Larkin v. State

Decision Date09 November 2020
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2705
Parties John B. LARKIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Attorneys for Appellant: Stacy R. Uliana, Jack Kenney, Bargersville, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Brown, Judge.

[1] John B. Larkin appeals his conviction and sentence for involuntary manslaughter, raising several issues. We reverse.1

Facts and Procedural History

[2] This is the third appeal in this case. In December 2012, police were dispatched to the home of John and Stacey Larkin for a reported shooting. State v. Larkin , 100 N.E.3d 700, 701 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied . Stacey sustained two fatal gunshot wounds during a domestic dispute. Id. Police took Larkin into custody for questioning and interrogated him even after he invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 701-702. Larkin's statements to police during those sessions were later suppressed. Id. at 702. On December 13, 2012, the State charged him with voluntary manslaughter as a class A felony,2 and police conducted a recorded interview. Id.

During a break, police left Larkin alone with his attorney, but kept the video recording equipment running, capturing Larkin and his attorney's privileged communications. Larkin and his attorney discussed various aspects of the case including insurance, motivation and motive, possible charges, filing for divorce, the children, conditions of bond, the funeral, possible defenses, and the sequence of events on the evening of the shooting. Police and prosecutors viewed the video and, therefore, saw and heard Larkin's privileged discussion with counsel. A court reporter even transcribed the discussion and distributed it to the prosecutor's office. Nearly one year later (December 2013), the State disclosed to Larkin that it had eavesdropped on privileged communications between him and his attorney.

Id.

[3] In July 2014, Larkin moved to dismiss the voluntary manslaughter charge citing police and prosecutorial misconduct and later moved to disqualify the LaPorte County Prosecutor's Office and requested a special prosecutor. Id. He also filed a motion to dismiss in September 2014 alleging the State's lead detective conspired to obstruct justice by having another officer change his statement regarding that officer's prior interaction with Stacey. Id. In October 2014, the court denied Larkin's motions but suppressed statements Larkin made to police after he invoked the right to counsel but before counsel arrived and the recorded conversation between Larkin and counsel. Id. Larkin initiated an interlocutory appeal, and this Court dismissed the appeal as moot since LaPorte County elected a new prosecutor in November 2014. Id. (citing Larkin v. State , 43 N.E.3d 1281, 1286-1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) ). The State moved for the appointment of a special prosecutor, which the trial court granted. Id.

[4] In May 2016, Larkin moved for discharge under Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C) and to dismiss the voluntary manslaughter charge, arguing the police and prosecutorial misconduct made a fair trial impossible. Id. at 703. The trial court ultimately granted Larkin's motions, discharging him pursuant to Rule 4(C) and dismissing the voluntary manslaughter charge. Id. The State appealed, and this Court affirmed. Id. (citing State v. Larkin , 77 N.E.3d 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), reh'g denied , trans. granted , opinion vacated , 94 N.E.3d 700 (Ind. 2017) ). The State sought transfer. Id. On June 27, 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court issued a decision which held:

In this case, there is no dispute that the State committed misconduct and on numerous occasions. First, police continued to question Larkin after he invoked his right to counsel. Then, Larkin's private conversation with his attorney was recorded and listened to by several individuals at the prosecutor's office. The situation was compounded when the conversation was transcribed and further distributed. Additionally, there is evidence in the record reflecting potential evidence tampering. That is, one officer instructed another to change his statement about his prior interaction with Larkin's wife. There is also evidence that a piece of physical evidence, the safe containing the gun used to shoot Stacey, was tampered with while in the State's custody and prior to allowing Larkin an opportunity to examine it.

Id. at 706. The Court held that the appropriate remedy for the State's misconduct was suppression of the tainted evidence for which the State could not rebut the presumption of prejudice pursuant to State v. Taylor , 49 N.E.3d 1019 (Ind. 2016) ). 100 N.E.3d at 706. It also held the Rule 4(C) motion for discharge should have been denied. Id. at 707. The Court remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 708.

[5] On May 7, 2019, Larkin filed a Motion to Dismiss for State Misconduct alleging that, after the Indiana Supreme Court's decision was issued, he discovered the State withheld material evidence that the gun involved in the shooting was defective and could discharge even when the safety was engaged or without the trigger being pulled when the gun was dropped or bumped, and he argued the withheld evidence went to the heart of his defense that he accidentally shot Stacey while struggling to keep the gun away from her. The court held a hearing on May 14, 2019.

