Larmon v. United States
| Citation | 37 F.2d 584 |
| Parties | LARMON et al. v. UNITED STATES. |
| Decision Date | 27 December 1929 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Coleman Taylor, of Russellville, Ky., and Woodward, Hamilton & Hobson, of Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs.
T. J. Sparks, U. S. Atty., and Frank A. Ropke, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Louisville, Ky., Bayless L. Guffy, of Washington, D. C., and George E. Brown, Jr., of Louisville, Ky., for the United States.
This is a suit to recover on a war risk insurance policy for the sum of $10,000, issued on May 26, 1918, to Henry Loving Larmon, who, at the time of its issue, was in the Navy of the United States, and who died as the result of pulmonary tuberculosis in January, 1922. The plaintiffs are the mother and the father of the deceased seaman.
The premiums on the policy were paid up to and including the 2d day of February, 1920, but no premiums were thereafter paid. The plaintiffs insist, however, that at the time of the death of Larmon the policy was still in force, by reason of the fact that under the World War Veterans' Act the deceased seaman had due him compensation uncollected, which, if applied to the payment of premiums as provided in section 305 of that act (38 USCA § 516), would have kept the policy in full force and effect. For the purpose of getting the benefit of section 305 of the act, application was made to the Director of the Veterans' Bureau to rate the deceased veteran for compensation purposes; it being contended that prior to the cessation of payment of the premiums on the policy, and at all times since that date up to his death, the seaman was entitled to such a rating for compensation purposes as would have kept the policy in force. The Director made the rating, but declined to rate him as suffering from a compensable disability prior to September 10, 1920. It was therefore held by the Director that the policy was not in force at the time of the death of the seaman.
Conceiving that the Supreme Court in the case of Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S. 221, 45 S. Ct. 69, 69 L. Ed. 256, ruled that the action of the Director, in compensation ratings, may be attacked judicially, if wholly unsupported by the evidence, or is wholly dependent upon a question of law, or is clearly arbitrary or capricious, this court in this cause is asked to review the action of the Director upon the ground that in denying to the deceased veteran the rating contended for, the Director's action was wholly unsupported by the evidence before him and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. Notwithstanding the intimation in the Silberschein Case, I am very much of the opinion that if this were a suit to recover...
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