Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2013
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SA213
• Citation: 303 P.3d 558
• Parties: Gary LARRIEU, Plaintiff–Appellant: v. BEST BUY STORES, L.P., Defendant–Appellee
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

303 P.3d 558

Gary LARRIEU, Plaintiff–Appellant:

v.BEST BUY STORES, L.P., Defendant–Appellee

Supreme Court Case No. 12SA213

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 24, 2013

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Appeal No. 11–1387

Attorneys for Plaintiff–Appellant: Taussig, Scipione, & Taussig, P.C., Deborah L. Taussig, John G. Taussig, Boulder, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant–Appellee: Montgomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio & Dusbabek, LLP Lori K. Bell, Krista Maher, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We accepted jurisdiction in this case pursuant to C.A.R. 21.1, certification of a question of state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified the following question to us:

Does Colorado's Premises Liability Act (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13–21–115) apply to injuries caused by a defendant–landowner's employee during an activity not directly or inherently related to the land?

Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 491 Fed.Appx. 864, 869 (10th Cir.2012).

¶ 2 Colorado's premises liability statute predicates a cause of action for landowner liability on injury that occurs to a person while on the landowner's property and as a result of the condition of the property or of activities conducted or circumstances existing on the property:

In any civil action brought against a landowner by a person who alleges injury occurring while on the real property of another and by reason of the condition of such property, or activities conducted or circumstances existing on such property, the landowner shall be liable only as provided in subsection (3) of this section.

§ 13–21–115(2), C.R.S. (2012) (emphasis added).

¶ 3 In making its certification, the circuit court stated that its “statement of this question is not meant to limit the Colorado Supreme Court's scope of inquiry and we invite the court to reformulate the question presented in any way it finds helpful.” Larrieu, 491 Fed.Appx. at 869. Upon considering the certified record and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we reformulate the question as follows:

Whether Colorado's premises liability statute, § 13–21–115, C.R.S. (2012), applies as a matter of law only to those activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land?

¶ 4 To this question, we answer “no.” As we have reformulated it, the certified question requires us to interpret the statute and to determine the meaning of the phrase “activities conducted or circumstances existing on such property.” Contrary to Best Buy's argument, we hold that Colorado's premises liability statute is not, as a matter of law, restricted solely to activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land. That restriction does not appear in the statutory language, and we do not adopt it now. But we also reject Larrieu's position, which would read the statute far too broadly, extending its application to any tort that happens to occur on another's property. Instead, we hold that the premises liability statute applies to conditions, activities, and circumstances on the property that the landowner is liable for in its legal capacity as a landowner. See§ 13–21–115(1), (2); Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215, 1221 (Colo.2002). This analysis necessitates a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry into whether: (a) the plaintiff's alleged injury occurred while on the landowner's real property; and (b) the alleged injury occurred by reason of the property's condition or as a result of activities conducted or circumstances existing on the property.

¶ 5 In enacting the premises liability statute, the General Assembly sought both “to protect landowners from liability in some circumstances when they were not protected at common law and to define the instances when liability will be imposed in the manner most consistent with the policies” set forth in the statute. § 13–21–115(1.5)(e). Because it is impossible to delineate every type of incident that might trigger landowner liability under the statute, whether the plaintiff's alleged injury occurred by reason of activities conducted or circumstance existing on the property depends on the specific facts alleged by the plaintiff in a given case. To defeat a claim brought under the statute, the defendant “landowner” may rebut these allegedfacts in the same way it may rebut alleged facts concerning whether the plaintiff's alleged injury occurred on the defendant “landowner's” property.

