Larkin v. Methacton Sch. Dist.

Decision Date23 February 2011
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 09–4146.
PartiesDeborah LARKIN, Plaintiff,v.METHACTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Holly Rogers, Gino J. Benedetti, Dilworth Paxson, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.Jonathan P. Riba, Sweet, Stevens, Tucker & Katz, LLP, New Britain, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

YOHN, District Judge.

Deborah Larkin brings this action against the Methacton School District (the District), alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 951 et seq. Larkin, a recovering alcoholic, claims that the District unlawfully discriminated against her because of her disability or perceived disability by (a) denying transfers to elementary-school positions for which she was qualified and (b) failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. She also claims that the District unlawfully retaliated against her for requesting a reasonable accommodation and filing a grievance regarding the District's handling of her request.1 Currently before the court is the District's motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, I will grant the District's motion as to each of Larkin's claims.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2

Larkin was hired by the District in November 2000 as a physical-education and health teacher at Methacton High School. (Def.'s Statement of Uncontested Facts (“Def.'s Facts”) ¶ 7.) In March 2007, Larkin told District officials that she was an alcoholic. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 23.) According to Larkin, the District did not change the way it treated her after learning that she was an alcoholic, and there is no indication that her alcoholism was affecting her ability to do her job. (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 24–25, 29.)

A. The February 8, 2008, Incident

On February 8, 2008, however, after drinking the night before, Larkin arrived at school drunk and drank a full bottle of cough syrup to satisfy her craving for alcohol. (Pl.'s Supplemental Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.'s Supp'l Facts”) ¶ 1; Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 34–35.) After confronting her, District officials required that she go to the hospital for a blood-alcohol test. (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶ 7; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. H.) According to the test results, Larkin's blood-alcohol level was 0.266 that afternoon (Def.'s Facts ¶ 37), more than three times the legal driving limit.

As a result of this incident, Larkin was suspended with pay for four days. In a letter dated February 11, 2008, Lawrence Feeley, who was then the District's acting director of labor relations and human resources, and Barbara Stevenson, who was then the superintendent of the District, informed Larkin of the suspension and explained that she would be allowed to return to work if she (a) contacted the District's employee assistance program or a similar resource and scheduled at least two counseling sessions during the week of her suspension and (b) scheduled an appointment, upon her return to work, with the District to review her “plan of action for the remainder of the 20072008 school year.” Feeley and Stevenson also explained that, before she returned to work, Larkin had to submit a copy of the results of her blood-alcohol test. (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts Ex. 36.)

Meanwhile, on February 9, Larkin checked herself into the Caron Treatment Center (“Caron”) for treatment for alcoholism. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 46; Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶ 30.) Larkin stayed at Caron for thirty days; upon her discharge, she continued to receive out-patient treatment and attended daily Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Uncontested Facts (“Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Facts”) ¶ 47.)

After Larkin checked herself into Caron, her primary-care physician, Dr. Birgit Wiswe, informed the District that Larkin was “under a Doctor's care and [would] be out of work for a minimum of one month.” (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts Ex. 11.) Dr. Wiswe sent the District letters again on March 10, April 10, and May 12, each time explaining that Larkin remained under a doctor's care and would be out of work for an additional month. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. J.)

B. Larkin's Request for a Transfer

On March 12, Larkin informed the District that she wanted to transfer to another school (Compl. ¶ 20), and in a March 25 e-mail, Feeley asked Larkin to contact him to discuss the possibility of her return to Methacton High School during that school year as well as her request for a transfer for the following school year (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. K).

Larkin met with Feeley, Stevenson, and Diana Kernop, the president of the Methacton Education Association, on April 23. (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶ 34.) Larkin explained that she could not return to the high school and was requesting a transfer because she needed to avoid the “people, places, and things” associated with her drinking. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, Dep. of Deborah Larkin (Mar. 9, 2010) (“Larkin Dep.”) at 129:2–20; Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶ 37.) She believed that the student population at the high school “was a threat to her health and her ability to remain sober.” (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶ 36.) According to Larkin, Stevenson understood Larkin's need to transfer and empathized with her because Stevenson's ex-husband was an alcoholic. (Larkin Dep. at 128:17–130:6; Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶¶ 35, 37.) Stevenson and Feeley told Larkin, however, that if she wanted to transfer, she would have to apply for an open position at another school and be interviewed for that position, and Larkin understood; there was no discussion about Larkin being transferred without participating in the normal application process. (Larkin Dep. at 129:11–15, 130:19–131:6; Def.'s Facts ¶ 53.)

