Large v. City of Elizabethton

Decision Date21 July 1947
Citation203 S.W.2d 907,185 Tenn. 156
PartiesLARGE v. CITY OF ELIZABETHTON et al.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from Chancery Court, Carter County; Joe W. Worley Chancellor.

Suit in equity under the declaratory judgment law by H. P. Large against the City and others, to determine the constitutionality of private acts providing for the regulation of taxicab business in the City and to enjoin the enforcement of the act. From a decree holding that the act with the exception of certain sections which were elided by reason of the severable provision of the act, was constitutional, the complainant appeals.

Decree affirmed.

Guinn & Mitchell, of Johnson City, for appellant.

Roy C Nelson, and Raymond C. Campbell, both of Elizabethton, for the City.

TOMLINSON Justice.

By Private Chapter No. 8, House Bill No. 6 enacted by our General Assembly in 1947, it is proposed to amend the charter of the City of Elizabethton. This charter is Chapter 437 of the Private Acts of 1937. The amendatory act provides for the regulation of the taxicab business in that city. The appellant, who is affected thereby, filed his bill in equity under the Declaratory Judgment Law, Code 1932, § 8835 et seq., and in that bill challenged the constitutionality of the act, and sought to enjoin its enforcement. The Chancellor in an excellent opinion held the act constitutional, with the exception of certain sections which were elided by reason of the severable provision of the act. Complainant, a taxicab operator, has appealed and makes the same insistences here.

By his first assignment of error, it is insisted that the amendatory act of 1947 violates Article 2, Section 17 of our Constitution in that the substance of the amendatory act is not expressed either in the title of the original act or of the amendatory act. The caption of the amendatory act is 'an act to amend the charter of the City of Elizabethton--being Chapter 437 of the Private Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee for 1937 and all acts amendatory thereof'.

Exactly in point is Van Dyke v. Thompson, 136 Tenn. 136, 189 S.W. 62. The caption of the amendatory act in that case was as follows: 'An act to amend the charter of the City of Chattanooga and all acts amendatory thereof'. The Court held that this caption and the body of the act gave sufficient notice of the respect in which the charter was proposed to be amended by the act. The 1947 amendatory act, therefore, meets the constitutional requirements if the subject of its proposed amendment is expressed in the title of the original charter act. By this amendment, the City of Elizabethton through its Board of Commissioners is vested with the power and duty of regulating the business of operating taxis for hire within the boundaries of this municipality. A detailed scheme of regulation of this business is set out in the amendatory act. This caption of the charter act recites that the body of the act will 'provide for the powers, duties and authority of said municipal corporation'. One of the powers which may be delegated to a municipality is the power 'to regulate the use of their streets by motor carriers for hire within the corporate limits'. City of Chattanooga v. Jackson, 172 Tenn. 264, 111 S.W.2d 1026. The caption of the charter act is sufficiently comprehensive, therefore, to legally permit its body to contain the provisions of the 1947 amendatory act regulating the taxi business. If the purpose is fairly indicated in the caption and the provisions of the act are germane to that purpose, they are not beyond the title. Swain v. Smith, 174 Tenn. 688, at page 694, 130 S.W.2d 116. It results that the amendatory act does not contravene Article 2, Section 17 of our Constitution.

Assignment of Error No. VI likewise attacks the validity of the entire amendatory act. It is here insisted that the act contravenes Article 11, Section 8 of the Constitution in that, so it is alleged, it suspends the general law and confers upon Elizabethton rights not enjoyed by other municipalities and imposes burdens upon those operating taxis in this town which are not imposed upon those in this business in other towns, and vests in the Board arbitrary powers. In considering this insistence, it is unnecessary to do more than state generally the provisions of the act, which contains 23 sections, some of them lengthy. Eliminating for the time being Section 9, and portions of Sections 15 and 17, which the Chancellor held unconstitutional and elided, the act requires as a condition precedent to the operation of a taxi in Elizabethton that the operator have a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and the Board is vested with the duty and discretion of determining whether the proposed service is or will be required for the public convenience and necessity and whether the applicant is fit and able to perform the service. The authority and duty to inspect taxi cabs and the business premises of persons holding certificates is required, and the Board is authorized to suspend or revoke the permit of those not complying with this law and the orders of the Board made pursuant * * * thereto. It imposes an annual 'fee' to cover the expense of inspection and of enforcing the act. It requires public liability and property damage insurance in reasonable amounts for each taxi or a surety bond approved by the Board to assure payment of damages or for injuries to others by reason of the negligent operation of such taxis.

