Larocque v. Larocque.
| Decision Date | 26 April 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 1790.,1790. |
| Citation | 58 A.2d 633 |
| Parties | LAROCQUE v. LAROCQUE. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; G. Frederick Frost, Judge.
Suit by Antonio D. Larocque against Evelyn F. Larocque for partition of property allegedly held as joint tenants, wherein defendant filed a cross bill praying that complainant be ordered to convey his interest in the property. From the decree, plaintiff appeals.
Decree reversed and cause remanded for entry of a decree in accordance with opinion.
Ernest L. Shein, of Providence, for complainant.
William R. Goldberg, of Pawtucket, for respondent.
This is a bill in equity brought by a husband against his wife wherein he prays that certain real estate in the city of Pawtucket now owned by them in fee as joint tenants be sold and that the net proceeds from such sale be divided equally between them. The respondent in her answer in the nature of a cross bill denies that the complainant is entitled to any interest in the real estate, averring that the entire consideration for the purchase of the property was paid by her from the proceeds of life insurance received upon the death of her first husband; that, prior to her marriage to the complainant, he had fraudulently induced her to insert his name in the deed as a joint tenant; and she prays that complainant be ordered to convey to her his interest in the property.
The cause was heard in the superior court on bill, answer and proof. It is before us on complainant's appeal from a final decree dismissing the bill and granting affirmative relief to the respondent. The decree orders that the real estate therein described ‘be cleared from the claims of the complainant and that said real estate be set aside to her in fee simple, free and clear from all right, title and claim of the complainant * * *.’
The following facts are undisputed. Complainant and respondent were married February 22, 1941. It was a second marriage for each. The complainant had a boy by his former marriage, and the respondent, formerly Mrs. Evelyn Genest, had a boy and a girl by her first husband, who died October 12, 1940. No child was born of the present marriage. Shortly after the death of Mr. Genest the complainant and respondent began to talk of marriage and in contemplation thereof they visited various properties for the purpose of buying a home for themselves and their children. They finally decided to purchase the property now in question from Joseph Desmarais for $6,800.
On December 18, 1940 a deposit in the sum of $200 was paid to Desmarais, who apparently agreed to assist in securing a mortgage for $6,000 towards completion of the sale. Such a mortgage, payable at the rate of $50 a month, including interest and taxes, was obtained from the Old Colony Co-operative Bank. The sale was completed at the bank in the presence of both complainant and respondent on January 14, 1941. Desmarais then received $600 from the parties in addition to the proceeds of the mortgage, thus making up the purchase price of $6,800. The warranty deed, which was prepared by a title guarantee company, conveyed the property to ‘Antonio D. Larocque and Evelyn F. Genest’ as joint tenants.
At the trial in the superior court the controversy centered around the question as to the ownership of the $800 that was paid for the property in addition to the $6,000 from the mortgage. Both parties, and later the trial justice, proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the determination of that question was all-controlling in the circumstances and, therefore, treated the payment of the $800 as if it constituted the entire consideration for the sale. They all overlooked the fact that the mortgage to the bank was an important element of the sale, and that the proceeds of that mortgage constituted a very material part of the money that went to make up the purchase price.
Since the completion of the sale on January 14, 1941, the complainant has been and, so far as appears in the record before us, is now bound to pay, in whole or in part, the $6,000 mortgage note that he signed when the property was purchased. The incurring of this obligation constituted a valuable contribution to the consideration for the sale. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 73 R.I. 1, 53 A.2d 501. Under the decree from which the complainant appeals, he is deprived of all right in the property but continues legally bound to pay the obligation of the mortgage note, whatever the balance due thereon may now be. This in itself is inequitable.
The evidence is highly conflicting as to the ownership of the $800 paid to Desmarais and also as to why complainant's name was inserted in the deed. Other than clearly showing that both the complainant and the respondent were almost continuously employed at good wages and that the latter, especially after marriage, attended to all financial matters, the evidence on the points just above mentioned is replete with denials, self-contradictions, evasions and exaggerations by both parties.
The complainant in substance claims that he and the respondent agreed to purchase the property now in dispute in contemplation of marriage and with the understanding that the deed to such property was to be in their joint names; that at that time he had savings in the sum of $900, which he kept in a cedar chest in his home; that he gave to the respondent $100 of this sum as his part of the initial payment when the $200 deposit was paid to Desmarais; and that he gave to her the remaining $800 of his savings when the sale was to be completed, part of this sum to be used in paying his one half of the down payment, and the remainder to be expended to purchase additional furniture for their home.
The respondent denies all this testimony, claiming that the $800 paid to Desmarais was life insurance money which she had received upon the death of her first husband. In support of her claim she produced a receipt for $200 in her name from Desmarais and a check for $800 in which she was the payee. The complainant's explanation of these instruments was that, as to the receipt, it was immaterial to whom it ran, as he trusted her because she was to be his wife; and, as to the check, it was respondent's suggestion to complete the down payment in that manner and that the check was merely in substitution of the money he had given her.
Now, as to why complainant's name was...
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