Larose v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.

Citation11 Wash.App.2d 862,456 P.3d 879
Decision Date27 January 2020
Docket NumberNo. 78454-4-I,78454-4-I
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Parties Sheila M. LAROSE, Respondent, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Appellant, King County, Defendant.

Paul Michael Weideman, Seattle Labor & Industries A.g. Office, Attorney at Law, 800 Fifth Ave, Suite 2000, Ms-tb-14, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, for Appellant.

Brian Michael Wright, Causey Wright, P.S., Po Box 34538, Seattle, WA, 98124-1538, for Respondent.

Kristen Eshleman Salha, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, 3101 Western Ave. Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98121-3071, Ann Silvernale, Holmes, Weddle, & Barcott, 999 3rd Ave. Ste. 2600, Seattle, WA, 98104-4011, for Other Parties.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Schindler, J.P.T.* ¶1 The right to workers’ compensation is statutory. Workers are entitled to disability benefits under the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, for industrial injuries and occupational diseases. Stress-related mental conditions or mental disabilities

that result from a single and sudden traumatic event are compensable as an industrial injury.1 By contrast, the legislature expressly directed the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) to adopt a rule to exclude "claims based on mental conditions or mental disabilities caused by stress" from coverage as "an occupational disease."2 Former WAC 296-14-300(1) (1988) excludes claims for mental conditions or mental disabilities

caused by stress from coverage as an occupational disease. However, former WAC 296-14-300(2) states that a claim for stress resulting from a single exposure to a traumatic event shall be treated as an industrial injury. The Department amended WAC 296-14-300(2) in 2015 to add subsections (b), (c), and (d).3 Subsection (2)(b) provides examples of what constitutes a "single traumatic event"; (2)(c) describes the ways the single traumatic event must occur; and (2)(d) clarifies that "[r]epeated exposure to traumatic events, none of which are a single traumatic event," is not an industrial injury or an occupational disease, but a single traumatic event "that occurs within a series of exposures will be adjudicated as an industrial injury." WAC 296-14-300. Sheila LaRose filed a workers’ compensation occupational disease claim for post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD) and major depressive disorder. LaRose stipulated her mental conditions were not the result of a single traumatic event but rather, the result of the cumulative effect from repeated traumatic events. The Board of Industrial Appeals (Board) affirmed denial of her occupational disease claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The superior court reversed on the grounds that the Department exceeded its statutory authority by adopting WAC 296-14-300(2)(d) precluding "[r]epeated exposure to traumatic events" as an occupational disease. The Department appeals. We hold the Department did not exceed its statutory authority. The 2015 amendment of WAC 296-14-300(2)(d) is consistent with the IIA and the express legislative directive to exclude claims for a mental condition or mental disability caused by stress from coverage as an occupational disease. We reverse the superior court order and the award of attorney fees. We affirm the decision of the Board to deny the occupational disease claim for PTSD and major depressive disorder.

Workers’ Compensation

¶2 The legislature enacted the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, in 1911 to create a new system of worker compensation benefits. LAWS OF 1911, ch. 74. The legislature abolished civil actions and made the IIA the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. RCW 51.04.010 ; Dennis v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash.2d 467, 469-70, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987) ; Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc., 185 Wash.2d 721, 733, 374 P.3d 1097 (2016).4 The stated intent of the IIA is to provide "sure and certain relief" for injured workers "regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy." RCW 51.04.010.

¶3 When enacted in 1911, there was "no coverage for disability resulting from occupational disease; only injuries sustained performing certain extrahazardous work." Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 472, 745 P.2d 1295. The IIA defined an industrial "injury" as "an injury resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction of disease." LAWS OF 1911, ch. 74, § 3. In 1927, the legislature adopted the present definition of industrial injury. LAWS OF 1927, ch. 310, § 2. The IIA defines an industrial "injury" as "a sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and occurring from without, and such physical conditions as result therefrom." RCW 51.08.100. A worker must file an industrial injury claim within one year after the date of injury. RCW 51.28.050.