The general law regulating the business of the conveyance of persons by motor vehicles is Chapter 119 of the Acts of 1933, carried in Williams Code commencing at section 5501.1. By Section 2 of that act, motor vehicles used exclusively in taxi-cab service are excluded from the act. The special act now under consideration does not, therefore, suspend the general law. The holding of the City of Chattanooga v. Jackson, supra, is in point and seems to be conclusive of the question. There this Court held at page 267 of 172 Tenn., at page 1027 of 111 S.W.2d: 'The extension of regulatory power over motor vehicles throughout the state to the Public Utilities Commission conveys no implication of an intention to deprive municipalities of power to regulate the use of their streets by motor carriers for hire within the corporate limits. Both are regulatory measures, cumulative in their effect, and both may be administered for the safety and convenience of the public.'

It is insisted, however, that the act vests extraordinary and arbitrary powers in the Board and is 'vicious arbitrary class legislation'. The legislature may confer discretion on some board in the administration of a statute which the legislature enacts, and vest in that board the 'power to adjudicate all matters arising under the statute'. Richardson v. Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, at page 667, 57 S.W.2d 797, 799. McConnell v. City of Knoxville, 172 Tenn., 190, at page 194, 110 S.W.2d 478, 479, 113 A.L.R. 966.

It is also insisted that the act violates Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution in that it vests the Board with authority to revoke or suspend permits 'at will--leaving it to the caprice of the Board, providing no appeal or basis of review'. Section 13 of the Act provides for the inspection of the taxis and premises of certificate holders and may require by order, 'issued pursuant to resolution, the correction of any condition of equipment or premises which may be detrimental to public safety or welfare' and in the event the certificate holder fails to correct the condition the Board may suspend or revoke his certificate. Section 15 of the act forbids revocation of a permit 'without reasonable notice * * * and after a reasonable hearing'. Therefore, as pointed out by the Chancellor, any arbitrary, fraudulent or illegal action of the Board in revoking the permit may be corrected by Code sections 9008-9018. In pointing out this remedy in a case like this, it was held in Richardson v. Reese, supra: 'If the commissioner in revoking his license acts arbitrarily, fraudulently, or illegally, the agent is afforded an adequate remedy by sections 9008-9018 of the Code of 1932'.

The same insistence is made with reference to the requirement that public liability and property damage insurance be carried or approved surety bond filed as a condition precedent to the operation of a taxi. The argument made is that it deprives taxi operators in Elizabethton of the privilege of driving therein without procuring this insurance or bond, while the general law permits him to drive anywhere else...

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3 cases
  • City of Baltimore v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 11 Octubre 1961
    ...not an inexorable command.' Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290, 44 S.Ct. 323, 325, 68 L.Ed. 686. In Large v. City of Elizabethton, 185 Tenn. 156, 203 S.W.2d 907, it was held that despite the alleged invalidity of the portion of an ordinance requiring all taxicab operators to obtai......
  • Checker Cab Co. v. City of Johnson City
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 11 Diciembre 1948
    ... ... taxicabs over the streets of Johnson City. An act with ... approximately the same provisions applicable to City of ... Elizabethton has recently been sustained. Large v. City ... of Elizabethton, 185 Tenn. 156, 203 S.W.2d 907. That act ... contained a provision identical in ... ...
  • Caldwell v. Harris
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 18 Octubre 1947
    ... ...          Guinn & Mitchell, of Johnson City, for appellees ...          PREWITT, ...          The 10 ... complainants are ...          And in ... the recent case of Large v. City of Elizabethton, ... 185 Tenn. 156, 203 S.W.2d 907, 909, this Court said: '* * ... * If ... ...

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