After Larkin left the meeting, Kernop asked—as an afterthought, as she put it—whether the ADA applied to Larkin's situation. (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts Ex. 15, Dep. of Diana Kernop (Apr. 15, 2010) (“Kernop Dep.”) at 45:16–47:7.) Kernop said that she would check with the union's legal counsel, and the District administrators said that they would check with the District's counsel. ( Id. at 46:10–47:2.) According to Kernop, later that day she sent e-mails to Feeley and Stevenson informing them that the union's counsel believed that the ADA did apply, but the District officials never indicated to her whether they believed that the ADA applied. ( Id. at 48:2–51:14.)

1. The Audubon Position

An opening for a health and physical-education position at Audubon Elementary School had been posted a couple of days before this April 23 meeting (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts Ex. 21), and on April 24, the day after the meeting, Larkin e-mailed her resume to Feeley to apply for the position (Def.'s Facts ¶ 54; Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶ 68).

Larkin was interviewed for the Audubon position on April 29 by Melissa Gorla, who was then the principal of the elementary school. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 69; Pl.'s Supp'l Facts ¶ 69.) Gorla also interviewed another candidate, Donica Godri, who at the time was working as a health and physical-education teacher in a split position at two other elementary schools in the District. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 72; Compl. ¶ 30.) Both candidates were asked the same set of questions. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 73; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. W, Deposition of Melissa Gorla (Mar. 3, 2010) (“Gorla Dep.”) at 16:9–16.) According to Gorla, she selected Godri, instead of Larkin, for the position because Godri was the “best candidate”—not only did she have elementary-school experience within the District, but, according to Gorla, she was very energetic and gave a positive outlook of working with young children.” (Gorla Dep. at 16:20–17:17; Def.'s Facts ¶ 74.) Gorla testified that Larkin told her she (Larkin) was a recovering alcoholic but that Larkin's status did not affect her decision in any way. (Gorla Dep. at 26:19–28:9; Def.'s Facts ¶ 75.)

2. The Split Position

Godri's transfer to Audubon meant that her split position as a health and physical-education teacher at Arrowhead and Worcester Elementary Schools was available. (Compl.¶¶ 30–31.) After the District posted the opening on May 1 (Pl.'s Supp'l Facts Ex. 24), Larkin applied for that position (Def.'s Facts ¶ 78). On May 13, she e-mailed Feeley to explain that she was applying for the position “as a reasonable accommodation as a recovering alcoholic under the ADA.” (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. M.) Larkin did not object, however, to the fact that she was being required to interview for the position. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 81.)

Around this time, Larkin's therapists and primary-care physician sent letters to Feeley recommending that the District transfer her to another school. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. N.) None of them mentioned a transfer to an elementary school specifically, and although they recommended and supported a transfer, none suggested that it was necessary. Dr. Wiswe, for example, wrote that she, “along with other health care professionals, [had] strongly encouraged [Larkin] to apply for transfer to another school ... to support her efforts in regards to maintaining sobriety.” ( Id. Ex N., Letter from Birgit Wiswe to Larry Feeley (May 9, 2008).) One of Larkin's therapists asserted that “Larkin remains very competent in every way to continue teaching” and that [a] change in her school environment will give her new opportunity to utilize the tools she's learned in the course of her treatment and to exercise her teaching skills and talents in a new environment with a different student population and different collegial support.” ( Id. Ex. N, Letter from Mary McCormick to Larry Feeley (May 7, 2008).) Another therapist noted that Larkin “appears to be using good judgment in her request for sick time and a transfer to another school with a different position, in...

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