Larracuente v. United States, 18-CO-308

• Decision Date: 11 July 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-CO-308,18-CO-308
• Citation: 211 A.3d 1140
• Parties: John LARRACUENTE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

211 A.3d 1140

John LARRACUENTE, Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 18-CO-308

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted May 24, 2019

Decided July 11, 2019

Paul H. Zukerberg, Washington, DC, was on the brief for appellant.

Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, T. Anthony Quinn, and Elizabeth Gabriel, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before Glickman and Thompson, Associate Judges, and Washington, Senior Judge.

Thompson, Associate Judge:

Appellant, John Larracuente, moved pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-803.02 (2016) (the "record-sealing statute") to seal the records in Superior Court Case No. 2013-CF2-16339, a case in which he pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute (PWID) marijuana. The Superior Court denied the motion without a hearing, concluding that the government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant possessed an amount of marijuana that exceeded the amount decriminalized under D.C. Code § 48-904.01(a)(1) (2016),¹ and that sealing also was not available under the "interest of justice standard" of § 16-803.02(a)(2). Appellant contends in this appeal that (1) the Superior Court's ruling was based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the record-sealing statute; (2) the government failed to meet its burden of establishing that appellant's conviction was not for conduct that has since been decriminalized; (3) the Superior Court relied on speculation in concluding otherwise; and (4) the court abused its discretion and deprived appellant of due process in denying his motion without a hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

In its filings opposing appellant's motion to seal, the government submitted copies of appellant's plea-proceeding transcript; the police report describing the items seized from appellant's apartment during execution of a search warrant on September 11, 2013; the Drug Enforcement Administration chemical analysis report for the substance seized; the police Gerstein affidavit; and other documents. Although the documents refer to differing estimates or measurements of the weight of the marijuana the police recovered from appellant's apartment, the documents indicate that appellant — who told officers that all of the items in the apartment were his — possessed more than the now-permissible two ounces of marijuana. The Superior Court found that the government established by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had possessed "over the decriminalized amount of marijuana[,]" and that, more likely than not, appellant intended to distribute more than the amount permitted by § 48-904.01(a)(1)(B) (one ounce or less). The court therefore concluded that appellant did not qualify for record-sealing under § 16-803.02(a)(1) or under the "interest of justice standard" of § 16-803.02(a)(2) (giving the Superior Court discretion, in the interest of justice, to seal records relating to a now-decriminalized offense, even if that offense was accompanied by an offense that remains illegal). See Washington v. United States , 206 A.3d 864, 869 (D.C. 2019).

Appellant contends that the Superior Court misapplied § 16-803.02(a) by failing to take a "categorical approach," rather than a case-specific-facts approach, to determine whether the offense of which appellant was convicted had been decriminalized.² Specifically, appellant argues that § 16-803.02(a) should be interpreted to mandate approval of a motion to seal so long as the least culpable act(s) that would satisfy the elements of the offense to which the records relate have been decriminalized. Appellant argues that the case-specific-facts approach creates inequities,³ and that use of a categorical approach is necessary to achieve the remedial effect the Council of the District of Columbia (the "Council") intended in enacting the record-sealing statute. Appellant further contends that the government did not negate the possibility that the marijuana found in his apartment was homegrown (thus falling within the statutory permission to possess marijuana produced by cannabis plants grown in the interior of a home) and also did not prove that appellant's intent to distribute went beyond transferring, without remuneration, one ounce or less of marijuana to another person 21 years of age or older,⁴ and thus failed to prove that his conduct was not decriminalized.

Appellant argues in the alternative that even if sealing was not mandated under § 16-803.02(a)(1), the court erroneously denied him relief under § 16-803.02(a)(2), which he contends makes sealing available in the interest of justice even as to the records of conduct that have not been decriminalized. He seeks an order directing that his records be sealed.

II.

