Larios v. Cox

Decision Date10 February 2004
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 1:03-CV-693-CAP.,CIV.A. 1:03-CV-693-CAP.
Citation300 F.Supp.2d 1320
PartiesSara LARIOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Cathy COX, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Frank B. Strickland, Anne Ware Lewis, Strickland Brockington Lewis, Stacy Grant Freeman, Arnall Golden & Gregory, Atlanta, GA, E. M. Braden, phv, Amy M. Henson, phv, Baker & Hostetler, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.

Dennis Robert Dunn, Thurbert E. Baker, Office of State Attorney General, Mark Howard Cohen, Troutman Sanders, David F. Walbert, Parks, Chesin & Walbert, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

Before MARCUS, Circuit Judge, PANNELL and O'KELLEY, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This case presents several challenges to the congressional and state legislative reapportionment plans enacted by the Georgia General Assembly in 2001 and 2002. Specifically, in their First Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs contend that these plans violate a number of constitutional and statutory provisions, including (1) the First Amendment, (2) 2 U.S.C. § 2c, (3) Article I, § 2, based on violation of the one person, one vote principle and transgression of the state's authority to dictate the times, places, and manner of congressional elections, and (4) the Equal Protection Clause, based on partisan gerrymandering, racial gerrymandering, violation of the one person, one vote principle, and the use of a combination of single- and multi-member districts in the state House of Representatives.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), a three-judge court, consisting of Circuit Judge Stanley Marcus, District Judge Charles A. Pannell, Jr., and Senior District Judge William C. O'Kelley, was convened. In orders dated August 29, 2003, and October 15, 2003, we ruled on the defendant's motions to dismiss, ultimately dismissing the plaintiffs' 2 U.S.C. § 2 claim and the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim challenging the combination of single- and multi-member districts in the state House, while allowing the remaining claims to go forward. Subsequently, in an order dated December 9, 2003, we granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claims of partisan gerrymandering, violation of the First Amendment, and violation of Article I, § 2 by exceeding the state's authority to dictate the times, places, and manner of congressional elections; however, we denied both parties' motions for summary judgment with respect to the one person, one vote claims. In that same order, we stayed consideration of the plaintiffs' racial gerrymandering claim, which relates only to the 2001 and 2002 Senate plans, pending further development of the preclearance proceedings before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Georgia v. Ashcroft, Civil Action No. 01-2111.

Accordingly, this three-judge district court conducted a bench trial on January 6-9, 2004, concerning only the plaintiffs' one person, one vote challenges to Georgia's congressional and state legislative plans. We have now considered the evidence presented at trial, as well as the parties' deposition designations, stipulated facts, and proposed statements of fact and conclusions of law. Based upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude:

(1) Georgia's state legislative reapportionment plans plainly violate the one person, one vote principle embodied in the Equal Protection Clause because each deviates from population equality by a total of 9.98% of the ideal district population and there are no legitimate, consistently applied state policies which justify these population deviations. Instead, the plans arbitrarily and discriminatorily dilute and debase the weight of certain citizens' votes by intentionally and systematically underpopulating districts in rural south Georgia and inner-city Atlanta, correspondingly overpopulating the districts in suburban areas surrounding Atlanta, and by underpopulating the districts held by incumbent Democrats.

(2) Georgia's congressional reapportionment plan, though it deviates from population equality by a maximum of seventy-two persons, does not violate Article I, § 2 because the very small population deviations are supported by legitimate state interests in avoiding additional precinct-splitting and in ensuring that those precincts that are divided are split along easily recognizable boundaries wherever possible.

I. Findings of Fact
A. The Reapportionment Process in General

The 2000 Decennial Census reported that the total population of the State of Georgia was 8,186,453 persons. From 1990 to 2000, the population of north Georgia, which is largely comprised of the urban and suburban areas surrounding Atlanta, grew at a much faster rate than the population of south Georgia, which is primarily rural.1 This population trend has remained consistent for the last several decades. In that same time period, the Republican party has also gained substantial strength in Georgia. In fact, the fastest-growing counties in the state over the past decade are Republican-leaning.

