Larr v. Dignan, 351

Decision Date08 April 1947
Docket NumberNo. 351,Jan. Term, 1947.,351
PartiesLARR v. DIGNAN, Secretary of State.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Original proceeding in mandamus by Leo Larr against Herman H. Dignan, Secretary of State, to compel defendant to vacate an order suspending plaintiff's operator's license, registration certificate, and certificate of title.

Mandamus denied.

Before the Entire Bench, except DETHMERS, J.

Charles S. Matthews, of Pontiac, for plaintiff.

Foss O. Eldred, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

SHARPE, Justice.

Plaintiff, Leo Larr, filed a petition in the supreme court for an order to show cause why Herman H. Dignan, secretary of State, should not vacate an order suspending plaintiff's operator's license, registration certificate and certificate of title. Upon the filing of the petition, we issued an order to said Herman H. Dignan, secretary of State, to show cause. The return to the order to show cause avers that the action taken by the secretary of State was in compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 3a of Act No. 248, Pub.Acts 1943, Comp.Laws Supp.1945, § 4685-53a, Stat.Ann.1946 Cum.Supp. § 9.1543(1).

The facts which developed the issues in the case at bar are that on the 19th day of January 1946, plaintiff was the owner of a motor vehicle; that on said date the motor vehicle, while being driven by plaintiff's son, was involved in an accident in which two persons were injured; that plaintiff filed a report with the department of State of said accident as required by law, showing among other things that at the time of the accident plaintiff was not carrying public liability insurance; that thereafter a demand was made upon plaintiff by the financial responsibility division of the secretary of State's office to deposit with the office of the secretary of State the sum of $600 cash or security or an affidavit of settlement of all personal injury claims arising out of the accident; that upon the failure of plaintiff to furnish the required security or affidavit of settlement, the financial responsibility division of the secretary of State's office notified him that his license and registration certificates were under suspension; and that coupled with the above notification was a demand for the surrender of plaintiff's operator's license, certificate of registration and certificate of title.

The attorney general's office, representing defendant concedes that under the act in question defendant lacks authority to demand a surrender of plaintiff's certificate of title. In our discussion of the question involved in this case we shall assume that defendant has or will return to plaintiff his certificate of title.

Plaintiff urges that the provisions of section 3a of the act in question only apply in the event of previous final determination of legal liability and liquidation of damages; and that no such determination of legal liability exists in the present case.

Section 3a of Act No. 203, Pub.Acts 1933, Comp.Laws Supp.1945 § 4685-53a, as added by the 1943 act, reads in part:

‘Every person owning or operating a motor vehicle which is in any manner involved in an accident on or after the effective date of this amendment anywhere within the boundaries of this state in which any person is killed or injured shall immediately, if not physically or mentally incapacitated, report said accident in writing to the secretary of state, upon forms prescribed and supplied by him. Such report shall contain the names and addresses of the owners and operators of all motor vehicles involved in said accident, and of all persons injured or killed, the date, time and place of the occurrence and the name of any insurance carrier whose policy of insurance was in force and applicable to the liability of said owner or operator. Failure to furnish said report within 10 days shall...

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21 cases
  • Orr v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 10, 1968
    ...93 Ariz. 273 at p. 279, 380 P.2d 136, particularly Sharp v. Department of Public Safety (La.App.1959) 114 So.2d 121; Larr v. Dignan (1947) 317 MIch. 121, 26 N.W.2d 872; and Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety (1953) 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177; and additionally State v. Finley (1967) ......
  • Shavers v. Kelley
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1978
    ...we might render as to the No-Fault Act's constitutionality."4 See, DeVries v. Secretary of State, supra; Larr v. Secretary of State, 317 Mich. 121, 26 N.W.2d 872 (1947).5 See, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U......
  • People ex rel. Roth v. Younger
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 3, 1950
    ...Michigan authorities are we cited? Mention is made of Surtman v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471; Larr v. Secretary of State, 317 Mich. 121, 26 N.W.2d 872; People v. Thompson, 259 Mich. 109, 242 N.W. 857, in which it was held that in accepting a license from the state to op......
  • Sitz v. Department of State Police
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • September 14, 1993
    ...presented to support it: Mention is made of Surtman v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich 270 [15 N.W.2d 471 (1944) ]; Larr v. Secretary of State, 317 Mich 121 [26 N.W.2d 872 (1947) ]; People v. Thompson, 259 Mich 109 [242 N.W. 857 (1932) ], in which it was held that in accepting a license from t......
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