¶ 6 This is not to say that such determinations must always be left for the trier of fact. As in all cases, summary judgment is appropriate where the trial court determines that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

I. Undisputed Facts and Prior Proceedings

¶ 7 According to the Tenth Circuit's certification, the following facts of this case are undisputed: On October 21, 2008, Gary Larrieu and his daughter arrived at a Best Buy warehouse in Aurora, Colorado, to pick up a freezer he purchased the previous day in a Best Buy retail store. Larrieu brought a truck with an attached trailer that would allow him to transport the freezer in an upright position. Together, Larrieu and a Best Buy employee, Stanley Monroe, removed the trailer's tailgate, which was too heavy for one person to lift alone. As Larrieu walked backwards, carrying one end of the gate, he tripped over a curb and fell when the employee kept carrying the tailgate forward towards the curb. The gate landed on top of Larrieu, causing a compression fracture of his lumbar spine.

¶ 8 Larrieu sued Best Buy in Colorado state court, alleging that he suffered personal injury on its property when the company, through its employee, violated the duty of care Best Buy owed him under Colorado's premises liability statute. Best Buy removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. After concluding that “[t]his case turns on whether this activity [ i.e., a Best Buy employee carrying a heavy tailgate with a customer while the customer walked backward] constitutes an activity conducted on Defendant's property within the meaning of the premises liability statute,” the federal district court determined that the statute “imposes liability on landowners only for activities inherently related to the land.” Larrieu, No. 10–CV–01883–CMA–BNB, 2011 WL 3157011, at *2 (D.Colo. July 27, 2011). The court granted Best Buy's motion for summary judgment, ruling that, even if the Best Buy employee “had an obligation to properly guide [Larrieu] as he walked backward with a heavy gate, his failure to do so is not an activity inherently related to the land,” so Larrieu could not recover under the premises liability statute. Id. at 3–4.

¶ 9 Larrieu appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Noting that this case presents “a close question” of state law and an “important and novel [question] of state legal policy,” the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified to us the question of whether our premises liability statute applies “to injuries caused by a defendant-landowner's employee during an activity not directly or inherently related to the land.” Larrieu, 491 Fed.Appx. at 868.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Upon considering the certified record and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we reformulate the question to ask whether the Colorado premises liability statute applies as a matter of law only to those activities and circumstances that are directly or inherently related to the land. As we have reformulated it, the certified question requires us to interpret the statute and to determine the meaning of the phrase “activities conducted or circumstances existing on such property.” We answer “no” to the certified question.

¶ 11 We begin our analysis with a short discussion of the principles of statutory construction and the general purpose of the premises liability statute. We then apply our analysis to the reformulated certified question before us.

A. Principles of Statutory Construction

¶ 12 In construing a statute, we ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly's intent. In re Miranda, 2012 CO 69, ¶ 9, 289 P.3d 957, 960; see alsoAssociated Gov'ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2012 CO 28, ¶ 11, 275 P.3d 646, 649. We apply the plain meaning of the statutory language, give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, and construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory design. Miranda, 289 P.3d at 960. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we employ additional tools of statutory construction. Id.; see also§ 2–4–203, C.R.S. (2012).¹ We avoid interpretations that would produce absurd results. Miranda, 289 P.3d at 960; S. Ute Indian Tribe v. King Consol. Ditch Co., 250 P.3d 1226, 1233 (Colo.2011); see also§ 2–4–201(1)(c), (e), C.R.S. (2012).²

¶ 13 When the General Assembly legislates in a particular area, we presume it was aware of existing case law precedent. Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo.2004); Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1219. We generally construe statutes as consistent with the common law. See Vigil, 103 P.3d at 327. On the other hand, we acknowledge and respect the General Assembly's authority to modify the common law by statute. Id.

B. Colorado Premises Liability Statute

¶ 14 The premises liability statute delineates duties owed by landowners to third persons who enter on the land under circumstances that cause those persons to be categorized as trespassers, licensees, or invitees. Trailside Townhome Ass'n, Inc. v. Acierno, 880 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Colo.1994). This statute applies to actions against a landowner for personal injuries occurring on its property when the landowner breaches the duty of care it owes to a plaintiff. Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 803 (Colo.2000). In enacting the...