Based on its substantial population growth over the previous decade, the state was entitled to two additional congressional seats pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 2a. Because of the addition of these new congressional seats and the substantial shifts in population around the state, it became necessary for Georgia to redraw its congressional districts. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; 2 U.S.C. § 2a. Likewise, the state's population growth had created population disparities in the state House and Senate districts, which needed to be corrected pursuant to Article III, § 2, ¶ 2 of the Georgia Constitution.

The Georgia General Assembly, therefore, met in two special sessions during August and September of 2001 for the purposes of redistricting the state's congressional seats and the state House and Senate seats. Prior to the 2001 special sessions, the House and Senate Reapportionment Committees had met both formally and informally on several occasions to prepare for the reapportionment process and to discuss various proposed plans. The committees also adopted guidelines for the reapportionment of congressional and legislative districts. These guidelines stated that the population of each state House and Senate district should be within 5% of the "ideal" district, so that the total deviation did not exceed 10%. Plaintiffs' Ex. 58. The guidelines also differed significantly from those adopted for the 1991 and 1981 redistrictings.2

The first special session of the General Assembly began on August 1 and ended on August 17, 2001. During the first special session, the General Assembly enacted a bill providing for the reapportionment of the state Senate ("the 2001 Senate Plan"). Then-Governor Roy Barnes signed the bill into law on August 24, 2001. During the first special session, the General Assembly also enacted a bill providing for the reapportionment of the state House of Representatives; however, that bill was subsequently vetoed by Governor Barnes.

The second special session of the General Assembly began on August 22 and ended on September 28, 2001. During this second special session, the General Assembly enacted a second bill providing for the reapportionment of the state House of Representatives ("the House Plan"), as well as a bill providing for the reapportionment of the state's congressional districts ("the Congressional Plan"). Governor Barnes signed both bills into law on October 1, 2001.

Both houses of the General Assembly used Maptitude software to draw their redistricting plans. With the available technology and the use of this software, redistricting plans in 2001 could have been created with a deviation of 0 to 1 persons. The combination of technology and political data available to legislators and plan drafters also allowed for sophisticated analyses of political performance, so that maps could be drawn and then immediately analyzed politically. Thus, in drafting and considering their proposed maps, members of both houses relied on political performance projections, indicating the percentage of votes Democrats and Republicans would likely receive in future elections based upon an assessment of past election results.

Republicans attempted to influence the redistricting in several ways, with little success. They drew up alternative redistricting guidelines that required adherence to traditional redistricting criteria, such as district compactness and contiguity. Plaintiffs' Ex. 59. These guidelines were rejected by both the House and Senate Reapportionment Committees. Test. of Rep. Westmoreland, Tr. at 366-68; Test. of Sen. Brown, Tr. at 662. During the special sessions, Republican legislators participated in the redistricting process by drawing up proposed plans and working with some Democratic legislators to reach compromise plans. None of these Republican-sponsored plans was passed. Test. of Sen. Johnson, Tr. at 456; Test. of Rep. Westmoreland, Tr. at 367-68, 374-75. During the special sessions, Republicans were not consulted by Democratic legislators regarding the redistricting plans. Test. of Rep. Westmoreland, Tr. at 401-02; Test. of Sen. Lee, Tr. at 511; Test. of Sen. Johnson, Tr. at 440; Test. of Bryan Tyson, Tr. at 976.

Because Georgia is a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, it was necessary for the state to have its reapportionment plans precleared by the federal government. To that end, the state filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on October 10, 2001, seeking a declaration that the plans enacted during the 2001 special sessions did not have the purpose or would not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. In an order dated April 5, 2002, the three-judge district court presiding over that action precleared the Congressional Plan and the House Plan, but refused...

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