Larochelle v. Cyr

• Decision Date: 10 March 1998
• Citation: 1998 ME 52,707 A.2d 799
• Parties: Leo LAROCHELLE v. Robert CYR and Stephen Hodsdon.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 799

707 A.2d 799

1998 ME 52

Leo LAROCHELLE v.Robert CYR and Stephen Hodsdon.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Dec. 2, 1997.

Decided March 10, 1998.

John S. Campbell(orally), Paulos & Campbell, P.A., Portland, for plaintiff.

Theodore H. Kirchner(orally), Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, Portland, for Hodsdon.

Kevin J. Beal(orally), Keith A. Powers, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, L.L.C., Portland, for Cyr.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, ^*RUDMAN, DANA, LIPEZ, and SAUFLEY, JJ.

WATHEN, Chief Justice.

¶1PlaintiffLeo Larochelle appeals from judgments entered in the Superior Court(York County, Brennan, J.) in favor of his former attorneys, defendantsStephen Hodsdon and Robert Cyr, in a legal malpractice action.Larochelle argues on appeal that the court improperly denied both his motion for judgment as a matter of law and his motion for a new trial.Finding no error, we affirm the judgments.

¶2 The evidence presented at trial may be briefly summarized as follows: In 1988, Larochelle was sued by his neighbors for trespassing on their property and removing timber, decorative trees, stones and loam.The civil action included one count of negligent trespass, one count of intentional or willful trespass, and sought damages of $75,000.Larochelle retained his son-in-law, Hodsdon, to represent him in the lawsuit.Although Larochelle had liability insurance, Hodsdon did not investigate whether the policy afforded coverage for the lawsuit.Hodsdon testified that he"implicitly" decided that a claim against the insurer would not be honored because the lawsuit was for trespass and involved an intentional act.Hodsdon continued to represent Larochelle until their relationship soured, and then withdrew from representation in October of 1989.

¶3 Larochelle was then referred to Cyr by a third attorney.Cyr testified that after failing to convince Larochelle to work out his disagreement with Hodsdon, he agreed to represent him.Cyr testified that the referring attorney, since deceased, told him there was no insurance coverage for the lawsuit and he made no further inquiry.

¶4 The trespass action was tried with Cyr defending, and a judgment was entered against Larochelle for $46,904.29 in March of 1990.No appeal was taken in the trespass action, but Larochelle filed the present legal malpractice action against Hodsdon and Cyr alleging a failure to investigate and obtain insurance coverage for the underlying action.He amended his complaint later to include an allegation that both attorneys were negligent in preparing his defense in the trespass action.

¶5 In the present action, the court bifurcated the trial, and first heard the issue of liability.At the close of Larochelle's case, the court granted Hodsdon's motion and dismissed the claim of negligent preparation against him.The jury returned three separate verdict forms.It found that Hodsdon was negligent in failing to investigate and obtain insurance coverage for the trespass action, but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of harm to Larochelle.With regard to Cyr, the jury found that he was not negligent in failing to investigate the availability of insurance coverage, nor was he negligent in preparing the defense of the trespass action.Larochelle now appeals solely with regard to the findings concerning each attorneys' failure to investigate and obtain insurance coverage.

¶6 At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Larochelle moved for "a judgment for the plaintiff."After the verdict was returned, he moved for "a judgment notwithstanding the verdict."Both motions were appropriately referred to as "motions for judgment as a matter of law."M.R. Civ. P. 50.The court denied both motions.We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law"to determine if any reasonable view of the evidence and those inferences that are justifiably drawn from that evidence supports the jury verdict."Davis v. Currier, 1997 ME 199, p 3, 704 A.2d 1207.

¶7 As plaintiff, Larochelle had the burden of proof.Defendants presented credible expert testimony that, even if they had inquired into insurance coverage during the course of their representation, at any time prior to our opinion in Massachusetts Bay Ins. v. Ferraiolo Const., ¹ the insurance company would have declined to provide a defense.The defense expert also testified that it was reasonable for Cyr to rely on another attorney's statement regarding the availability of insurance coverage.Moreover, in the underlying trespass action, the jury had found that Larochelle acted willfully and knowingly in trespassing on his neighbor's land and even his own expert witness conceded that an insurer would have no duty to indemnify such a judgment.Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants, the jury was not rationally compelled to conclude that Larochelle had established the essential elements of his claims.SeeLewis v. Knowlton, 1997 ME 12, p 8, 688 A.2d 912, 913.The court did not err in denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law.

¶8 Larochelle also moved for a new trial and argued unsuccessfully that error committed in the course of the trial deprived him of substantial justice.He also argued that the verdicts were contrary to the evidence.We review a denial of a motion for a new trial for a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.Taylor v. Lapomarda, Jr., 1997 ME 216, p 5, 702 A.2d 685, 687.It is proper for the "trial court to deny a motion for a new trial unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has been committed or that substantial justice has not been done."Davis v. Currier, 1997 ME 199, p 7, 704 A.2d 1207.

¶9 First, Larochelle contends that the court erred in bifurcating the trial on the issues of liability and damages.Contrary to his contention, he fails to demonstrate that the limitation on evidence regarding damages in phase one of the trial prejudiced his efforts to establish liability.The jury heard evidence of the amount of the judgment returned against him in the underlying trespass action.By deferring the presentation of evidence concerning consequential damages other than the judgment, the court did not prejudice Larochelle's ability to prove a breach of duty and causation.The court committed no error in bifurcating the trial.

¶10 Larochelle next argues that the court erroneously instructed the jury that "the law was 'unclear' as to coverage as of 1990."He misstates the court's language.The court stated that the issue of insurance coverage in cases of trespass was "undecided" at the time Hodsdon and Cyr were involved in representing Larochelle.We first found a duty to defend a trespass action in Massachusetts Bay Ins. v. Ferraiolo Const., 584 A.2d 608, 610(Me.1990) and noted that we had never before been called on to decide whether an alleged trespass could...