Our review on matters of statutory interpretation is de novo . See Peterson v. United States , 997 A.2d 682, 683 (D.C. 2010). We look first to the statute's plain language to determine if it is "clear and unambiguous." Id. at 684 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the plain language of a statute "is clear and unambiguous and will not produce an absurd result, we will look no further." Pixley v. United States , 692 A.2d 438, 440 (D.C. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the language is ambiguous, we may "turn to legislative history to ensure that [we interpret the statute in a manner that] is consistent with legislative intent." Aboye v. United States , 121 A.3d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We review for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's denial without a hearing of a motion to seal. See V.C.B. v. United States , 37 A.3d 286, 290 (D.C. 2012) ; White v. United States , 582 A.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. 1990). "Whether or not a hearing is held in connection with a motion to seal, a trial court's determinations in connection with that motion constitute findings of fact and are reviewed for clear error." Sepulveda-Hambor v. District of Columbia , 885 A.2d 303, 306–07 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

We turn first to appellant's argument that § 16-803.02(a) must be applied using a "categorical" rather than a case-specific-facts approach. We conclude that the categorical approach cannot be squared with the language of § 16-803.02(a)(1), as explicated by the legislative history.⁵ Section 16-803.02(a)(1) instructs the Superior Court to grant a motion to seal (as to decriminalized or legalized offenses that were not accompanied by other offenses that were not decriminalized or legalized) unless the government bears the burden of "establish[ing] by a preponderance of the evidence that the record is not eligible for sealing pursuant to this section because the conduct was not decriminalized or legalized." § 16-803.02(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The legislative history sets out examples of how eligibility for record-sealing under § 16-803.02(a)(1) will depend on a movant's underlying conduct, not merely on how the conduct was charged. The Report of the Council Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety on Bill 20-467, the "Record Sealing for Decriminalized and Legalized Offenses Act of 2014" (the "Committee Report"), explains:

[T]he act did not decriminalize the public consumption of marijuana. Because the distinction between possession and public consumption of marijuana did not previously exist under D.C. law, as both possession and consumption constituted criminal conduct, a person arrested for the public consumption of marijuana would be charged with marijuana possession. As a result, it is possible that an individual who was arrested for marijuana possession may have been arrested for conduct that was not actually decriminalized. Similarly, an individual arrested for marijuana possession may have been arrested for possessing a quantity of marijuana that remains a crime (i.e. more than one ounce).^{[6 ]} In these cases, the government can submit evidence showing that a record is ineligible for sealing under this bill because the person was arrested, charged, or convicted based on conduct that has not been decriminalized or legalized.

Committee Report at 5.

In the underlying proceedings in issue here, appellant pled guilty to PWID (marijuana). Some individuals convicted of misdemeanor PWID (marijuana) may be eligible to have their records sealed based on the facts surrounding their offenses. But in pleading guilty, appellant admitted that he possessed 1100 grams of "green weed substance" – an amount the Superior Court found was "significantly more" than two ounces of marijuana. Appellant may be correct that he had no motive to contest the specific amount of marijuana described in the government allocution since it was not material to the offense with which he was charged (which required only a measurable amount of marijuana), but the other records that were before the Superior Court corroborated that appellant possessed more than two ounces of marijuana: per the DEA report, the marijuana received for testing totaled over 660 grams; per the Gerstein , the recovered green leafy substance weighed 1189.3 grams.⁷ Using the case-specific-facts approach that we conclude the record-sealing statute mandates, the Superior Court had ample basis for concluding that appellant possessed a quantity of marijuana that has not been decriminalized.

IV.

Appellant contends, however, that the government did not meet its burden of establishing that his possession of more than two ounces of marijuana was not decriminalized, because it did not negate the possibility that the marijuana in his possession might have been the yield from cannabis plants grown in his apartment, making the marijuana lawful to possess under § 48-904.01(a)(1)(D). As the trial court noted, the record contains no evidence that cannabis plants had been growing in the apartment.⁸ Importantly, the record also contains no proffer by appellant to that effect, even though, in his memorandum in support of sealing, appellant told the Superior Court...