protection against the reality or the chilling threat of administrative infringement."

. . . . . .

"We need only add that when we say there may be cases which will present special circumstances that would justify deleting material from, withholding, or refusing to mail communications with courts, attorneys, and public officials, we necessarily rule that prison officials may open and read all outgoing and incoming correspondence to and from prisoners." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, at 200, 201 (2d Cir. 1971 in banc).

Since present prison mailing practices do conform with the foregoing standards established by the appellate courts, even if individual instances of violation were found to have occurred in the past, no grounds for equitable relief now exist.

". . . (I)t is elementary that a court of equity will not enjoin one from doing what he is not attempting and does not intend to do." New Standard Pub. Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1952); Negron v. Wallace, 436 F.2d 1139 at p. 1145 (2d Cir. 1971).

Second Count

When LaReau arrived back in prison as a parole violator (Tr....