¶4 In 1937, the legislature expanded coverage under the IIA for certain diseases. LAWS OF 1937, ch. 212, § 1; Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 472-73, 745 P.2d 1295. In 1941, the legislature eliminated the list of enumerated diseases and enacted the present definition of "occupational disease." Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 473, 745 P.2d 1295 (citing LAWS OF 1941, ch. 235, § 1). The IIA defines "occupational disease" as "such disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of employment." RCW 51.08.140. A worker "who suffers disability from an occupational disease in the course of employment ... shall receive the same compensation benefits" and medical care as would be paid to an injured worker under the IIA. RCW 51.32.180. A worker must file an occupational disease claim within two years following receipt of a physician diagnosis. RCW 51.28.055.

Exclusion of Occupational Disease Claims for Mental Conditions Caused by Stress

¶5 In Dennis, the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether a disability that results from repetitive work-related aggravation of a pre-existing nonwork-related disease was compensable as an occupational disease.

Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 469, 745 P.2d 1295.

¶6 The court held the IIA is "remedial in nature" and must be "liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker." Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 470, 745 P.2d 1295. Citing the purpose of the IIA, the rule of liberal construction in favor of coverage, and the broad definition of occupational disease, the court held the worker was entitled to compensation under the IIA. Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 474, 745 P.2d 1295.

By expressly providing that workers suffering disability from occupational disease be accorded equal treatment with workers suffering a traumatic injury during the course of employment, RCW 51.32.180 effectuates the [IIA]’s purpose of providing sure and certain relief to all workers injured in their employment. The worker whose work acts upon a preexisting disease to produce disability where none existed before is just as injured in his or her employment as is the worker who contracts a disease as a result of employment conditions.

Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 471, 745 P.2d 1295,5 ¶7 In the 1988 legislative session, the legislature enacted a statute directing the director of the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) to adopt a rule to exclude mental conditions and mental disabilities

caused by stress from coverage as an occupational disease. LAWS OF 1988, ch. 161, § 16 (codified at RCW 51.08.142 ). The Final Bill Report states, in pertinent part:

In a 1987 Washington state supreme court decision, industrial insurance coverage for occupational diseases was extended to certain disabilities caused by repetitive trauma and aggravation of preexisting nonoccupational diseases. It is not clear whether the court’s decision extends coverage to mental stress cases.

FINAL B. REPORT ON ENGROSSED H.B. 1396, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1988).

Former WAC 296-14-300 (1988)

¶8 In June 1988, the Department adopted a rule excluding occupational disease claims "based on mental conditions or mental disabilities

caused by stress." Wash. St. Reg. (WSR) 88-14-011 (June 24, 1988) (codified at WAC 296-14-300, "Mental condition/mental disabilities"). Former WAC 296-14-300(1) (1988) states:

Claims based on mental conditions or mental disabilities

caused by stress do not fall within the definition of an occupational disease in RCW 51.08.140.

Examples of mental conditions or mental disabilities caused by stress that do not fall within occupational disease shall include, but are not limited to, those conditions and disabilities resulting from:

(a) Change of employment duties;

(b) Conflicts with a supervisor;

(c) Actual or perceived threat of loss of a job, demotion, or disciplinary action;

(d) Relationships with supervisors, coworkers, or the public;

(e) Specific or general job dissatisfaction;

(f) Work load pressures;
(g) Subjective perceptions of employment conditions or environment;
(h) Loss of job or demotion for whatever reason;
(i) Fear of exposure to chemicals, radiation biohazards, or other perceived hazards;
(j) Objective or subjective stresses of employment;
(k) Personnel decisions;
(l) Actual, perceived, or anticipated financial reversals or difficulties occurring to the businesses of self-employed individuals or corporate officers.

¶9 However, consistent with coverage for a stress-related industrial injury under the IIA, former WAC 296-14-300(2) states, "Stress resulting from exposure to a single traumatic event will be adjudicated" as an industrial injury under RCW 51.08.100.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

¶10 The American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is the authoritative treatise that defines, classifies, and provides criteria to diagnose mental disorders.

¶11 The 1987 third revised edition of the DSM (DSM-3) defined the "essential feature" and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD) as follows:

The stressor producing this syndrome would be
...

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