[6] On July 2, 2019, the court issued an order stating that it had read the transcripts of the questioning of Larkin after he requested an attorney and of the recorded conversation between Larkin and his attorney, which were suppressed, and the transcript of questioning of Larkin by the police and prosecuting attorney in the presence of Larkin's attorney. The court found the State gained no information from the suppressed items that it did not receive in its interview with Larkin when his attorney was present and, "[t]herefore, any such evidence obtained is not tainted." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 206. The court also stated that, "[a]s to the gun defect, the defense is now fully aware of that and the failure to disclose has no effect on the evidence." Id.

[7] The court held a jury trial on September 9 through 13, 2019. The jury heard evidence that in 2012 Larkin and Stacey lived together and had four children who were nine to fourteen years old. The parties entered into a stipulation that Stacey was hospitalized for three days in November 2000 for suicidal gestures and ideations, depression, and anxiety, that she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder

, and that records indicate concern over hypomanic behaviors. The parties also stipulated as to the various medications she had been prescribed.

[8] K., Larkin and Stacey's oldest child, testified that she played the role of therapist for her mother, she took care of her mother during the times she dealt with her mental health, medications, and alcohol, and that her mother told her she had placed a gun to her own head three times. K. testified that, in mid-2012, her mother started taking a new medication and her behavior worsened, she would drink alcohol, there were multiple instances where she observed Stacey push or punch Larkin, and she observed Stacey scream and lock herself in her room. K. testified that she would unlock the door using either a key or a knife and enter the bedroom to take care of her mother. She also testified that, when she was younger, she would unlock her mother's computer and read documents in which her mother wrote about her life to make sure that she was okay. K. further indicated there was an incident in June 2012 during which Stacey had taken a gun from the house, threatened suicide, and eventually brought the gun back to the house and handed it to K. K. indicated she gave the gun to Larkin, who placed it in the back of his car. Larkin stated in his police interview it was in the family's storage unit and told Stacey where he placed the gun and that there was no reason to have it in the house.

[9] K. further testified there was an incident the weekend before July 4th during which Larkin told Stacey she could not drive the family home from a festival because she was intoxicated, Stacey screamed, cursed, and ran away, and Larkin found her about thirty minutes later and was able to take her home. K. also testified that, on July 8, 2012, there was a party at their house at which Stacey was intoxicated, she heard Stacey yelling, Stacey struck Larkin and broke a phone, Larkin called 911, and Stacey started to scratch herself, ran to the garage, told K. to get in the car with her, and drove away with K. K. testified that, while in the vehicle, the police called and told Stacey to turn around, Stacey did a U-turn, while she was intoxicated and K. held the steering wheel, and after they arrived home the police administered field sobriety tests. Stacey was arrested, and Larkin later wrote a letter stating that he did not wish to press charges for any battery by Stacey and that his hope was that she would obtain the assistance she needed. K. testified that, in September 2012, there was a family meeting during which Larkin told Stacey that he wanted her to participate in a treatment program and that, if she did not, he would divorce her. K. also testified that, during the week before she died, Stacey was very angry and was walling herself off, and deleting files from her computer.

[10] Q., another of Larkin and Stacey's children, testified that Stacey became more agitated and depressed as the year 2012 progressed. Q. testified as to Stacey's changing demeanor in the summer of 2012, the incidents in July 2012, and the family meeting in September 2012. Q. testified that the family bought Stacey a birthday cake in September, she threw the cake in the garbage, and started screaming at them. Q. kept a key which unlocked many of the doors in the house and would sometimes unlock...

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5 cases
  • Larkin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • September 14, 2021
    ...an intent to batter rather than with an intent to kill" or that he "committed [a] battery by pushing Stacey." Larkin v. State , 159 N.E.3d 976, 986–87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), vacated. And there was, "at a minimum, reasonable doubt as to whether the State's charging instrument provided Larkin ......
  • Larkin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • September 14, 2021
    ..."with an intent to batter rather than with an intent to kill" or that he "committed [a] battery by pushing Stacey." Larkin v. State, 159 N.E.3d 976, 986-87 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), vacated. And there was, "at a minimum, reasonable doubt as to whether the State's charging instrument provided Lark......
  • Emery v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 19, 2021
    ...or intentionally kills another human being while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter." Larkin v. State , 159 N.E.3d 976, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a) ). Emery was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a level 2 felony. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.......
  • Emery v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 19, 2021
    ...who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter." Larkin v. State, 159 N.E.3d 976, 985 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (citing Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a)). Emery was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a level 2 felony. Ind. Code § ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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