Larkin v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

• Decision Date: 17 April 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 17-cv-09298
• Parties: RHONDA LARKIN, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, A BODY POLITIC INCORPORATED, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

RHONDA LARKIN, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,A BODY POLITIC INCORPORATED, Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-09298

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

April 17, 2020

Judge Martha M. Pacold

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Rhonda Larkin filed this lawsuit against her former employer, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, for employment discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq. The Board moves for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), contending that Larkin's claims are time-barred. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion [45].

Legal Standard

Rule 12(c) provides: "After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." "A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is governed by the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). . . . To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. East-West Univ., No. 17 CV 7092, 2018 WL 4591863, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2018); P-Americas, LLC v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Area Pension Fund, No. 13-cv-08808, 2014 WL 3858396, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014).

"A plaintiff whose allegations show that there is an airtight defense has pleaded himself out of court, and the judge may dismiss the suit on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). At the same time, "Judges should respect the norm that complaints need not anticipate or meet potential affirmative defenses. If the facts are uncontested (or the defendants accept plaintiffs' allegations for the sake of argument), it may be possible to decide under Rule 12(c); if the parties do not agree, but one side cannot substantiate its position with admissible evidence, the court may grant summary judgment under Rule 56." Id. at 638.

Here, the Board seeks judgment on the pleadings on the basis of an affirmative defense. The court limits its consideration to the pleadings. See Williams, 2018 WL 4591863, at *1.

For the purposes of a 12(c) motion, "[t]he pleadings include the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits." N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). In the Seventh Circuit, a "written instrument" includes "documents such as affidavits . . . [,] letters, and loan documentation." Id. at 453 (internal citations omitted).

Felsenthal v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-07402, 2013 WL 469475, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2013); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ("A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.").

The Seventh Circuit has explained in the context of Rule 12(b)(6) motions (and the court sees no reason why these principles would not also apply to Rule 12(c) motions): "A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based only on the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice. . . . If a moving party relies on additional materials, the motion must be converted to one for summary judgment under Rule 56" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).

In particular: "If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Rule 12(d); see Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745 n.1; Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2002); Rutherford v. Judge & Dolph Ltd., 707 F.3d 710, 713-14 (7th Cir. 2013); Williams, 2018 WL 4591863, at *1; Brack v. Dart, No. 11-cv-08192, 2013 WL 2251741, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2013); Curry v. City of Chicago, No. 10-cv-07153, 2013 WL 884454, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2013); Krepps v. NIIT (USA), Inc., No. 11-cv-08787, 2012 WL 1532227, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2012).

"A plaintiff, however, has much more flexibility in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . . [A] party opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may submit materials outside the pleadings to illustrate the facts the party expects to be able to prove."Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745 n.1. Again, the court sees no reason why this principle would not also apply to Rule 12(c) motions.

Consistent with these principles, the court sets forth the facts in the light most favorable to Larkin and then turns to the Board's affirmative defense. In describing the facts, the court considers the complaint (Dkt. 1), the documents attached to the complaint (which are the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge (Dkt. 1-1) and the EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights (Dkt. 1-2)), and the answer (Dkt. 11).¹ The parties have reattached these documents, and attached other documents, to the motion for judgment on the pleadings and the response; the court addresses these documents separately below.

Background

The Board of Education hired Rhonda Larkin around September 2002. (Dkt. 1, Compl., ¶ 10.) She held multiple positions with the Board, and most recently served as Principal at Alex Harley Academy. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) On June 28, 2012, Larkin and the Board entered into a four-year employment agreement, covering Larkin's employment from July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2016. (Id. ¶ 14.)

In 2013, Larkin required surgery on both knees for torn meniscuses. (Id. ¶ 16.) Larkin requested medical leave for the surgery and the Board approved her leave from January 2014 through February 2014. (Id. ¶ 17.) Larkin required multiple surgeries and requested three extensions of her leave in early 2014; the Board granted them, ultimately extending her leave through April 25, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 18-20.) On or around March 28, 2014, Larkin requested an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Id. ¶ 21.) Larkin also requested that her medical leave and job protection be extended until May 2, 2014. (Id. ¶ 22.) Due to her medical condition and the torn meniscuses, Larkin needed assistance walking and was unable to walk up and down stairs. (Id. ¶ 23.)

The Board denied Larkin's request in significant part. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Board did extend her job protection until May 2, 2014. (Id. ¶ 25.) However, it did not provide the necessary accommodations for her to be able to return to work by May 2, 2014, as her recovery was ongoing and she was still unable to go up and down stairs. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Larkin was therefore forced to request another extension of her job protection past May 2, 2014. (Id. ¶ 28.) The Board denied her request. (Id. ¶ 29.)

Larkin had accumulated sufficient leave days to cover her absence past May 2, 2014. (Id. ¶ 30.) Despite Larkin's request for time off due to her medicalcondition and even though she had accrued leave sufficient to cover her time off, the Board terminated Larkin on May 16, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 37.)²

On March 11, 2015, Larkin filed a charge with the EEOC. (Dkt. 1-1.) The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on September 27, 2017, checking the box on the form indicating that it was closing the file because the charge was untimely. (Dkt. 1-2.)³ Larkin received the Dismissal and Notice of Rights on October 2, 2017. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 4; Dkt. 1-2 at 3.) She filed this lawsuit on December 27, 2017.

On May 11, 2018, the Board filed its answer, denying the paragraphs in which Larkin alleged that she was terminated on May 16, 2014, and asserting affirmative defenses, including the timeliness of Larkin's charge. (Dkt. 11 ¶¶ 31, 37; see also id. at 9-10 (first and fourth affirmative defenses).) The parties proceeded with written discovery. (Dkts. 21, 26, 27, 29.) The parties appeared for a status hearing on May 22, 2019, during which the Board raised the timeliness of Larkin's EEOC charge. (Dkt. 44 (Norgle, J.).) After the status hearing, the Board filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that Larkin's claims fail as a matter of law because she did not file her EEOC charge within the 300-day filing period. (Dkt. 45.) While the parties were briefing the motion, the case was reassigned to this judge. (Dkt. 54.)

Analysis

"The ADA prohibits a 'covered entity' from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability 'in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.'" Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist. 203, 392 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). "[T]he ADA's enforcement provision expressly incorporates § 2000e-5 of Title VII." Stepney, 392 F.3d at 239 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). "Under Title VII, a plaintiff in Illinois must file an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC within 300 days 'after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.'" Stepney, 392 F.3d at 239 (quoting § 2000e-5(e)(1) and citing cases). Accordingly, "claims for discrimination under the ADA also must be filed within 300 days 'after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.'" Stepney, 392 F.3d at 239 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)).

In discriminatory discharge cases, two elements are necessary to establish the date on which the "unlawful employment practice" occurred. First, there must be a final, ultimate, non-tentative decision to terminate the employee. . . . However,

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